Summer 2001 Review by War College, The U.S. Naval
Naval War College Review
Volume 54
Number 3 Summer Article 30
2001
Summer 2001 Review
The U.S. Naval War College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
repository.inquiries@usnwc.edu.
Recommended Citation





















EV IRI B U S   M AR I   V I C
T OR
I A
NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Summer 2001















War College: Summer 2001 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Cover
In one of his best-known presentations,
“The Future Security Environment: Chal-
lenges to Maritime Security,” the President
of the Naval War College, Vice Admiral
Arthur K. Cebrowski, offers several ways
of conceptualizing the “domain” in which
the U.S. Navy operates. “Of them, a less
traditional, but compelling, approach is
electronic. If one plots on a blank sheet of
paper the location of radio emissions re-
lated to commerce, the result is a map of
the world, with very prominent zones co-
inciding with conflict fault-lines. An
analysis of the world’s finely tuned net-
work of shipping produces a pattern com-
plementary with the zones of most intense
electronic activity. . . . All this produces a
coherent pattern, one that suggests that
the U.S. Navy will continue to be forward
deployed and that gives a pretty good in-
dication of where those deployments will
be.” Our cover (adapted from the briefing
graphic, produced by the College’s Graph-
ics Department, to which the Admiral
spoke) depicts that coherent pattern and,
in so doing, points to this issue’s focal
theme—forward deployment and the
U.S. Navy. Dr. Daniel Gouré of the
Lexington Institute challenges the neces-
sity for forward deployment and the ca-
pacity of the Navy to maintain it. Prof.
James F. Miskel, of the Naval War Col-
lege faculty, takes a different view, accept-
ing the requirement but arguing the need
for a rigorous (ideally economic) metric if
the U.S. Navy is to “be there” in the
places in which it can best support the na-
tion’s interests.
An early iteration of the Admiral’s pre-
sentation was reprinted as our Summer
1999 “President’s Notes.” A link to the
graphics can be found on the College’s
home page, http://www.nwc.navy.mil.
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Vice Admiral Cebrowski commanded Fighter Squadron
41 and Carrier Air Wing 8, both embarked in USS
Nimitz (CVN 68). He later commanded the assault
ship USS Guam (LPH 9) and, during Operations
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, the aircraft carrier
USS Midway (CV 41). Following promotion to flag
rank he became Commander, Carrier Group 6 and
Commander, USS America Battle Group. In addition
to combat deployments to Vietnam and the Persian
Gulf, he has deployed in support of United Nations
operations in Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. He has served
with the U.S. Air Force; the staff of Commander in
Chief, Atlantic Fleet; the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations, on four occasions; with the Joint Staff
(as J6); and as Director, Navy Space, Information War-
fare, and Command and Control (N6). Vice Admiral
Cebrowski became the forty-seventh President of the
Naval War College in July 1998.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
America’s international status and global interests require that
our forces have as their operating domain not only the majority of
the earth’s surface, but also the skies and space above, the ocean
depths below, and the electronic environment we think of as
cyberspace.
THE TITLE OF THESE NOTES might well be “Stronghold Lost.”
During our March intersessional conference, the importance of geography in
the Information Age was debated. The U.S. military has already demonstrated
that, as information is substituted for mass, military forces can respond more
rapidly and overcome many of the traditional impediments imposed by geogra-
phy. We further hear that in Information Age war the occupation of terrain may
not always be a legitimate objective of military operations. These arguments
combine to challenge traditional thinking about the priority of geogra-
phy—strategically, operationally, and tactically. Care must be taken lest we make
judgments which are too broad, resulting in decisions which increase risk.
The concept of a stronghold is closely linked to key elements of geography in
both time and space. Strongholds are places of security for friendly forces, areas
that the enemy cannot reach and his forces cannot effectively threaten. This con-
cept is deeply imbedded in military thinking. Traditionally, strongholds were
situated where geographic features suggested, as at West Point on the Hudson
River during the American Revolution or Fort McHenry protecting Baltimore’s
Inner Harbor in 1814; sometimes, however, they were created as military expe-
dience dictated, as in “circling the wagons” on the American Great Plains. Either
way, to be able to fight from a stronghold is a great advantage. To allow an enemy
a stronghold is to yield to him some degree of control over the initial conditions
of an engagement. Because of the way that a war proceeds, small changes in initial
conditions can result in profound changes in outcome. This is why controlling
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the initial conditions, holding the initiative, and fighting from strongholds are
so important.
More than ten years ago, historian Colin Gray asserted that America has had
the wonderful blessing of never having to fight for its survival at the start of a
war. To put it bluntly, America has become accustomed to playing “away games.”
Bordered by two vast oceans and two friendly neighbors, America has enjoyed
the great strategic advantage of being a secure stronghold. With that advantage,
America has decided which wars to fight and whether to win or lose them. But
now, many argue that even if Gray still is right today, he will not be so for long:
the preferred American way of war is increasingly at risk.
The prospect of national vulnerability affects the security policies and deci-
sions of the new administration. It casts a different light on the controversial
subject of missile defense and places it in the context of a far larger issue. The loss
of the homeland stronghold indicates a requirement for a broad program, of
which missile defense is but a part. A global power with global interests quite
naturally wants to be able to use all the instruments of national power for policy
purposes ranging from homeland defense through the projection of national
values. But, in the case of America, the growing vulnerability of our nation itself
may restrict, if not exclude, some options at all levels of security planning.
Our national preference (and a moral imperative) is to deliberate at length
whether to go to war. Once war is decided upon, this nation traditionally builds a
coalition, preferably including nations near the scene of action, and moves
forces forward en masse. A forward stronghold is created with the acquiescence
and assistance of coalition partners in the region. Alternatively, a stronghold can
be created at sea. Commanders maneuver their forces to create secure opera-
tional zones if only for brief, necessary periods.
Thus, we see the concept of stronghold manifested at the strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical levels of war. Americans prefer this approach for the same
reason that potential enemies seek to prevent us from using it. In fact, we like the
concept of strongholds so much that the nation is willing to go to extraordinary
lengths to create and maintain them. I hardly need to remind readers that in
World War II we suspended the civil rights of Japanese-Americans because their
very presence was thought to be an internal threat to the national stronghold.
During the Cold War, we adopted the seemingly perverse strategy of mutually
assured destruction in the hope that, with both sides’ strongholds vulnerable to
devastation, neither side would dare attack at that level.
Today, for example, at the highest governmental level the use of chemical or
biological weapons is declared to be unacceptable, and it is a national goal that
certain technologies will not be allowed to proliferate. By invoking prohibitions
in this way the nation seeks to establish universally acknowledged strongholds.
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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A strategic example is the decision to dominate the sea, air, space, and cyberspace
as operating domains. At the level of grand strategy we speak of the concept of
“projecting defense” as a means of coalition creation and assurance. This defen-
sive concept extends to the operational level of war when we employ forward
basing, either ashore or afloat. At the tactical level of war, strongholds can be cre-
ated in locale with maneuver, or in time with speed. The techniques used nor-
mally depend on the physics of the systems involved and on the environment.
Tactically, the duration of a stronghold may need to be only seconds, or perhaps less.
What are the implications for the Navy? From the perspective of strategy, the
Navy must train, equip, and operate to maximize its capabilities in its operating
domain. America’s international status and global interests require that our
forces have as their operating domain not only the majority of the earth’s surface,
but also the skies and space above, the ocean depths below, and the electronic
environment we think of as cyberspace. Here, the U.S. Navy must predominate.
At the operational level of war, the Navy must guarantee both speed of de-
ployment and speed of employment of force. Time lost in the creation of a
stronghold in effect grants a stronghold to the enemy. This suggests a need for
forces which are capable of clearing distant seas of mines and enemy subma-
rines, while projecting air and missile defense and essential elements of the joint
force, including sensors and command and control capabilities, all at high speed
in the opening days or even hours of a conflict.
The critical planning requirement at the tactical level of war is to offset the
emerging condition of tactical instability. Tactical instability occurs when unit
or force capability is allowed to increase disproportionately to survivability,
which is staying power under stress. What tactical instability produces is a force
which has to be risk averse. Such a force is unable to conduct sustained opera-
tions in heavily contested areas; by extension, then, it is unable to support other
elements of the joint force in such areas. In the case of the U.S. Navy, if highly ca-
pable units are too vulnerable to operate in littoral regions, the Navy cannot per-
form missions itself nor support joint and coalition forces in those regions. The
point is not that the Navy must be able to create a permanent geographic strong-
hold in the close-in littoral for any and every purpose, but that it must be able to
fight and sustain forces whenever and wherever that is required. The conse-
quence of tactical instability will be that an enemy will enjoy the advantages of
operating from a stronghold, one that contains the vast majority of the world’s
population, the sources of much of the world’s wealth, and the termini of the
world’s most critical networks.
We—not our enemies—must fight from the strongholds of the future. To do
so will require a profound comprehension of tomorrow’s battlespace, from the
complexities of urban combat to the intricacies of orbital dynamics, and from
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 9
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the details of electromagnetic propagation to the subtleties of an adversary’s
motivations. Will we be able to establish strongholds wherever and whenever
the United States may need them? That is the challenge now being posed to to-
morrow’s leaders.
ARTHUR K. CEBROWSKI
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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THE TYRANNY OF FORWARD PRESENCE
Daniel Gouré
Aspecter is haunting U.S. Navy strategic and force planning. It is the specterof forward presence, the continual deployment of Navy and Marine Corps
units in waters adjacent to foreign littorals. Although the Navy speaks of its
central purpose as maritime power projection, it is forward presence, particu-
larly in peacetime, that drives both force structure requirements and operations
tempo. The demands placed on both force structure and operations tempo by
the Navy’s long-standing commitment to maintain forward presence in
multiple regions have been exacerbated in the past few years by that institution’s
desire to extend its area of influence to both littoral waters and the land beyond.
The ever-increasing scope of forward presence exerts a tyrannical hold on the
future of the Navy, a hold that threatens—in an era of constrained defense bud-
gets and rapidly changing threats—to break the force.
The general argument for forward presence as a
cardinal principle of Navy strategic planning is that
“shaping” the international environment is a neces-
sary and appropriate mission for the U.S. military in
general, and the Navy in particular.1 The military is
not alone in believing in the importance of the
“shaping” mission. Under various rubrics, this im-
petus was central to the Clinton administration’s
articulation of national security policy and national
military strategy.2 Were this only the view of one ad-
ministration, it could be readily dismissed as inter-
national social work.3 But a growing chorus of voices
in the academic and analytic communities argues
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that U.S. defense planning should emphasize “shaping” functions. Some are so
bold as to speak of a new role for U.S. forces in terms of “what can only be
termed ‘imperial policing.’ ”4
The myth that the world is in dire need of shaping or policing derives from
the proposition that with the end of the Cold War the forces that had dampened
disorder and disunity ceased to function. This “chaos theory” increasingly per-
vades all the services and the Department of Defense as well, but the Navy and
Marine Corps have been among its chief proponents. Here is but one example of
the Navy–Marine Corps view:
Never again will the United States exist in a bipolar world whose nuclear shadow
suppressed nationalism and ethnic tensions. The international system, in some re-
spects, reverted to the world our ancestors knew. A world of disorder. Somalia,
Bosnia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq, and the Taiwan Straits are examples of continu-
ing crises we now face. Some might call this period an age of chaos.5
But is this Hobbesian vision real? Has the world reverted in the last decade to
a state of nature, from some prior regime of civility, or at least restraint? The
Middle East suffered four Arab-Israeli wars prior to the end of the Cold War. For
decades, Iraq engaged in predatory behavior toward its neighbors—producing
most notably a ten-year bloodbath with Iran—before deciding to invade Ku-
wait. India and Pakistan have several wars to their account, the last in 1971, as
well as chronic conflict over Kashmir. The Taiwan Straits is a military problem
not because of the end of the Cold War but because of China’s arms buildup and
the failure of the United States to provide countervailing capabilities to Taiwan.
The civil and regional wars of Africa are largely consequences of colonization
and the rivalries of the Cold War itself.
Many once-fractious parts of the world have become more stable over the past
decade. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the downfall of the Soviet Union
eliminated the major supporter of international terrorism. Thereafter, the in-
ability of Russia to provide cheap conventional weapons to client states also re-
duced regional arms races dramatically. Lack of arms may have reduced as well
the aggressive tendency of such former client states as Syria, Libya, Iraq, and
Iran. One can point even to recent events on the Korean Peninsula as a direct,
albeit delayed, result of Pyongyang’s loss of its Soviet godfather.
Where problems have arisen, it is not clear that the end of the Cold War was
the catalytic event. It is difficult, for instance, to establish a correlation between
the end of the Cold War and the rise of militant Islam. Further, events in Indone-
sia have had less to do with the rise and fall of superpowers than with the conse-
quences of the Asian economic crisis (during which, it must be noted, the
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Treasury Department did more to maintain stability than all the U.S. forces de-
ployed to the region).
Current military planning has somewhat tempered its earlier “Boschian”
vision of global chaos, asserting now that it is the uncertainty of our time and
the difficulty of predicting the future security environment that necessitates a
strategy of power projection
based on forward presence.6 The
fault, in that view, lies not in the
unstable nature of the external
world but in our inability to
forecast the future accurately. For planning purposes, uncertainty may be as
good as chaos. In some respects it is even better, since—as the services’ planning
documents note—it requires that the military maintain capabilities to address
all threats.
This sense of chaos, or even mere uncertainty, masks what is really happen-
ing: a restructuring of the international environment, the creation of a new in-
ternational system.7 We know from history that such restructuring is long,
complex, and often quite messy. Wherever we look, in each of the critical regions
of the world, the character of the relations among the dominant powers has yet
to be firmly set, much less put on a course toward stable, positive, and
peaceful relations. Western Europe is waiting to see if a closer union, and with it
an incipient common security and defense identity, can be effected. Nato expan-
sion is confronting the question of Russia’s legitimate security interests in
Eastern Europe. China’s role in East Asia is being defined by Beijing—witness
the 1999 military maneuvers and missile launches against Taiwan—in ways that
must make all of its neighbors nervous; how China acts will determine to a large
extent the behavior of others in the region. The relationship between India and
Pakistan is as tense as it has ever been; increasingly, both states see the need to
reach out to other powers of the Middle East and Asia in order to strengthen
their positions in their own rivalry. Finally, the future of the political and secu-
rity relationships in the Persian Gulf is frozen, and it will be as long as Iraq and
Iran remain pariah states and the United States is required to maintain a military
presence in the area.
Historically, the creation of new international orders has been dominated by
major economic and military powers. This current period of evolution appears
to be no different. In prior periods of reorganization, emerging powers have
sought ways to shift regional and even global power balances in their favor, pro-
voking similar behavior by their adversaries. (It is in this light that we need to
look with some concern at current Russian and Chinese efforts to forge a new
strategic alliance.)
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Certain regions will be most important in the development of the new inter-
national order. For future U.S. policy, three regions are of vital importance: Eu-
rope, from the Atlantic to Russia’s borders; the Pacific Rim, from Korea through
Southeast Asia; and South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Those regions have three
things that set them apart from the rest of the world. First, they contain the over-
whelming predominance of global wealth, economic activity, and technological
investments. Second, they are the loci of vital U.S. allies and of economic inter-
ests that must be protected. Third, they each border on one or more of the
emerging potential competitor states.
The United States is the sole global power; it has interests in every region of
the world and vital interests in each of them.8 Thus, while it is difficult to identify
where confrontations will arise, the sheer breadth and scope of U.S. interests
abroad provide more than a few reasons that this nation may find itself at basic
odds with local adversaries. Indeed, at least one major study of U.S. foreign pol-
icy in the next century argues that the foremost U.S. interest in Asia and Europe
is to prevent the domination of those regions by adversarial powers.9 Therefore,
the United States could find itself in confrontations with rising powers as it seeks
to preserve regional balances of power or American access. This would be partic-
ularly likely should, as has been the case in the past, a powerful regional state
threaten U.S. allies. The United States is likely to be the only nation that can
provide sufficient military support to enable these allies to deter or, if necessary,
defeat such an adversary.
It is true that the post–Cold War world has demonstrated a degree of disor-
derliness. But it can hardly be said that the world has entered a period of mount-
ing chaos. Nor can it be claimed that U.S. decision makers and planners are
paralyzed by uncertainty. They continue to make decisions and set priorities on
force structure, regional deployments, and future acquisitions with a great deal
of self-assurance. The chaos/uncertainty argument, then, serves largely as a
means of defending the military against the increasingly evident need to make
hard choices with respect to current missions and future capabilities. For the
Navy, the validity of the doctrine of forward presence represents one of those
hard choices.
SHOULD THE NAVY MAINTAIN A STRATEGY OF
FORWARD PRESENCE?
It is not clear that the U.S. military should focus its planning and force-building
around forward presence, much less “imperial policing.” The idea that military
forces can shape the political environment in regions in which they are deployed
has become fashionable as a result of the rise of an issues-based approach to
national security policy.10 Many of these issues are sociopolitical in nature, and
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their solutions fall, broadly speaking, under the heading of “shaping.” The trend
toward employing military forces for political purposes has been given addi-
tional impetus by the activism of the regional commanders in chief (such as
those of Pacific Command or Central Command), which has grown as the power
of the State Department and U.S. ambassadors to conduct foreign policy has de-
clined.11 (One of the potential consequences of their use of forward-deployed
forces for political purposes was highlighted by the USS Cole incident.)
It is for these reasons, then, that the U.S. military is increasingly focused on
and driven by the demands of peacetime and crisis forward presence. The prob-
lem of maintaining forward presence has been a crucial factor, for instance, in
the U.S. Air Force’s creation of a new organization centered on ten aerospace ex-
peditionary forces. The U.S. Army is undergoing its own transformation, seek-
ing to become more responsive and deployable. Each of the services is investing
in capabilities to make rapid forward presence easier to establish, whether for
major conflicts or smaller contingencies.
In particular, and without question, forward presence has served the Navy
well. Forward presence provides a defensible rationale for force sizing, a matter
of particular importance in the absence of a threat.12 In any case, the Navy func-
tions best when it is under way, and as long as it is steaming, it might as well do so
where it might be needed.
The idea of forward presence, however, is for the Navy more than a bureaucratic
convenience; it is an article of faith. According to the Navy’s own Strategic Planning
Guidance, “By remaining forward, combat-credible naval expeditionary forces
guarantee that the landward reach of U.S. influence is present to favorably shape
the international environment.” In the Navy’s view, forward-deployed naval
forces discourage challenges to U.S. interests, deter would-be aggressors, and,
should deterrence fail, provide means for a timely response. For these reasons,
the Navy argues, it could play a new and unique role in U.S. national security.
But for this to be true, forward presence has to be the Navy’s central mission.13
For a number of reasons, tying the future of the Navy to forward presence is
problematic. The concept of “shaping” the international environment is fuzzy at
best. Too often it has extended well beyond traditional notions of security to in-
volve, inter alia, attempts to influence the internal politics of failing states, ef-
forts to address almost intractable socioeconomic problems, and engagement in
what are classic policing functions. Looked at this way, Navy combat forces seem
to have little relevance.14 The forces that would seem to be most useful in the
social-work and policing dimensions of forward presence are those generally
classed as “combat support” or “combat service support” (e.g., engineer, mili-
tary police, logistical, and medical units).
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The term “forward presence” too is subject to interpretation and competing
definitions. In its narrow sense, the emphasis is on forward—it simply means the
deployment of forces in proximity to locations of interest to U.S. security and
foreign policy. A broader definition, focusing on the word presence, suggests
more complex and political purposes, for which presence generally needs to be
nearly continuous and highly visible—requirements that can limit both the flex-
ibility and the combat effectiveness of the forces engaged.
Leaving aside for the moment the question of what constitutes a combat-credible
force, it is fair to ask what evidence there is that naval forward presence helps to
shape the international environment. One can acknowledge that military forces
can perform tasks that are essentially political in nature, such as demonstrating
resolve and commitment. The objective of these tasks is different from that of
forward presence, as narrowly defined above.
Advocates of forward presence as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy must
acknowledge that there is no empirical evidence to support their case. This is
particularly true for naval forward presence. While various theories have been
propounded as to the relationship
between the pursuit of national
objectives, the protection of re-
gional interests, the suppression
of sources of regional instability,
and forward presence, none has
any real data to support it.15 It has
been possible to show in certain instances some relationship between the ebb
and flow of economic indicators and the deployment of U.S. forces; however,
these cases involve the deployment of forces after crises or conflicts have started.16
Such analyses have not been able to demonstrate the usefulness of peacetime
forward presence as a mechanism for preventing conflicts and shaping regional
environments. As one analyst (in fact, an advocate of naval power) noted a few
years ago, “The interesting fact is that there is virtually little or no evidence, anal-
ysis and rigorous examination on which to make a fair and objective assessment
of the benefits, costs, advantages and downsides of presence. . . . [T]he record is
at best ambiguous regarding the utility, benefits and disadvantages of naval
presence.”17
Even the projection of maritime power may not serve to shape the environ-
ment or resolve a regional crisis. The history of the U.S. presence in the Persian
Gulf in the 1980s—including Operation EARNEST WILL, the ill-fated attempt
to protect oil shipments by reflagging foreign-registry tankers—does not sup-
port the thesis that naval forward presence exercises a positive influence on re-
gional dynamics. Similarly, it is considered self-evident in Navy circles that the
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deployment of two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits region ended the 1996
crisis. At least one post-incident assessment suggests otherwise.18
In addition to the shaping function, the Navy asserts, forward presence
provides unique operational advantages. The Navy makes a strong case that
such deployments are critical enablers of joint warfare, through a combination
of sea control and maritime power projection; for instance, where land bases are
not available, naval forces can become alternative bases. Naval power-projection
capabilities, in this view, are likely to be less vulnerable to adversary attack than
land bases. Even here, however, the other services have attempted to make cases
that forward presence can be accomplished in other ways and with different
means.19
The land-versus-sea-base argument has been going on for a long time, with
no resolution in sight. It is sufficient here to point out that the fact that naval for-
ward presence may be needed if land bases are not available does not make it the
preferred solution. Indeed, when the stakes are sufficiently grave or vital inter-
ests and allies are threatened, it is unlikely that U.S. political and military leaders
will rely solely on naval forward presence. To put it bluntly, if land bases are nec-
essary, they will be found or even seized. This is an often-overlooked lesson of
the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign. In this connection, the Navy itself
speaks of its role as that of an enabler, suggesting that it is the responsibility of
the other services—those that require land basing—to win a war. In that light, it
is not clear that allies will find the simple presence of naval units offshore
adequate. U.S. “boots on the ground” have reassured allies for some fifty
years as indications that the United States is willing to share equally in the risks
of resisting aggression.
At the very minimum, the Navy needs to rethink how it describes the forward-
presence mission.20 Justifying forward presence in terms of the ability to shape
the international environment raises questions of how relevant the current Navy
force structure is to that purpose. Moreover, it risks promising more than the
Navy can deliver, at least in terms of demonstrable impact. Also, because for-
ward presence is tied to a particular national security strategy, it may be ren-
dered less relevant if the new administration formulates a new, more restrained
strategy.
It is, then, difficult to see continuous, peacetime forward presence as anything
other than a vehicle for defending the Navy’s desired force structure. The political
rationale is weak at best, and holding on to it may undermine the Navy’s case for
more capable forces in the future. One naval officer appears to have recognized
the danger in a recent article: “If . . . naval forward presence forces have but small
roles in crisis response and contingencies, such forces are luxuries that may have
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some relevance in peacetime diplomacy but little usefulness in crisis and war.
This is not an impression that bodes well for the future of a military service.”21
CAN THE NAVY MAINTAIN A STRATEGY OF
FORWARD PRESENCE?
Even if it were obvious that forward presence is an important tool of U.S. na-
tional security strategy, there are reasons to believe that it will not be possible to
continue it for long. Forward presence places inordinate and, in the current bud-
getary environment, unsustainable physical demands on the Navy. Some fixed
and substantial number of ships is necessary to maintain a fraction of them on
station continually. For every ship deployed, the U.S. Navy requires between
three and five more in rotation: steaming to or from the deployment area; in
overhaul; in port for leave and repair; and “working up” in local training exer-
cises. All that in turn translates into a minimum required budget. It is clear that
the Navy will not have a large enough budget, and thus not enough ships. Vice
Admiral Edmund Giambastiani was reported to have pegged the Navy–Marine
Corps annual procurement budget at between twenty-eight and thirty-four
billion dollars annually, far above the twenty-two-billion average for the past
decade.22 The lower procurement number translates into reduced ship construc-
tion and, inevitably, a navy of fewer than three hundred ships. Even if additional
funds and an adequate number of ships were available, changes to the threat en-
vironments in regions where forward naval presence is now practiced raise ques-
tions as to its wisdom.
All naval forces are subject to the terrible tyranny of distance. It takes time for
ships to sail from their home ports to deployment areas. Nowhere are the dis-
tances to be traveled greater than in the Pacific. Whereas it typically takes a U.S.
warship about eleven days to travel from the East Coast to its assigned station in
the Mediterranean, the same deployment can take up to twenty days from the
West Coast of the United States to the littoral waters of the Asian landmass.
No other navy is so tyrannized by its strategy and geography as that of the
United States. Every other naval power is concerned largely with the protection
of its own coastlines and nearby waters. Only the United States is confronted
with the need to project naval power eight to ten thousand miles to areas of
concern. The farther away a deployment area is from home ports, the more ships
are required in order that a given number can be continually present. Hence a
strategy that emphasizes forward presence inevitably puts additional strain on
an already-overstretched U.S. Navy.
From a force of nearly six hundred ships in the late 1980s, the Navy has been
reduced to a little over three hundred ships today, of which approximately 45
percent must be under way in order to meet current peacetime responsibilities.
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This places enormous strain not only on the ships but on the men and women
who serve aboard them. At the same time, because of reduced funds for ship-
building, the average age of the Navy’s vessels is increasing; accordingly, break-
downs become more frequent,
maintenance costs rise, and avail-
ability rates decline. However
valuable forward presence may
be in the Pentagon’s internecine
budget battles, it can impose in-
tolerable stress on a service that is asked to perform missions for which it is
underequipped. When forward presence becomes a burden to the very service
that is its chief proponent, it is time to rethink the whole proposition.
The Navy understands the problem. In testimony before the House of Repre-
sentatives in 2000, Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, declared that “it is no secret that our current resources of 316 ships
are fully deployed and in many cases stretched thin to meet the growing national
security demands.”23 This is not merely the view from headquarters. Admiral
Dennis McGinn, commander of the Third Fleet, stated before Congress in Feb-
ruary 2000 that “force structure throughout the Navy is such that an increased
commitment anywhere necessitates reduction of operations somewhere else, or
a quality of life impact due to increased operating tempo.”24 The commander of
the U.S. Fifth Fleet, operating in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, said it best:
Although I am receiving the necessary forces to meet Fifth Fleet obligations, the fleet
is stretched and I am uncertain how much longer the Navy can continue to juggle
forces to meet the varied regional requirements, including Fifth Fleet’s. I am uncer-
tain that we have the surge capability to meet a major theater contingency, or theater
war. Eventually, the increased operational tempo on our fewer and fewer ships will
take its toll on their availability and readiness.25
The reality is that numbers matter. The U.S. Navy is critically short of ships;
it does not have enough to maintain a full-time, combat-credible naval presence
in regions of interest to the U.S. and provide the necessary surge capability for
crisis or war. As a result of recent events like Kosovo, for which the western Pa-
cific was stripped of its aircraft carrier, public and congressional attention has
been focused on the inadequacy of the Navy’s inventory of carriers. Further, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have published a study concluding that the nation requires
sixty-eight attack submarines instead of the fifty that have been allowed. A
recent surface combatant study concludes that the Navy requires up to 139
multimission warships in order to satisfy the full range of requirements and
carry out day-to-day operations; instead, the Navy has been allowed only 116.
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At least a quarter of its surface combatants are aging frigates and older destroyers
that lack offensive and defensive capabilities essential to a twenty-first-century
navy. Speaking of the lack of surface combatants, one senior naval officer has
been quoted as saying, “We know we are broken. We are running our ships into
the ground, our missions are expanding and our force structure is being driven
down to 116 surface ships. We have to address it before we hit the precipice.”26
Unfortunately, without significantly higher defense budgets, there is no pos-
sibility that the Navy will be able to acquire the ships and submarines it needs to
maintain its current forward presence posture. It is already evident that U.S.
defense spending is well short of what will be required to maintain the existing
force structure. The United States
must be willing to spend on aver-
age 4 percent of its gross domestic
product (GDP) to support fully
the force recommended by the
Quadrennial Defense Review over the next twenty years, fiscal years (FY) 2001–20.
In fact, however, based on the current FY 2002 budget submission to Congress,
defense spending will fall from 2.9 percent of GDP in FY 2000 to 2.4 percent in
FY 2010, and to 2 percent in 2020.27
The Congressional Budget Office reports that the Defense Department is
faced with annual budget shortfalls of fifty-two to seventy-seven billion dollars.
General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before
Congress in October 2000 that the military services had estimated that they will
need at least $48.5 billion more each year. The Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitten
Peters, asserted in a recent interview that the U.S. military needed some $100
billion over current spending levels in order to replace aging equipment and
maintain or improve operational readiness.28 Unless real annual defense spending
is increased well above the current $310 billion at some time during this decade,
the president and Congress will be left with little choice but to make additional
personnel cuts, force structure reductions, and base closures.
The Navy will suffer severely if such projections, and others, of budgetary
shortfalls are even approximately accurate. A recent Navy study warned that
procurement was short some eight-five billion dollars for the period 2008–20,
with the shipbuilding budget likely to be underfunded by some four billion
annually, and naval aviation by $3.3 billion.29 These shortfalls could result in a
Navy one-third to one-half its present size by the year 2010.
If the force cannot be recapitalized, perhaps it can be modernized or trans-
formed, thereby avoiding the problem of finding the necessary additional funds.
A number of analytic and political writers have advocated “skipping genera-
tions” in procurement in order to focus attention and resources on revolutionary
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Were “shaping” only the view of one adminis-
tration, it could be readily dismissed as inter-
national social work.
24
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 30
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/30
capabilities. Unhappily, the idea of skipping a generation is a fantasy. There is an
illusion among its advocates that the current force will last the additional
twenty-odd years while the transformation takes place. In fact, however, the
funds necessary to support a transformation can be freed up only if current
forces and near-term acquisitions are sharply reduced. Reducing forces and ac-
quisitions now will only make the conduct of current operations, including for-
ward presence, more difficult. Moreover, reducing the acquisitions will seriously
damage the defense industrial base, on which the services will have to rely for the
production of next-generation equipment.
Budgetary strictures also constrain the fielding of the advanced capabilities
forward-deployed forces will need if they are to be combat credible and surviv-
able. The Navy acknowledges that the threat to its forward-deployed forces is
serious and likely to grow substantially worse over the next few decades.30 This
means that combatants built for the Cold War are increasingly vulnerable,
particularly in littoral waters. The Navy will need to invest in a host of new
technologies enhancing both the offensive and defensive power of the fleet;
otherwise, forward presence will be not merely an expensive conceit but a truly
dangerous fetish. Yet it is not clear that either the technology or the resources
will be available. The demand that the Navy operate forward in peacetime, then,
exerts a perverse effect, forcing on the Navy an expensive modernization/trans-
formation effort that may in the end prove unsuccessful, if only due to a lack of funds.
It must also be recognized that even if transformation is possible, it will
take decades to complete. As a result, today’s Navy will be required to execute the
forward-presence strategy ten and even twenty years into the future. If, as is
argued by advocates of transformation, today’s Navy will be the wrong force
with which to maintain forward presence or contest littoral waters, it seems ob-
vious that the problem is not with the force but with the demand that the Navy
continue to base its strategy on forward presence. The Navy must seek ways
other than slavish obedience to the tyranny of forward presence to pursue its
strategic objectives and support national security.
There remains a final question. Facing a growing littoral threat, depending on
large “Cold War era” ships and submarines, and recognizing the effort by some
potential adversaries to acquire “green” and even “blue-water” capabilities, why
does the Navy continue to emphasize forward presence? It would seem reckless,
to say the least, to continue to pursue a demanding strategy with declining re-
sources of the wrong type. Moreover, it would seem to be a waste of the single
advantage that the U.S. Navy possesses and that will remain uncontested for de-
cades to come: its ability to dominate the open oceans.
Operating in close-in waters would appear to provide littoral adversaries
with an unacceptable advantage. The desire of potential adversaries to contest
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the U.S. Navy for control of these waters suggests that it would be foolhardy for
the Navy to sail into that trap.
THE FUTURE OF FORWARD PRESENCE
The future of forward presence, then, appears uncertain at best. The American
people’s patience with the idea that the United States can shape an international
environment to suit its sensibilities appears to be wearing thin. A more judicious
approach to the application of military power in the service of foreign policy
will inevitably lead to a reduced requirement for forward presence. Where
peacetime forward presence is required, naval forces may not be able to provide
it more effectively than other kinds of forces. It is possible that policy makers
and the public alike will look for more “bang for their presence buck.”
The Navy acknowledges that if forward-deployed forces are to play useful
roles in peacetime or crisis, they must possess credible combat power. It is not
clear how this can be accomplished in the face of the emerging threat. The prolif-
eration of asymmetric and anti-access capabilities may threaten the survivabil-
ity of forward-deployed naval forces. This problem is particularly acute for
traditional surface platforms. Efforts to address the emerging vulnerability of
forward-deployed naval forces by changing the character of naval systems and
developing new concepts of operations may compromise the combat capability
of such forces. To the extent that enhanced survivability must be acquired at the
expense of offensive capabilities, it would seem to undercut the basic rationale
for forward presence.
Finally, if forward-deployed capabilities can be maintained only at the expense
of the ability to control the broad oceans, it will have proven to be a bad decision.
At present there are no threats to the U.S. Navy in the open oceans, and this will
be the case for the next several decades. However, a force built over the next
ten or twenty years for forward presence and littoral combat will have to meet
whatever threats emerge in the “shallow seas” for many decades beyond. In-
creased competition between the United States and rising regional powers could
result in a challenge to the U.S. Navy’s mastery of the open oceans, or at least one
ocean. Such a challenge could come soon enough to necessitate reconsideration
of the present policy of optimizing naval forces for the forward-presence mission.
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“BEING THERE” MATTERS—BUT WHERE?
James F. Miskel
Which parts of the world will be most important to the United States inthe future? Where should the United States be ready to fight a war?
During the Cold War the answers to these questions seemed obvious. The parts
of the world that were most strategically important to the United States were the
lands along the Nato–Warsaw Pact fissure in Central Europe, and Northeast
Asia, where two allies, Japan and South Korea, abutted the two largest commu-
nist powers, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Other parts of
the world could become strategically important if events there involved a Soviet
or Chinese client, or even a potential client. When this happened, that part of the
world became, ipso facto, an area of great importance to the United States, lead-
ing sometimes to covert conflict and sometimes to large-scale fighting.
Today, if only because there no longer is a superpower for the United States to
balance against, U.S. interest in some regions has
diminished. This has, for example, been true with
respect to Africa. While the United States and the
Soviet Union played strategic chess against one an-
other in the Third World, African countries were
perceived as important. But once the chess game
ended, the great powers lost interest in the rooks
and pawns. Developments in Africa ceased having
balance-of-power ramifications, so the United States
and most other major powers started to pay less at-
tention to them. Some other parts of the world, of
course, remain of great interest to the United States,
but now for economic reasons as much as, if not more
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than, traditional political-military balance-of-power reasons. One particular as-
pect of national security strategy—military forward presence—deserves reas-
sessment in light of the shift that is taking place in security interests.
The driving factor in determining the requirements for routine, noncrisis
forward presence ought to be reasoned, objective judgments by the president
and Congress about the relative importance of the various regions of the world
to the United States. Indeed, the challenge for national strategists is to determine
whether the regions that are important to the nation today will be equally im-
portant tomorrow and, if not, to begin making the necessary adjustments in for-
ward presence strategy. Meeting this challenge requires clear and objective
thinking about where national interests may lie in the future. It requires think-
ing that is unencumbered by the traditional Euro-centricity of the American
foreign policy establishment and media, or by the habit acquired in the Cold
War of instinctively assuming that the national-interest glass in some regions is
perpetually more than half full.
One way of forcing policy makers to take a more objective approach and limit
the influence of nostalgic assumptions about military forward presence is to de-
fine specific criteria for determining the intensity of U.S. national interests. Un-
til such time as the global balance of military power shifts and a serious global
threat begins to emerge, the most sensible criteria are economic. For the pur-
poses of reassessing American military forward presence strategies, the most
telling statistics involve interdependence. The practical effect of adopting eco-
nomic criteria would be to accord a higher priority to those parts of the world
where economic interdependence with the United States is growing and a lower
priority where it is diminishing.
Forward presence entails the deployment of military forces overseas on a full-time
basis or on rotational cycles during noncrisis periods. When crises do occur in
important regions, adjustments are often made in the pattern of forward pres-
ence deployments to signal high levels of concern or to deter military action by
third parties. For example, in 1997 and 1998 military forces were deployed to
Southwest Asia to increase the existing levels of forward presence in response to
threatening gestures by Iraq against Kuwait. Another example occurred in 1996,
when the United States deployed warships to the seas around Taiwan in response
to escalated tensions between Beijing and Taipei. However, the principal focus of
this article is noncrisis, routine forward presence—although crisis deployments
such as these will be discussed.
Forward presence has two broad goals. The first is to help ensure regional sta-
bility and promote productive relations with the United States by demonstrating
its national interest in a region or an individual state as well as its commitment to
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the defense of friends and allies. From this perspective, both routine forward
presence during noncrisis periods and special deployments in response to crises
are as much diplomatic-political functions as they are military. To maximize
the yield from this perspective,
forward presence should be allo-
cated primarily to those parts of
the world that will be most im-
portant to the United States in the
future. That is to say, the United
States government should do what any sagacious investor would do: it should
invest more heavily in areas where the prospective returns are great and only
sparingly, if at all, where the potential for profit is slight.
The second broad goal of both routine and crisis-oriented forward presence
is to improve the ability of U.S. military forces to fight and win wars that are not
deterred. Forward presence does this by providing opportunities to promote
interoperability between U.S. and friendly forces. Forward presence also in-
creases the operational awareness by American military forces of the conditions
(such as terrain, coastlines, currents, weather, and infrastructure) in parts of the
world where they may have to fight. To maximize yield from the military per-
spective, forward presence should be concentrated in areas of the world that are
both troubled by the risk of war and important to the United States. In other
words, the prospective returns on investments in operational awareness and
interoperability are greatest when and where there is a reasonable likelihood
that these capabilities will actually be used in war. There is, obviously, little prac-
tical value to be gained by making substantial investments in interoperability or
operational awareness in regions where the United States has no intention to
fight because it has no important interests to defend.
The United States currently maintains high levels of forward presence in sev-
eral parts of the world—Western Europe, the Mediterranean basin, Northeast
Asia, and Southwest Asia. Numerous factors undoubtedly affect this allocation
of forward presence resources. Alliance commitments are, of course, a main
factor, but they are to a great extent discretionary. Treaties between allies do not
ordinarily specify the exact levels of routine, noncrisis military forward presence
that the allies will maintain in each other’s territory. Rather, the treaties typically
commit their signatories “only” to commit forces when war erupts. The North
Atlantic Treaty of 1949, the founding document for the world’s premier and
longest-lasting military alliance, makes no mention of military forward pres-
ence.1 The treaty commits its members to defend each other against attack and
thus authorizes—but does not require any specific level of—U.S. military for-
ward presence during peacetime.
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ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND
THE REGIONAL APPROACH
The aphorism that “trade follows the flag,” if it was ever true, no longer holds, at
least in the sense that U.S. businessmen do not now require diplomats or the
military to pave the way before opening shop on distant shores. There are no
exotic ports left for the fleet to open, no remote, fog-shrouded kingdoms for
soldier-diplomats to intimidate into accepting Western merchants and mer-
chandise. The businessman’s way has already been paved, at least as much as mil-
itary forward presence is capable of doing so. It is not physical access that keeps
entrepreneurs out of some markets but rather doubts about the opportunities in
those markets relative to others. Today, and even more tomorrow, the flag will
follow trade. In that light, military forward presence can be a way of nurturing
the political-military stability that is essential to continuing economic growth
and political-economic reform. It can also be a tool for maintaining access to
existing markets. The best places to apply that tool are the regions with which
the United States is, or is becoming, economically interdependent.
Economic interdependence can be measured through statistics on trade flows
and foreign investment. Thus the critical regions would be those that account
for the highest proportions of American trade and foreign investment. All other
things being equal, a region representing 20 percent of U.S. trade and invest-
ment ought to be accorded a higher priority in terms of military forward pres-
ence than one accounting for only 2 percent. Of course, “all other things” never
stay equal over time; levels of presence should be adjusted to reflect the risk
of instability in the high-priority regions. When the risk of instability in a
high-priority region is low, relatively little military forward presence need be
maintained. When the risk increases, consideration should be given to deploy-
ing forces.
Political-military alliances are, of course, important—but alliances are means
to an end, not ends in themselves. It is well to remember this distinction between
ends and means. No alliance lasts forever, and even when the form of an alliance
remains intact, its substance may change. This has already happened to Nato.
Once a mutual defense organization integral to the security of the United States,
Nato has become a regional policeman without a central role in the defense of its
North American members. Some of the positions taken by the United States in
the mid-1990s appear to concede this point, at least indirectly. At the time,
Clinton administration spokespersons correctly argued that even though the
Cold War was over, membership in Nato was still in the national interest because
it gave the United States “a seat at the table” of Europe. That is, it gave Washing-
ton an official platform from which to participate in European deliberations. In
the mid-1990s the crucial European deliberations did not involve mutual defense
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issues; they involved the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and the economic mat-
ters associated with Europe’s nascent single economic community. Since the
Clinton White House was (as the preceding administration was, and as the suc-
ceeding administration is) reluctant to participate directly in peacekeeping op-
erations in Bosnia, it seems reasonable to conclude that the “seat at the table”
was considered important primarily because it provided a way to ensure that
U.S. economic interests were protected as Europe formulated community-wide
economic policies and regulations.
With what geographic “units,” then, should U.S. policy makers deal, if even
Nato no longer defines a zone sufficiently cohesive and homogeneous in terms
of American interests? In gen-
eral, it is useful to think in terms
of regions smaller than a conti-
nent, or than the lands encom-
passed by an alliance like Nato,
or than the expanses of territory
that have been assigned by the Unified Command Plan to each of the military’s
regional commanders in chief (or “CinCs,” such as of the Southern or Central
Commands). All such groupings are too broad and heterogeneous; for example,
the Southern Cone of South America differs markedly from the rest of the conti-
nent in terms of its economic growth, the robustness of its democratic reforms,
and the absence of active insurgency movements and border disputes. On the other
hand, focusing on units as small as the individual nation-state is too cumber-
some, and in any event, some economic relationships and diplomatic-security
obligations are transnational.
For these reasons, a regional approach is most suitable for the purposes of
formulating requirements for forward presence. The regional “unit” further
commends itself in that it would force strategists to look at priorities in new and
different ways and thus avoid a pitfall all too common in long-range plan-
ning—implicitly assuming that the future will closely resemble today. Ex-
actly how the regions should be defined will, of course, be a subject for debate;
wherever the boundaries are drawn, incongruities and artificialities will result.
The main point here is that geographical regions larger than states and smaller
than such massive zones as continents or “CinCdoms” are useful units of analy-
sis for determining U.S. national interests.
For the purposes of illustrating the regional approach to U.S. national
economic interests and to the measurement of forward presence requirements,
this article will focus on the Mediterranean Basin and South America.
The Mediterranean has been a major focus of American military forward
presence, particularly naval, for nearly fifty years. Although the level of presence
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has been reduced since the height of the Cold War, the U.S. Sixth Fleet currently
maintains eighteen to twenty ships in the Mediterranean and conducts several
dozen military exercises annually with local navies.2 Since individual ships
rotate in and out of the Sixth Fleet on six-month cycles, between thirty and forty
ships actually gain operational awareness of the Mediterranean and improve
their interoperability with regional navies each year. For its part, South America
is useful for the purposes of comparison, as that continent has traditionally re-
ceived considerably less attention than the Mediterranean. For instance, the
UNITAS exercise series, the principal naval forward presence activity in South
America (annual exercises and port visits over a four-month period), involves
fewer than half as many U.S. ships, aircraft, and personnel as are engaged in
twelve months in the Mediterranean.3
TRADE AND INVESTMENT
The economic interdependence between the United States and various parts of
the world can be at least approximately measured through statistics on trade
flows and foreign investment. The International Monetary Fund compiles data
on the total value of U.S. exports to and imports from each nation in the world.4
These data on bilateral trade flows can be aggregated for geographic regions or
for any other grouping or category of states. The same can be done for statistics
on the amount of U.S. investment in every other nation and the amounts that
other nations have invested in the United States.
By these standards, two geographic regions stand out as being of major eco-
nomic importance to the United States: Western Europe (Ireland, Great Britain,
France, the Low Countries, and Germany) and Northeast Asia (Japan, China,
and South Korea). For some regions the absence of economic importance to the
United States is equally obvious. Central Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania,
Uganda, Congo, and Kenya) is an example; the United States has no significant
investment in or trade with that region. Most regions—including South Amer-
ica and the Mediterranean—fall between Western Europe and Central Africa in
terms of the level of economic interdependence with the United States.
In the early 1970s, the entire Mediterranean Basin—that is, the countries
with Mediterranean coastlines—accounted for approximately 10 percent of all
U.S. trade (exports and imports combined). Since then, the Mediterranean’s
percentage has steadily declined. During the last five years for which data are
available (1994–98), its share has been in the 6.8–7.3 percent range. The high
end of the range represents a 25 percent reduction over nearly three decades, the
low end a drop of fully one-third. These reductions in the relative position of the
Mediterranean region reflect the dramatic increases that have taken place in U.S.
trade with other regions, particularly the Pacific Rim and the other parts of
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North America. These data suggest that despite significant increases in absolute
values, relative to other parts of the world the Mediterranean region has become
significantly less important in economic terms to the United States.
What is true for the Mediterranean is true as well for each of its subregions.5
The subregions are North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), the
Middle East (Cyprus, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan—which has
no Mediterranean coast but is usually considered a Middle Eastern state), and
southern Europe (Greece, Italy,
Malta, France, Spain, and Portugal).
Albania and the successor states
of the former Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia-
Montenegro) could also be consid-
ered as part of southern Europe. Since none of the latter states has substantial
economic ties to the United States, their inclusion would have no substantial
effect on the data for that subregion.
From 1991 through 1998, the Middle East and North Africa subregions
accounted for only about 1 percent each of U.S. trade. This is not a post–Cold
War phenomenon; these subregions have accounted for roughly the same pro-
portion of American trade since 1970, apart from a blip in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Of the three Mediterranean subregions, only southern Europe rep-
resents a considerable amount of U.S. trade, about 6 percent. Yet that percentage
was lower in the late 1990s than at any other time in the last thirty years. Over the
course of the 1990s, southern Europe’s share of all U.S. trade decreased by about
15 percent.6
Foreign-investment statistics tell a similar story. Most U.S. investment in the
Mediterranean takes place in southern Europe. As a percentage of all American
overseas investment, that in the North Africa and the Middle East subregions is
negligible; each accounts for less than 1 percent of all U.S. foreign direct invest-
ment. With respect to southern Europe, the preponderance of U.S. investment is
in three countries—Spain, Italy, and France. In 1990 about 9.5 percent of the
total value of all U.S. foreign direct investment was in these three. Since then, the
proportion has been steadily declining, to 6.8 percent in 1998.7
Not only do the trade and investment statistics suggest that the Mediterra-
nean Basin has become relatively less important to the United States, but the
figures actually overstate the region’s economic standing. This is because the
statistics assume that all trade with and investment in France, Spain, and Portu-
gal can be considered “Mediterranean.” France and Spain are, obviously, both
Atlantic and Mediterranean countries, and a considerable volume of U.S. trade
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with and investment in those countries is “Atlantic” in character rather than
Mediterranean. Portugal has no Mediterranean coastline, but it is a member of
Nato and, perhaps for lack of a better alternative, has been considered Mediter-
ranean by U.S. strategists; it is, for example, in the Sixth Fleet’s area of responsi-
bility. The American trade with France, Spain, and Portugal that flows through
Atlantic seaports should be set aside when estimating the significance of U.S.
economic interests in the Mediterranean; U.S. investment in those nations’ busi-
nesses and infrastructure projects that are oriented toward the Atlantic or West-
ern Europe should similarly be excluded. (An example would be a factory that
U.S. investors build in northern France near the Channel tunnel so as to maxi-
mize its access to markets in England and the Low Countries.) The implication
is that the United States may be able to accomplish its forward-presence objec-
tives with France, Spain and Portugal through Atlantic-oriented, instead of
Mediterranean, activities.
Figure 1 depicts the proportion of U.S. trade represented by the two sub-
regions of South America. The data presented on this chart indicate that both
subregions are more economically important to the United States in
terms of trade than are
the Middle Eastern and
North African subregions
of the Mediterranean.
While not high relative to
Western Europe and
Northeast Asia, U.S. trade
with each South American
subregion is about twice
as great as for either
North Africa or the Mid-
dle East. Unlike those for
the latter, the percentages
for the Southern Cone subregions have increased during the 1990s. Until the
very late 1990s, trade with the Andes-Caribbean subregion also tended to in-
crease; the drop-off in 1998 may have been anomalous, a partial result of the
civil war in Colombia (which will be discussed below). The Andes-Caribbean
subregion of South America consists of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia,
Venezuela, Panama, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana. The Southern Cone
includes Chile and the MERCOSUR (common market) countries of Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. As with Middle East and North Africa, U.S.
investment in the Andes-Caribbean subregion is relatively insignificant as a
percentage of all investment. On the other hand, American investment in the
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Southern Cone has in re-
cent years been increas-
ing , presumably in
response to political and
economic reform. The
value of U.S. investment
in the three largest South-
ern Cone countries (Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile)
approaches the value of
that in Spain, France, and
Italy. As figure 2 suggests,
the value of U.S. invest-
ment in the Southern Cone will soon, if recent trends continue, exceed that for
southern Europe.8 Increasing investment can be a precursor of increased trade
volumes. Thus one might expect U.S. trade with the Southern Cone to surge in
the future. Indeed, the long-term prospects for both investment and trade ap-
pear greater for the Southern Cone than for any Mediterranean subregion.
This may be in part a consequence of the fact that unlike southern Europe, the
Southern Cone may only now be entering the “spurt” phase of the economic de-
velopment cycle—when annual growth rates are typically at their highest and
greater than those of mature economies. Furthermore, the Southern Cone has
more abundant and diverse natural resources than southern Europe; it also has a
larger population and higher population growth rates. By 2020, the combined
population of Brazil, Chile, and Argentina is expected to grow from 220 million
today to 260 million. The combined population of Spain, France, and Italy is
predicted to remain virtually flat over the next twenty years, at 160 million. Italy
is expected to experience negative population growth rate during this period.9
On the basis of these economic statistics, the priority for the purposes of for-
ward presence of each of these five subregions would be as given in the table.
Assuming that the threat of war or instability were equal for all of these subre-
gions, the most rational strategy would be to calibrate presence according to
priority. Absent a crisis, there would thus ordinarily be roughly equal levels of
military forward presence for southern Eu-
rope and the Southern Cone; very low levels
would be maintained in the Middle East,
North Africa, and the Andes-Caribbean.
Because economic trends change gradually,
policy makers can be reasonably confident
that a region that is determined to be of
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high priority in 2001 will almost certainly still be in 2004 and 2005. Equally, the
status of southern Europe and the Southern Cone as medium-priority regions
would not be expected to change dramatically over the short term. Thus it makes
sense to base multiyear plans for routine, noncrisis forward presence on endur-
ing interests. Adjustments can be made if threat levels increase.
SECURITY THREATS
Predicting where and when an international incident will occur is a highly com-
plex affair. Threats can develop quickly. That is why the United States has long
maintained a large and sophisticated intelligence apparatus to identify trouble
spots around the globe and to evaluate continuously the prospects for war and
instability. Definitive assessments are, of course, beyond the reach of this article,
but it does seem reasonable to assume that the probability of war is currently
quite low in Western Europe, a high-priority region for the United States. Insta-
bility appears more likely in another high-priority region, Northeast Asia. Al-
though the risk appears to be diminishing as North Korea opens itself to the
West, until such time as the risk is significantly diminished, a high level of for-
ward presence in Northeast Asia may make a strategic difference in terms of pre-
venting war.
Of the two subregions in South America, the one that is more likely to experi-
ence instability is the Andes-Caribbean. Colombia is already consumed with a
violent, anarchic civil war involving at least two major insurgent groups. The
disorder has had ripple effects in neighboring Panama, Ecuador, Venezuela, and
Brazil, effects that could well worsen. Cross-border conflict between well-armed
Colombian paramilitaries and the military forces of neighboring countries is
a distinct possibility, as is collaboration between the Colombian insurgents
and criminal or rebel groups in nearby countries. This could have dramatic
long-term consequences for American policy in the Andes-Caribbean region, as
political and economic reforms are still quite fragile there. Conversely, the risk
of instability in the Southern Cone is quite low. Democratic and economic re-
forms appear to have taken root, the territorial disputes between traditional ri-
vals Chile and Argentina have been resolved, and the subregional nations are
increasingly working together to address common challenges. For example, in
1996 Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay collectively pressured Paraguayan
military officers into abandoning a planned coup against the elected government.10
In the Mediterranean, tensions between Israel and its neighbors continue to
flare, but there are no indications that the tensions will lead to another general
war in the subregion. It is, in fact, difficult to determine exactly what benefits
military forward presence can bring in the Middle East that are not already be-
ing achieved by U.S. diplomats in sponsoring the peace process—more recently,
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attempts to restore the peace process—between Israel and the Palestinians. Fur-
thermore, instability in the Middle East may simply be of the type that military
forward presence is least likely to deter; that at least is what the historical record
suggests. The Lebanese civil war of the early 1980s was only temporarily inter-
rupted, not deterred or stopped, by
the presence of the U.S. Navy off-
shore, or even by the “boots on the
ground” of American, French, and
Italian peacekeepers. Similarly, the
intifada and the continuing vio-
lence that began in late 2000 in Gaza and the West Bank were obviously not de-
terred by U.S. naval forward presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, it
may simply be unrealistic to expect Palestinian factions or extremists of any
kind to forgive past grievances, relinquish claims for territory, or back away from
their convictions simply because foreign warships routinely visit local ports, or
because one indigenous navy or another can demonstrate its interoperability
with the U.S. Navy in offshore exercises.
It might be argued that due to the proximity of the Middle East to Southwest
Asia, military forward presence in the Middle East contributes to deterrence in
the Persian Gulf. If this is true, the opposite must also hold—that is, that the
objective of deterring interstate conflict in the Middle East can be served by mil-
itary forward presence in Southwest Asia.
As for North Africa and southern Europe, at present the risk of war also seems
to be low. In southern Europe, most of the major interstate issues arising out of
the dissolution of “greater Yugoslavia” have now been resolved, about as well as
anything short of total war can resolve them. Furthermore, so long as military
peacekeepers from Nato, with or without U.S. participation, remain on the
ground in Kosovo and Bosnia, the contribution that other forms of military
forward presence can make to deterrence seems marginal.
As noted previously, however, there is more to forward presence than deter-
rence or demonstrations of national interest. Forward presence also enables the
U.S. military to acquire operational awareness—practical knowledge about
conditions in a theater. It also allows U.S. forces to improve their ability to work
together with indigenous military forces and with allied forces that are not resi-
dent in the particular subregion but operate there.
Plainly, the benefits of current operational awareness of in-theater conditions
and confidence in interoperability with friendly forces are time-sensitive;
they are obviously most valuable when there is a high likelihood of war and
when the United States is very likely to become directly involved. Just as plainly,
operational awareness and interoperability are less valuable when conditions are
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pacific. They are least valuable when the United States has no significant inter-
ests to defend.
In subregions where high levels of military forward presence are continu-
ously maintained, the United States is in effect making a considerable invest-
ment in current operational awareness and interoperability with friendly forces.
Setting aside national interests for a moment, that is prudent when the risk of
war is continuously high (as it was during the Cold War) but profligate when the
threat is thought to be low. It may even be excessive when low threat levels are
assumed to be transitory, because most forms of military forward presence can
be increased if and when threat conditions become more adverse.
Based on this brief tour of the security horizon in South America and the
Mediterranean, it would appear that absent a new crisis the only zone where the
threat warrants a higher level of presence than economic interests alone would
dictate is in the Andes-Caribbean subregion.
STRATEGIC COMMODITIES
Overall trade and investment statistics may obscure the significance of strategi-
cally important commodities to the United States. This could cause national
strategists to underestimate not only the impact of a supply interruption on U.S.
economic interests but also the contribution that military forward presence can
make to preventing interruptions. Oil is the standard example, one that has
particular salience given the recent spikes in oil prices as well as the tensions in
the Middle East subregion.
There are two general aspects to the oil equation, production and distribution.
It seems reasonable to presume that forward presence by the United States
would tend to deter invasions of oil-producing states. That is to say, the presence
of U.S. warships, air forces, and ground troops in a subregion can contribute to
interstate stability by creating at least the perception that the United States is
primed to defend oil-producing states from attack. This argues strongly for high
levels of military forward presence in and around the Persian Gulf, due to the
huge volume of production that might be lost in a war, and to the high costs of
evicting an invader—as in Operation DESERT STORM. This same argument
could be used to justify forward presence in other oil-producing or potentially
oil-producing areas; none of the Mediterranean subregions fall into this cate-
gory. Developments in the Middle East affect oil production by influencing the
political decisions on oil output by Arab states in other subregions, but none of
the states in the Middle East subregion as we have defined it (Cyprus, Turkey,
Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel) is a significant oil producer.
An area that does fall into the category of a potentially important oil producer
is the Andes-Caribbean subregion of South America. Venezuela is a major oil
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producer and shares a troubled and occasionally contested border with Colom-
bia. Colombia, in turn, has both oil reserves and a domestic insurgency problem
that could destabilize the entire region. Ecuador also has oil reserves and has al-
ready experienced spillover from Colombia’s turmoil. (For example, in Septem-
ber 2000 an estimated fifteen thousand Colombians fled into Ecuador to avoid
the fighting between the Colombian government and an insurgent force.)11
Oil distribution and pricing should, perhaps, be approached differently than
oil production, at least in terms of evaluating the contribution that military
forward presence can realistically make. Extensive naval forward presence in the
Mediterranean did not keep oil prices low or supplies high during the 1970s,
when two oil embargoes led to economic recession in the United States and
Europe. Nor have high levels of forward presence of naval, air, and ground
forces in Southwest Asia and the
Mediterranean kept prices from
sharply rising in 2000. Indeed, it is
unrealistic to expect military for-
ward presence of any kind to pre-
vent sovereign states like Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela from deciding to limit oil production in order to raise
prices. Iraq may be the best example of the limited effect that forward presence
can have in this respect. There has been an extraordinarily heavy military for-
ward presence in and around Iraq for the ten years since the end of the Gulf
War; large parts of Iraqi airspace are regularly patrolled by U.S. aircraft—a
particularly intrusive form of presence made necessary by the international
community’s desire to protect minority groups inside Iraq. Yet even under these
conditions, Iraq has manipulated its oil production in an attempt to inflate the
prices paid by the West.
Oil distribution to world markets can, of course, be disrupted in other ways.
A state could mine or blockade a critical sea-lane. For example, during the
Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s, sections of the Persian Gulf were mined by Iran,
and Iranian Revolutionary Guards used captured oil platforms to attack tanker
traffic near the Straits of Hormuz. (The U.S. response was to provide military
escorts for the tankers.) Continuous military forward presence might deter such
actions, but that is an expensive approach to what is ultimately a constabulary
function. In comparison to the difficulties and expense of reversing production
problems caused by the conquest of an oil-producing state, reversing distribu-
tion problems created by mining and blockades should be easy. It should be
within the capacity of expeditionary forces from the United States or of local
military forces that, in the Mediterranean, are part of the Nato structure and are
more robust than their equivalents in many other parts of the world.
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The bottom line appears to be that maintaining a continuously high level of
military forward presence is not an efficient or effective approach to the threat of
oil distribution problems. There is a more effective and perhaps more efficient
approach—the strategic petroleum reserve. The United States built a strategic
petroleum reserve for the express purpose of cushioning the effects of interrup-
tions in distribution and of sudden price hikes. Investing in larger petroleum
reserves is a better hedge against distribution problems and price hikes than is
military forward presence.
IMPLICATIONS
Until the global balance of military power changes—and perhaps even after it
does change—the United States should measure its military forward presence
requirements on the basis of economic criteria. Such criteria should be applied
in a regional framework, so as to guard against nostalgic assumptions that the
parts of the world that are important to the United States today will be equally
vital in the future. The basic allocations would then be adjusted as conflict in
particular parts of the world became more likely. The proposed approach im-
plies that military forward presence resources may not presently be allocated in
a way that properly reflects the emerging future.
The various levels of routine, noncrisis military forward presence can be
thought of as a continuum ranging from continuously high to none. The United
States maintains continuously high forward presence in Western Europe, North-
east Asia, and the Mediterranean. Forces permanently stationed in these regions
conduct cycles of interactions with local militaries (for instance, in exercises, in-
formation exchanges, planning, port visits, and other, largely ceremonial, activi-
ties). At the other end of the spectrum are regions like Central Africa, where the
United States routinely maintains no military forward presence. That is to say,
military forces are neither permanently stationed in nor periodically deployed
to Central Africa to demonstrate national interest, deter interstate conflict, ac-
quire operational awareness, or improve interoperability with local forces.
Most other regions fall between these two extremes. The two South American
subregions are examples. In the Southern Cone subregion, the level of military
forward presence might be classified as intermittent—largely confined to peri-
odic port visits, exercises, and information exchanges. Presence in the An-
des-Caribbean is determined by U.S. involvement in the war on drugs rather
than an overall strategy for the subregion.
If national interests were determined on the basis of economic interdepen-
dence, it would appear the United States should consider reducing the level of
military forward presence it maintains in the Mediterranean Basin. The savings
could be transferred to other purposes, including force modernization. The
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savings could also be applied to military forward presence in other regions, such
as South America. Economic statistics suggest, in fact, that the Southern Cone
will soon become as important to the United States as southern Europe—a Med-
iterranean subregion where particularly high levels of military forward presence
are maintained—and that the Andes-Caribbean subregion has a particularly
severe risk of instability.
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INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Thinking about the Unthinkable
Paul D. Taylor
Developments in South Asia during 1999 reminded the world that the nu-clear tests undertaken in 1998 by India and Pakistan had ominously in-
creased the danger of nuclear conflict. Pakistani occupation of territory in the
Kargil and Dras sectors on the Indian side of the Line of Control in the state of
Jammu and Kashmir precipitated the fourth sustained engagement between the
armed forces of India and Pakistan in the fifty years since independence and under-
scored the violent potential of incompatible claims in Kashmir by the two countries.
The coup d’état in Pakistan in October 1999 raised questions about governance, sta-
bility, and democratic pluralism in a country that had spent about half of its politi-
cal life since independence under military rule. Late in the year, the hijacking of
Indian Airlines flight 814 by Pakistani militants introduced into the conflict the
specter of state-supported terrorism. Together these events created the climate for
the 28 percent increase in India’s military budget that was announced early in 2000.
SIMULATIONS OF THE UNTHINKABLE
Early in this chain of events, shortly after the nuclear tests in May 1998, the U.S.
Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, undertook a series of simulations
and “decision events” designed to examine the con-
sequences of these developments. The project
started from the premise that the tests had increased
the possibility of weaponization, deployment, and
use of nuclear weapons in South Asia. In the tradi-
tion of games that the Navy had conducted in New-
port for more than a hundred years, the college’s
Decision Strategies Department organized a series
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of events that gathered experts from the U.S. government, academia, foreign
governments, business, private voluntary and nongovernmental organizations,
and military commands to react to a prepared scenario set in the year 2003.
Asking people from diverse backgrounds and organizations to interact with one
another as they grappled with the issues posed by a hypothetical scenario was in-
tended to produce insights that might have eluded an individual researcher or a
group working within a single discipline. In addition to playing roles in simula-
tions, participants were invited to develop their views in seminars employing a
combination of anonymous commentary (using a networked array of comput-
ers) and ordinary discussions. The scenario depicted conflict in South Asia esca-
lating from civic unrest and terrorism to an exchange of tactical nuclear
weapons; the events ranged in length from four hours to six working days.
MAJOR ISSUES
In the interest of learning how the players representing the U.S. government,
other governments, and other actors would respond to the hypothetical events,
researchers acting as game controllers presented, in various simulation settings,
successive segments of the event scenarios and then gave players free rein to react
as they believed their “character”would in a real situation. In seminars, the ques-
tions posed were deliberately broad and open-ended, such as, “How do you
think your organization or other organizations would respond to the events you
have just heard described?” In this manner, the organizers tried to avoid con-
straining responses, as well as to encourage maximum interactions among
participants.
In the exchanges that ensued, several questions emerged as salient in event af-
ter event. What could the United States or other actors in the international com-
munity do to discourage an escalation of hostilities between India and Pakistan?
Could the United States or any other third country use military power to affect
the outcome of a conflict in South Asia? Inasmuch as India and Pakistan account
for only a minor share of international trade, would the impact on the world
economy of a nuclear war on the Asian subcontinent be modest? If the United
States and other countries wished to help ameliorate a disaster involving mil-
lions of casualties from a nuclear exchange, would they have the capacity to do
so? Recognizing that the human and economic costs of a nuclear war in South
Asia would likely be enormous, should the United States and other countries in-
vest resources and effort now to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan,
and also share with them the means of preventing an accidental disaster? Could
such things be done while maintaining the arms-length posture the United
States had assumed toward India and Pakistan in the name of nonproliferation?
Finally and fundamentally, is a future scenario in which violence between India
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and Pakistan that escalates to a substantial nuclear exchange plausible enough to
justify worrying about the other questions?
THE GAME SCENARIO
In the tradition of military gaming, a difficult scenario—the overall “scripted”
background and the situational framework within which role playing and dis-
cussion of important issues was to proceed during the successive events—was
elaborated. Developed in consultation with experts on South Asia from the U.S.
government and academia, the scenario was intended to stimulate planners to
address tough challenges. The designers stressed to participants in all the events
that the scenario was to be consid-
ered as only one possible future
and that it was not intended in
any sense as a prediction of the
most likely evolution of events.
The scenario was essentially the
same in each event, but it became more elaborate as the series evolved—espe-
cially after an event known as the International Game, when the actions of for-
eign players moved the narrative farther than had been envisioned.
The scenario events began with a crisis postulated in the year 2003:* The defeat
of a new resolution in the United Nations Security Council calling for international
involvement to resolve the status of Kashmir precipitated violent anti-Western and
anti-Hindu demonstrations in India and Pakistan. This civic unrest was accompa-
nied by a sharp increase in Islamic guerrilla activity in Kashmir. That activity cul-
minated in the downing, by a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile, of an Indian
transport aircraft carrying the home minister, the minister of defense, and the army
chief of staff, who were en route to Srinagar for an inspection visit. “Informed re-
ports” implicated the government of Pakistan in the shoot-down. India responded
by launching Operation RESOLUTE SWORD, air and artillery attacks against targets
in Kashmir and northern Pakistan suspected of harboring and supporting perpe-
trators of violence in Kashmir and the rest of India. Simultaneously, the government
of India declared that its intentions were limited in both scope and objective. Fur-
ther, it issued an ultimatum demanding the immediate delivery of terrorist leaders
who were sheltered in Pakistan, the dismantling of known terrorist headquarters
and training facilities, and the removal of all Pakistani military forces from Kash-
mir. Initially, Pakistan offered little resistance to the Indian attacks, which inflicted
heavy damage to the infrastructure targets against which they were delivered.
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When Indian forces suspended their attack and began to celebrate the success of
RESOLUTE SWORD, the Pakistani high command seized the opportunity for a sur-
prise attack against Indian forces east and south of Lahore. During a two-day bat-
tle, Pakistani units managed to push about fifty kilometers into Indian territory,
inflicting heavy casualties on Indian civilians, before a counteroffensive repulsed
the Pakistani thrust. India matched its defeat of Pakistani troops in the Indian
Punjab with a rapid movement across the Thar Desert toward the Indus River.
Fearing that India was about to cut Pakistan in two, severing Islamabad’s economic
lifeline to the south, the Pakistani high command ordered a barrage of tactical mis-
sile strikes. Four of these missiles carried nuclear warheads: three twenty-kiloton
weapons were delivered against Indian forces to halt their advance toward the bor-
der, and the fourth was used against the supporting rail hub in Jodhpur. The strikes
stalled the Indian movement and destroyed the rail hub but also caused widespread
destruction among the civilian population of Jodhpur. Experts from the U.S. De-
fense Threat Reduction Agency estimated the number of dead and seriously injured
in the hundreds of thousands.
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
In January 1999, researchers organized a two-day international simulation to
gauge reactions to these hypothetical events and the capacity of the interna-
tional community to prevent, manage, and resolve such a conflict. The simula-
tion brought together a multinational cross section of diplomats, academics,
analysts, and military personnel. The countries represented were Australia, Can-
ada, China, Finland, France, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines,
Russia, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Many of the diplomats present had reached the rank of ambassador in their
countries’ diplomatic services; one had served as foreign minister. In the game,
they were given roles as their countries’ principal representatives in the UN Se-
curity Council. In fact, they also had to replicate their governments’ entire decision-
making authorities, because they worked without the benefit of instructions
from home, and—with the exception of India and Pakistan—their actions in the
simulation were “free play,” based on their individual best judgment of what
their respective governments would do in response to the hypothetical situation
as it unfolded. The scenario prescribed most of the military actions of India and
Pakistan; however, even those nations’ representatives, who were experienced
diplomats and scholars, devised their own diplomatic activities.
The International Game was unusual in having countries represented by
their own nationals. This arrangement brought a greater degree of reality to the
responses of foreign countries than is usual in U.S. government–sponsored sim-
ulations, which are generally played exclusively by American experts.
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The participants were briefed on the scenario’s assumptions about the under-
lying situation for 2003. It assumed that unsatisfactory economic conditions had
fomented significant unrest in both countries, leading to a rise in nationalist fervor
and rhetoric. Both India and Pakistan had signed and ratified the Fissile Materials
Cutoff Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.* India’s real-world unilat-
eral policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons was incorporated in the scenario;
Pakistan (reminiscent of the real-world posture of Nato during the Cold War)
had made no such commitment. Both India and Pakistan had nuclear warheads
that could be delivered by either aircraft or missile.
Move One of the simulation asked the players to react in the Security Council
to early events in the scenario, including the civic unrest and stepped-up guerrilla
activity, the shoot-down of the aircraft carrying Indian officials, and the beginning
of Operation RESOLUTE SWORD. The Security Council moved swiftly into action.
The Canadian delegate, in consul-
tation with the belligerents, pro-
posed a resolution calling upon
India and Pakistan to cease hostili-
ties and immediately disengage
their troops on both the Line of
Control and the international bor-
der. The resolution invited the UN
Secretary-General to strengthen the military observer group already in place and
deploy it on both sides of the border to witness the called-for disengagement. How-
ever, since the resolution would have committed troops without putting in place any
new confidence-building measures, several representatives of the Permanent Five
members** expressed reservations, and it was not adopted. Some of the delegates
suggested that the presence of nuclear weapons made a traditional peacekeeping op-
eration inappropriate.
At this point, the game-control cell advanced the players to Move Two, in
which the Pakistani authorities ordered a nuclear attack against Indian troops ad-
vancing toward the international border. The Pakistani delegate justified his coun-
try’s attack as purely defensive and stressed that it had been directed at strictly
military targets. The Indian delegation withdrew from the Security Council, de-
claring that the time for diplomacy had passed. The U.S. delegate and several others
condemned Pakistan for its use of nuclear weapons, while China insisted that the
international community bore a degree of responsibility for the Pakistani action, in
that it had neglected to ensure that a military balance existed in the region.
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The Permanent Five considered putting sanctions in place against Pakistan but
declined to intervene militarily to stop the crisis, fearing that such intervention
would only raise the stakes, perhaps even lead to World War III. The Pakistani rep-
resentative reacted to this decision with a mixture of disbelief and dismay, asserting
that this conflict was World War III.
While the Security Council cell debated, the Indian player let it be known that
his government had responded to the Pakistani strike by launching twelve nuclear
weapons of its own, in an attempt to destroy Pakistan’s entire nuclear research, pro-
duction, storage, and delivery capability. The game controllers assessed that it was
unclear whether this objective had been fully realized, but inasmuch as many of
Pakistan’s nuclear-related facilities postulated by the scenario were near popu-
lated areas, expert analysis by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency esti-
mated some fifteen million casualties from the attack, including one to two
million dead.
The Permanent Five, after separate consultations with India and Pakistan, now
developed a proposal for ending the crisis: immediate cessation of military activi-
ties, renunciation and elimination of nuclear activities by both countries, a return
to the status quo ante in Kashmir, and international security guarantees for both
India and Pakistan. Several delegates opined that the security guarantees would be
“difficult to sell” to their governments.
In a seminar discussion after the simulation, the senior Pakistani delegate ex-
plained that his government had been cognizant throughout the event of Paki-
stan’s unfavorable military balance with India. In an unscripted simulation, it
would have sued for a cease-fire during Move One. The Pakistani players had
been motivated in the game crisis, they explained, by eagerness to engage out-
side powers, especially China, Iran, and the United States, in forging a solution.
The Indian delegate argued that his government would have worked very hard to
reach a peaceful settlement but that once Pakistan fired nuclear weapons, only
one response would have been acceptable to India. The Russian player, a scholar
with strong ties to the Boris Yeltsin government (then still in power), explained
that his country might see a nuclear crisis in South Asia as an opportunity to ex-
pand the Russian role in a system in which Russia was frustrated by its lack of
clout. If breaking down the current nuclear proliferation regime could restore
Russia’s proper voice in the international system, he believed, a Russian govern-
ment might be willing for that purpose to renounce the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty.
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
In March 1999, a group of eighteen Americans—senior officials responsible for
U.S. economic policy, business executives, academics, and military
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officers—met for an evening and the following workday to examine the possible
economic and commercial consequences of a conflict in South Asia. The partici-
pants either occupied or had recently left offices ranking from under secretary to
deputy assistant secretary in the Departments of Commerce, State, and the
Treasury. They were not asked to play roles per se but to offer their considered
judgments about how the world would and should react to the events posed by
the scenario.
As the scenario was introduced, and even before the downing of the Indian
transport aircraft triggered a major escalation in the crisis, participants thought
that an increase in tensions between countries with nuclear arsenals would
cause investors and markets to
jump to worst-case conclusions
and precipitate an international
financial crisis. Firms with eco-
nomic interests in India and Paki-
stan would begin to hedge,
checking on the security of their
local employees and expatriates, evaluating financial exposure, and reviewing
policy options. (The “real world” was to produce something of a reality check
later, during the 1999 Kargil crisis, which would exhibit an eerie similarity to the
scenario up to this point. Markets were to seem more relaxed in that actual event
than the discussants had been, however, suggesting that participants in simula-
tions may tend to anticipate escalation.)
When in the scenario military forces engaged in conventional exchanges, the
discussants judged that international markets were likely to go into a tailspin,
driving capital out of emerging markets to seek safe haven in the United States.
Leading governments and international financial institutions would be pressed
to resolve the resulting financial crisis. When the conflict widened, the partici-
pants judged, the humanitarian crisis within the subcontinent would increase
the pressure on foreign governments for action. Business representatives
strongly suggested that the most helpful way that governments could address the
economic and commercial crisis would be to use every means available to defuse
the underlying military and political crises before they deteriorated into a nu-
clear exchange.
When such an exchange occurred in the scenario, the participants concluded
that a nuclear exchange of the magnitude postulated would create a humanitar-
ian catastrophe. The situation would be hard for the government of the United
States and other major countries to ignore, even though some people might say
the governments of South Asia had caused the calamity and that it was up to
them to deal with the damage. Relief efforts would also be complicated by
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residual contamination and the possibility of further conflict. Other questions
would center on the capacity of the government of Pakistan to manage assis-
tance and the willingness of the government of India to accept it.
Depending on weather conditions, the discussants predicted, severe short-
ages of food and potable water could exceed the capacity of relief organizations
to respond and might even stress international markets. A conference of inter-
national donors would be required to mobilize the billions of dollars needed for
relief. The prices of certain commodities, especially foods, could skyrocket and
could trigger a global recession. Countless Indian and Pakistani citizens might
seek refuge abroad; large numbers of refugees could cause other countries to
create barriers to immigration. The most mobile people would carry away with
them skills needed at home; the flight of elites might be matched by decisions of
foreign investors in the region to take their chips off the table, resulting in pro-
found and lasting damage to the economies of India and Pakistan.
OPERATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
More than fifty flag and field-grade American military officers, middle-grade and
ambassadorial-level diplomats, civilian executives, and representatives of non-
governmental relief and developmental organizations participated in a six-day
simulation as part of Global 1999—the major annual simulation at the Naval
War College. Military officers from Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom
joined them. Drawn from, inter alia, the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Pacific
Command, the Departments of State and Defense, the Agency for International
Development, and the U.S. embassies in Islamabad and New Delhi, participants
reacted to the unfolding scenario in ways that they believed their organizations
would in a real crisis.
As the South Asian crisis began to develop in Global 1999, players pressed
diplomatic measures to keep it from escalating. At the same time, nations effected
voluntary withdrawals of their citizens from India and Pakistan. The eventual non-
combatant evacuation operation was complicated physically by the distance of
Islamabad and New Delhi from naval support ships at the outset, as well as by the
dangers to military units inserted to conduct the evacuation. There was also a sense
that the evacuation was sending a pessimistic signal as Washington was urging re-
straint on the local governments. The players did not anticipate that a nuclear ex-
change would occur as rapidly as the scenario dictated—only eight days after the
downing of the Indian transport—so the evacuation was not completed before
the nuclear strikes. Therefore, substantial numbers of Americans were presumed
among the casualties, including many U.S. citizens of Indian origin, particularly
those residing in the Punjab, from which they had been reluctant to depart.
T A Y L O R 4 7
51
War College: Summer 2001 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
While participants did not perceive a direct intervention or deterrent role for
U.S. military forces in the crisis, they felt certain that in the aftermath of such a
nuclear exchange any U.S. administration would look to the U.S. military, with
its personnel, logistical, and technical resources, to carry heavy responsibilities
in conducting decontamination, disaster relief, and early reconstruction efforts.
Questions arose as to whether U.S. troops would be welcomed by the govern-
ments and the populations of the two countries, and whether the requirements
of short-term crisis management might conflict with the longer-term interests
of the United States in fostering constructive relations with both India and Paki-
stan. Military planners in the game sought to minimize the presence of U.S.
forces on the ground and to define in advance the exit strategies by which re-
sponsibility would pass to civilian and nongovernmental leadership.
In the Global 1999 simulation, the physical requirements of disaster relief
were found greatly to exceed current real-world preparations, which typically
envision disasters on the magnitude of the bombing of the World Trade Center
or the nuclear accident in Chernobyl. After the game, participants favored cre-
ation of a standing consequence-management force, an organization that could
be deployed to alleviate disasters anywhere in the world. This force would be a
ready and efficient alternative to current arrangements, under which regional
commanders in chief are responsible for planning and organizing efforts, the-
ater by theater. In its contingency planning, such a force would anticipate issues
of coordination with other countries and determine how its activities would be
directed on the ground.
Global 1999 players also concluded that although nongovernmental orga-
nizations were well equipped to assess local needs and deliver relief, they typi-
cally did not plan for major emergencies and certainly would not have the
resources in personnel or materiel to contribute meaningfully in the aftermath
of a nuclear exchange without enormous transfers from governments.
Nongovernmental organizations would most likely have to perform “triage”—that
is, explicitly identify the relatively small portion of victims they would be able to
help, deliberately but unavoidably leaving many hundreds of thousands, per-
haps even millions, without aid. Participants recommended more aggressive
contingency planning and early integration of nongovernmental organizations
into planning.
IMPORTANT INSIGHTS
This overall project examined a hypothetical problem from the perspectives of
fifteen countries and specialties ranging from warrior to diplomat, missionary,
and investor. Its most compelling result was that while participants differed on
the details of their assessments and their remedies, and while some participants
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in each event commented that the scenario pushed events more relentlessly to-
ward nuclear war than they would expect in a real situation, no one argued that
the scenario could not happen. In fact, they frequently expressed fears that it was
a worrisome and consequential possibility.
The players in the simulations and seminars identified no significant military
role for the United States or its allies in a military crisis between India and Paki-
stan. They asserted that though the United States and others might wish to help
ameliorate a disaster involving millions of casualties from a nuclear exchange,
the magnitude of resources and efforts required would be well beyond those en-
visioned in current contingency planning. The U.S. government, they suggested,
should start now to create a standing, deployable “consequence management”
force that could provide skills and material aid to help relieve the effects of major
catastrophes anywhere in the world.
Participants argued that in economic terms alone, the costs to the world of
dealing with the consequences of a nuclear exchange between India and Paki-
stan would far exceed the cost of trying to prevent one. On the other hand, they
noted that the influence of the
United States was limited and, in
the simulations, only became
more so as the crisis escalated.
Still, time after time participants
asked whether the international
community was doing all it could to prevent terrorism over Kashmir and, in-
deed, whether more could be done to encourage India and Pakistan to reach a
settlement in the Kashmir dispute itself.
An understanding of the problem needs to take account of the fact that India
and Pakistan see different threats emanating from each other. Simply put, Paki-
stanis stress the injustice of India’s occupation of a large portion of a state in
which Moslems are a majority, while fearing India’s stronger conventional
forces; they accordingly seek international help to redress a wrong. Indians recall
the accession of Kashmir by the governing maharaja at the time of partition—a
legitimate procedure under international law, in their view—and reject any out-
side interference that could upset the status quo. Their main fear with respect to
Pakistan is that its successful support of Kashmiri secession could cause groups
elsewhere in India to seek new status for themselves—a prospect made worse by
the specter of a fundamentalist Islamic government coming to power in
Islamabad and mounting a jihad to free Kashmir. Any long-term solution will
somehow have to give to Pakistanis a greater sense of security vis-à-vis their
more powerful neighbor, and to Indians confidence that their pluralistic society
can be protected against exploitation by outside agitators. The disagreement
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over Kashmir, which has provided the flash point for the series of conflicts since
independence, might best be resolved as a secondary problem addressed in a
context of broader concerns. That approach might also offer a way around the
inherent conflict between attempting to apply outside pressure for resolution
and simultaneously arguing that a solution has to be forged between the Indians
and Pakistanis themselves.
Participants in the project’s simulations wondered if the United States and others
could facilitate a solution in the same way U.S. diplomacy has contributed on
several occasions to ameliorating conflicts in the Middle East and Northern Ireland,
where conflicting claims have often appeared at least as intractable as those in
South Asia. Some results had been achieved in those cases even though the gov-
ernments of two close allies of the United States—Israel and the United King-
dom—had argued for years that for the United States even to talk to the groups
that had terrorized their countries would be wrong and counterproductive.
Finally, many players throughout the simulation underscored the need to re-
examine policies that weaken U.S. leverage in defusing potential crises. At pres-
ent, as punishment for their proliferation, American policy denies military sales
to India and Pakistan and the use of International Military Education and
Training funds for attendance by their personnel in U.S. military schools and
training courses. Additionally, military-to-military contacts with Pakistan are
proscribed as a consequence of the coup d’état. American unhappiness with the
nuclear tests and the coup needed to be expressed, but avoiding interactions
with Indians and Pakistanis even on nonsensitive subjects has the effect of mini-
mizing American influence on the very people who might push their countries into
a military escalation, and it prevents the United States from getting to know the next
generation of military leaders. In addition, current policy prevents the United States
from engaging with the two governments on just the kind of confidence-building
measures needed now on both sides to decrease the chance of a nuclear ex-
change: reliable nuclear command and control systems, for example, and nu-
clear threat reduction centers of the type the United States and the Soviet Union
established, as well as cooperative threat reduction measures to reduce tensions
between conventional forces along the border.
American policy, these simulations suggest, has stressed the laudable objec-
tive of discouraging nuclear proliferation to the point of dangerously reducing
its own ability to discourage the use of the nuclear technology that India and Pa-
kistan now possess. The United States would wield more influence over India
and Pakistan if it accepted the fact of their nuclear status and attempted to estab-
lish safeguards and counter-use regimes, even while working to dissuade other
countries from gaining a nuclear capability. In the last analysis, the Newport
games warn, a policy based on the hope that either India or Pakistan is going to
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abandon its nuclear arsenal is almost certainly wishful thinking and provides no
basis for exerting U.S. influence in the urgent and difficult work of keeping those
weapons from being employed.
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“SECURITY IS LIKE OXYGEN”
A Regional Security Mechanism for West Africa
Lieutenant Commander Seth Appiah-Mensah, Ghana Navy
Since the end of the Cold War, the geostrategic significance of Africa to theUnited States has markedly declined, resulting in the treatment of Africa as a
“backwater” in official U.S. policy making in recent years.1 The derogation of Af-
rican issues in U.S. foreign relations became evident as early as 1989, when war
broke out in Liberia, a country hitherto regarded as having a long-standing spe-
cial relationship with the United States.2 But Africa’s, even Liberia’s, low priority
in the dawning era failed to draw U.S. military intervention “to nip the civil war
in the bud.”3 This prompted the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) to form and insert an ad hoc military force—the ECOWAS
Cease-Fire Monitoring Group, or ECOMOG—into Liberia in 1990.4 Initially
designed for a brief operation in Liberia, ECOMOG has since deployed in two
other states as well, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. Given the current chaotic,
even hopeless, situation in Sierra Leone, and the less serious but still nebulous
s ta te of a f fa i r s in Lib er ia , Guinea , and
Guinea-Bissau, subregional leaders have been under
pressure to transform ECOMOG into a permanent
regional force within a general ECOWAS security
framework.5 To give effect to that dream, in October
1998 the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of States and
Governments endorsed the establishment of a col-
lective security regime known as the Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution,
Peacekeeping, and Security. (In this article, “West
African subregion” refers, unless otherwise speci-
fied, to the ECOWAS community of nations.)
Commander Appiah-Mensah is a graduate of the Britan-
nia Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, U.K.; the Com-
mand and Staff College (Junior Division) in Jaji, Nigeria;
the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
(Senior Division); and the U.S. Naval War College’s Na-
val Staff College (December 2000). He has had two tours
of duty in West African ECOMOG peacekeeping opera-
tions in Liberia, as navigating officer of GNS Achimota
and GNS Yogaga. Commander Appiah-Mensah was ex-
ecutive officer of GNS Dzata from 1995 to 1996. He holds
a master’s degree in maritime policy from the University
of Wollongong in Australia. He has published in the U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings and the Journal of the Aus-
tralian Naval Institute.
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Though some outside observers see these regional initiatives as offering op-
portunities for African countries and their external partners, the new security
arrangement poses many challenges. The West African subregion may not yet
have the political, military, or economic means to accom-
plish the strategic objectives it has set for itself.6 In fact, this
is a tall order; to imagine that ECOWAS can shoulder the
burden alone would be a strategic miscalculation. If the
security mechanism is to take off at all, let alone have any
real chance of success, external support from the United
States and other Western countries is crucial. Therefore, the
United States and the international community may have to
rethink their policies, reorienting them toward Africa in a way that reflects the
current security dynamics in the region.
This article begins by defining the concept of security within the context of
the volatile African environment. It then offers insight into the framework of the
ECOWAS security architecture, as envisaged by its current leaders. Against the
background of the political, socioeconomic, and military realities in the subre-
gion, the article makes a case for strong external support to help bring about the
desired dividends of the security mechanism.
Any critical analysis of the security paradigm in Africa requires a firm grasp of the
unique African concept of security. For Africans, “emancipation is the freeing of
the people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints
which stop them [from] carrying out what they would freely choose to do. . . .
Security and emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not
power or order, produces true security. Emancipation, theoretically, is security.”7
Thus, African security encompasses the whole range of dimensions of a
state’s existence, including some that are already assured in developed countries.
Generally, but especially in some states, such issues as internal disorder, the
danger of food shortages, human-rights abuses, unequal opportunity, tribal
imbalance in government and military institutions, insufficient social devel-
opment, economic dislocation, colonial and neocolonial cleavages (mind-sets),
and threats to freedom of speech constitute security problems in Africa.
ECOWAS AND THE SECURITY FRAMEWORK
Founded in 1975 as a forum for economic promotion and development, social
and cultural matters, and the general progress of the continent, ECOWAS has
emerged from the Liberian civil war as Africa’s foremost economic, political,
and security grouping.8 ECOWAS adopted security-related protocols in 1978
and 1981, but none had been implemented at the time of the Liberian conflict.9
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Thus, the conflict served as a wake-up call for the community to fashion its own
security agenda. This conflict threatens the stability of the subregion—it has
spilled over to neighboring Sierra Leone, and it poses serious threats of rebel at-
tacks at the borders of Guinea.10 Guinea-Bissau’s recent political turbulence may
also be linked to the war. It was, then, to contain and manage the current crisis,
and to build a degree of security and confidence in the subregion, that ECOWAS
endorsed a new security mechanism for West Africa.
The security system is to have as its highest decision-making body a Media-
tion and Security Council.11 The council may convene “as often as necessary” in
the performance of its five primary functions: authorizing political as well as
military interventions; determining mandates and terms of reference for such
interventions; reviewing such determinations periodically; appointing such au-
thorities as the special representative of the executive secretary and the force
commander, upon the executive secretary’s recommendation; and informing
the United Nations and Organization of African Unity of its decisions.12
The council will operate through three committees. The Committee of Am-
bassadors will meet regularly and submit reports on regional peace and security
issues to all council members, as well as affected states. Sec-
ondly, the Committee of Foreign Ministers, Defense, and
Internal Affairs has the mandate to discuss the general po-
litical and security situation quarterly, or more frequently as
necessary, and report to the council’s third committee, the
Committee of Heads of State.13 In a provision characteristic
of African organizations, an appointed Council of Elders
would arbitrate, reconcile, and mediate during conflict.14
The executive secretary will maintain a database of qualified and competent in-
dividuals who can serve on the Council of Elders. The executive secretary indi-
vidually has been given an especially important role in conflict prevention and
management—even to the point, innovatively, of deploying fact-finding and
mediation missions on his or her own initiative. (The secretary will, however, be
required to report any findings to the Mediation and Security Council.)15
Another major innovation is a subregional Peace Observation System to pro-
vide ECOWAS early warning, and thereby opportunities for early action, to help
the organization prevent situations from degenerating into violent crises.16 The
idea emerged from the caucus of French-speaking African states that opposed
and frustrated ECOMOG activities in the early 1990s;17 apparently there has
been a change of heart and attitude among the francophone states—a cause for
cautious optimism.
At the operational level, it is envisaged that a brigade-sized formation, to be
called the ECOWAS Peace Monitoring Group (ECOMOG, as before), would
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be set up as a permanent peacekeeping force.18 This “bank of rapid reaction
force” (that is, a reserve of rapid-reaction capability) will comprise contingents
from member states—earmarked, trained together, and organized for deploy-
ment at short notice.19 Of course, to train a force of this size will require a
sizable and reliable logistical capability. As would be expected in an army-
dominated organization, the organizers seem to have been oblivious to the in-
valuable role played by naval and air forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and to
their future utility. This is a grave omission; naval forces from Nigeria and
Ghana have been organic to ECOMOG since its inception and have proved
themselves indispensable.20
Patterned to some extent after the Nato security structure, this collective-
security mechanism will require enormous amounts of administrative support
(staff and offices), logistics, military resources, and funding, all of which would
be difficult to obtain from Africa. Funding from the international community
will therefore be crucial to this security project. However, to show its commit-
ment, ECOWAS has proposed a community levy to fund its activities: each
member state would be assessed 0.5 percent of the value of its imports from out-
side the subregion.21 The levy’s main rationale is easing the financial burden that
contributing states would face during military operations.22
U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
A prominent Western analyst has argued, “Africa is poorly understood by U.S.
policymakers, [who] completely ignore the continent until some sort of politico-
military crisis grabs their attention.”23 This encapsulates the nature of the atten-
tion that African issues have received from the United States, and from its major
partners as well, in recent years. U.S. engagement in Africa lacks clarity and sense
of purpose. Indeed, ever since the Berlin Wall came down it has been axiomatic
for the United States, its Western allies, and the international community to pur-
sue African policies that merely respond to crises rather than attempt to shape
desirable outcomes.
Consequently, the amount of U.S. assistance to Africa has declined dramati-
cally. From fiscal year 1985 to 1994, military assistance declined from $279.2
million to $3.8 million, and economic support funding from $452 million to fif-
teen million.24 For the same period, the total aid flow to Africa declined from
roughly 10.3 percent ($1.87 billion) of an overall foreign-aid budget of $18.13
billion in fiscal 1985 to 7.6 percent ($1.36 billion) of $17.99 billion spent on for-
eign aid in fiscal 1994. This trend continued through the Clinton administra-
tion, which restructured the aid package according to four new general categories:
sustainable development, humanitarian assistance, building democracy, and
promoting peace.
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However, the emphasis placed on democratic and economic development
tends to exclude security factors, which are not only of vital importance to Afri-
cans but critical to their survival in the twenty-first century.25 As Joseph Nye has
put the point, “Security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin
to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you think about.”26 Re-
grettably, such oxygen is ever in short supply in West Africa. To make even a start
at reversing this trend, ECOWAS, in cooperation with external players, needs to
optimize all the major components of state making. The three main compo-
nents with respect to security—political, socioeconomic, and military—are so
linked, interdependent, and intertwined that they can be regarded as a “trinity”:
a weakening of one part drags them all down (although the triad is not a
zero-sum game—increasing the importance of one factor does not decrement
that of the others). It is no accident that more than three decades ago, Robert
McNamara (who had just left office as the U.S. secretary of defense) expressed
similar sentiments about security in developing nations: “As development pro-
gresses, [and] security progresses[,] . . . [the people’s] resistance to disorder and
violence will enormously increase.”27
ENGAGING THE UNITED STATES
The essential threats to the viability of third-world states today have been de-
scribed in a vivid fashion:
The most important . . . are the lack of internal cohesion, in terms of both great
economic and social disparities and major ethnic and regional fissures; lack of un-
conditional legitimacy of state boundaries, state institutions, and governing elite;
easy susceptibility to internal and interstate conflicts; distorted and dependent devel-
opment, both economically and socially; marginalization, especially in relation to
dominant international security and economic concerns; and easy permeability by
external actors, be they more developed states, international institutions, or
transnational corporations.28
This indeed is the predicament of West African states.29 Many factors contribute
to this situation, which is characteristic of nearly all the countries in the ECOWAS
group.
The Political Factor: Statecraft in Africa
One set of problems includes the incomplete stage of state making at which
these nations find themselves; another involves the timing of their entry into an
established international system. A third concerns their collective colonial heri-
tage: “Rather than encourage integration, the colonial administrators fostered
fragmented loyalties and ethnic particularism as part of their mechanism for en-
suring effective control of these colonies.” 30 Together, these three kinds of
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problems have produced African states that are weak, vulnerable, and insecure.
Many ECOWAS members have therefore become candidates for “failed state”
status, which has already claimed Sierra Leone and Liberia.31
The United States and other international donor countries have for the past
two decades invested in what they perceive as viable West Af-
rican democratic institutions, but the subregion still remains
politically volatile.32 Nevertheless, in spite of this goodwill, a
contradiction exists in U.S. policy making: “African coun-
tries, even if they do adopt political reforms, are unlikely to
receive greater amounts of resources from a shrinking foreign
aid budget.”33 Since recipient nations possess weak econo-
mies and no credible military might, the least armed resis-
tance by a disgruntled politician or soldier causes their fragile political
institutions to tumble.
Socioeconomic Considerations
Current statistics on the economic performance of sub-Saharan Africa reveal a
dire situation, one that has the potential to degrade even further. The debt bur-
den remains insurmountable and unsustainable. The region’s external debt in
the 1990s averaged U.S. $204 billion, a per capita external debt of $359 for its es-
timated population of about 628 million (1998).34 External debt payments,
which for Africa as a whole peaked at thirty-three billion dollars in 1997 (eight
billion more than in 1995) represent more than 17 percent of the continent’s
earnings from exports.35 The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi
Annan, observes that “this reflects a catastrophic fall in personal incomes on a
scale seen by no other region since the Great Depression of the 1930s.”36 Perhaps
it is time for Africa to have its own Marshall Plan.37
Whilst this could be a long-term goal, the short and medium-term economic-
aid objectives of the United States, other donor states, and international institu-
tions need be synchronized and focused on specific critical areas. To that end,
ECOWAS should be assisted to pursue and sustain collective prosperity through
feasible economic reforms, macroeconomic coordination, and free-market prac-
tices.38 This would give ECOWAS a fair chance of survival as an economic entity,
with a reasonable prospect of achieving the ambitious security architecture it
has proposed for itself.
Military Power
The current military capabilities of the ECOWAS member states are inadequate
to counter contemporary challenges and threats in the subregion. Even Nigeria,
the subregional power, has struggled to maintain its presence in Liberia/Sierra
Leone. As retired commodore Olutunde Oladimeji of the Nigerian Navy has
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observed, “Nigeria has been operating with inadequate equipment [and] . . .
budgets and [under] logistics constraints.”39 For this reason the new security
mechanism envisages the pooling together of military strengths, in the form of
an ECOMOG standing force that will be trained, equipped, and prepared to in-
tervene in crisis areas. To this end, assistance in the form of equipment, funding,
and training from the United States and other Western allies is critical. It would
also be encouraging to see Nato initiate a dialogue with ECOWAS to share its in-
valuable experience in institutional arrangements and assist where necessary
with equipment, military accoutrements, and technical cooperation.
Already, cooperative security arrangements exist between certain members of
Nato and some of the ECOWAS states. The United States has initiated an African
Crisis Response Force, training personnel in selected countries so that indige-
nous forces can deploy into crisis areas.40 Also, in 1996 ECOMOG enjoyed some
$30.4 million in assistance from the United States.41 Britain and France are also
pursuing similar but parallel initiatives in the region. It would be prudent to co-
ordinate and synchronize all these efforts, if their full potentials are to be real-
ized. This is very important, because, as one unofficial but authoritative study of
U.S. government policy states, “unilateral U.S. peacekeeping or peace enforce-
ment operations in Africa are not anticipated.”42
WHY SHOULD AMERICA BOTHER?
It has been argued that for the United States, allowing African peace forces to
resolve regional conflicts would be both a “load-decreas[ing]” and a “dollar-
saving” opportunity.43 Therefore, investing in an indigenous rapid reaction force
in Africa will reduce significantly the demands upon American forces for inter-
vention in Africa, and therefore, in due course, upon its operating budget.
Moreover, the current U.S. “low-priority,” risk-averse policy on Africa may
ignore longer-term risks to its existing “investment.” During the early 1990s, for
instance, the U.S. failure to intervene in Liberia (where more than 150,000
citizens were slaughtered) did not spare America the loss of facilities worth an
estimated four hundred million dollars.44
There is also a significant moral and cultural impetus for the United States to
rethink its African policy. It is currently estimated that more than thirty million
members (12 percent) of the population of the United States claim African-
American heritage.45 These historical and cultural ties should be translated into
viable political, economic, and military relationships in the new millennium. It
will be interesting to watch whether the new American secretary of state, Colin
Powell, allows Africa to be all but ignored in U.S. foreign policy.
Last but not least, Africa has over five hundred million people, as well as
untapped natural resources. It is in the interest of the United States “to support
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and preserve American values of freedom, individual rights, the rule of law,
democratic institutions, and the principles of constitutional liberalism”46 in the
ECOWAS subregion. Regarding military aid, Washington has the “ability to in-
fluence African militaries to demobilize or downsize, reform and professionalize
themselves, and engage more effectively in legitimate security and peacekeeping
missions.”47
In his 1998 report on Africa, the UN Secretary-General restated, in effect, Robert
McNamara’s 1968 observation (quoted above) on the relationships among de-
velopment, security, and stability: “Peace and development,” Kofi Annan de-
clared, “remain inextricably linked—one feeding on the other, enabling the
other and securing the other.”48 Development has eluded Africans for far too
long, as a result of nearly permanent economic crisis; it is not hard to fathom the
reason why peace has also proven to be elusive.
To address the threats to security in West Africa, ECOWAS envisages a
Nato-type security organization that would have an overarching responsibility
for the security of the subregion. This is an ambitious but important security
mechanism; however, inadequate military resources, fragile political institu-
tions, and weak economies forebode great difficulty in getting started. Increased
assistance from the United States, other nations and international organiza-
tions, and private institutions, properly coordinated and synchronized with re-
spect to the desired “end state,” should be pursued in the new millennium. In
West Africa, the three factors of development, stability, and security are so inex-
tricably linked as to defy piecemeal solutions. A holistic and comprehensive ap-
proach—one that engages the trinity of security development—is the key to
unlocking the subregion’s security dilemma. In such a way, “the international
community could help not only to support African governments and peoples,
but also rekindle a sense of common purpose and shared humanity essential for
planetary survival.”49
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FUTURE CARRIER AVIATION OPTIONS
A British Perspective
David J. Jordan
One of the key debates that face naval aviation in the twenty-first centuryrelates to its key equipment: the airplane. The United States is the only
power that will be able to deploy a carrier force of any size, and it has held this
position for over two decades. Soviet/Russian ambitions to deploy a blue-water
air capability have been downsized, rationalised, abandoned, then reinstated
under the threat of cancelation, and now lack funding. The People’s Republic of
China is known to aspire to develop its naval aviation through the procurement
of aircraft carriers, but it has made little obvious progress. While aircraft carriers
enable the projection of airpower well beyond a nation’s shores without reliance
on host-nation support, they have a major problem: they are expensive. De-
signing, running, and upgrading carriers are beyond the financial capacity of
most nations. Only a few have the ability to deploy combat aircraft at sea, and the
conventional aircraft carrier can only be procured in small numbers. While the
United States can, within the politics of budget constraints, present a formidable
air presence from carrier decks, the United Kingdom and France, the two
middle-ranking powers with aspirations to maintain
aircraft carriers, have been obliged by cost consider-
ations to make some uncomfortable decisions.
Furthermore, there are continuing questions
about the necessity of aircraft carriers for middle-
ranking powers. It is argued that the aircraft carrier,
by virtue of its considerable cost, is an unnecessary
luxury. Under this scenario, the United Kingdom
and France are perceived as being unlikely to em-
bark upon independent naval operations but as
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instead contributing to task forces dominated by the U.S. Navy, which in
turn would provide the aviation assets. Practical experience, particularly for
Britain, suggests that this view is dangerous.
Nonetheless, Britain’s experience of carrier aviation since the mid-1960s has
not been altogether happy. A combination of a reduced world role and serious
economic problems led to the downsizing of all British military services, with
particularly savage cuts in the 1964–70 period. The aircraft carrier was deemed
to be an expensive irrelevance. This view was shortsighted, ignoring the fact that
Britain had a number of commitments and obligations in areas that had been
brought into the ambit of Britain’s concerns through trade and colonialism. As
always, plans failed to survive contact with the enemy—in this case, Argentina in
1982, when the only means of recovering the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas)
was an amphibious operation. Since that time, despite ever-diminishing defence
budgets, the aircraft carrier has returned to prominence, with the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review (SDR) planning for two carriers capable of embarking around fifty
aircraft, thus enhancing the deployability of British forces and increasing flexibility.
Nonetheless, there are a number of issues that need to be settled before the
new vessels enter service in 2012. This article (based on the state of affairs in late
1999) seeks to provide a general outline of the options facing British naval avia-
tion in the next ten to twenty years. It does not claim to be definitive but seeks to
inform, highlighting in particular the manner in which the aircraft carrier has
returned to the core of British military thinking as Britain adjusts to the condi-
tions likely to pertain in the first two decades of the twenty-first century.
BRITAIN AND NAVAL AVIATION SINCE 1960: THE BACKGROUND
Decline has been a particularly notable factor in the United Kingdom, where
cost considerations led to the abandonment of conventional-takeoff-and-landing
(CTOL) aircraft carriers when HMS Ark Royal was retired in 1978. This was not
a sudden decision.
The Decline of the British Carrier Force
The first threat to British naval aviation came in the 1960s. In 1957, a whole
swathe of advanced aircraft projects had been canceled on the grounds of cost
and a belief that their job would soon be done by missiles. Hawker-Siddeley Avi-
ation’s P.1127, an innovative vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing (VSTOL) air-
craft, was allowed to survive. The P.1127 was designed to prove the validity of
VSTOL and was not intended for operational service. However, a derivative,
the P.1154, was proposed by Hawker in 1962; it was finally abandoned in 1964,
in favour of the F-4K Phantom.
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It is arguable that the P.1154 had too much stacked against it. There appears
to have been a suspicion amongst senior officers that a capable, supersonic
VSTOL aircraft might have allowed a cost-conscious government to abandon a
then-projected carrier design (known as the CVA-01) and replace it with smaller
ships that could operate VSTOL air wings. The theory continues that the Admi-
ralty had no intention of giving up its large carriers and agitated against the
P.1154. This may or may not be true. What is not beyond dispute is that the Royal
Air Force and the Royal Navy had completely different views on how the air-
craft should be equipped; the na-
val P.1154 would have been a very
different one from the RAF’s.1 In
addition, the P.1154 was a techni-
cal risk. The P.1127 had not vali-
dated the concept of VSTOL at this point, and the notion of moving from a
technology demonstrator with relatively simple equipment to a fully operational,
supersonic type (the P.1154) was highly adventurous. Finally, there was already a
superb, proven naval type in operational service—namely, the Phantom.2 The
Phantom could be operated from the existing carrier fleet (with modifications),
and it would obviously be fully compatible with CVA-01 from the start.3
CVA-01, in spite of its innovative design, was vulnerable.4 The Royal Navy
had five carriers (Ark Royal, Centaur, Eagle, Hermes, and Victorious) when Prime
Minister Harold Wilson took office, plus two more (Albion and Bulwark) that
had been converted into “commando carriers.”5 Of these seven vessels, only the
Ark Royal and Eagle were large enough to accommodate the Phantom.6
After a period of financial crisis, Wilson’s government decided to end the
British military presence “East of Suez,” a conclusion that made the aircraft car-
rier an endangered species. In 1966, CVA-01 was canceled. While modifications
to allow the operation of Phantoms from the existing vessels were financed, the
carriers were not to be replaced. It was then decided that Eagle would not be
modified to embark the Phantom.7 By the mid-1970s, it was clear that Britain
would be left with only an antisubmarine helicopter force after Ark Royal’s
withdrawal from service.
The argument put forward against complaints that this decision was short-
sighted took the form that Britain’s reduced military commitments meant that
naval operations where airpower would be required—opposed amphibious
landings—would be coalition operations. The aviation assets required would
come from the U.S. Navy’s carriers. Where the U.S. Navy was unavailable, the
RAF would defend the fleet from land bases. This was a spurious idea, as the
Royal Air Force did not have any suitable aircraft available for this task.8 In the
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event of a war, the RAF would be busy elsewhere, and the Navy would have to
hope that a U.S. carrier was nearby.
Consequently, the Royal Navy looked for alternatives. It became clear that the
problem would be twofold. First, the government had to be convinced that a
class of air-capable vessels was necessary; second, a suitable aircraft had to be
found. The second problem was the easier to solve. The P.1127 had been devel-
oped into the Harrier, via a type known as the Kestrel.9 The Harrier entered service
with the RAF in 1969. The U.S. Marine Corps placed an order (for the AV-8A)
shortly afterward. Neither the RAF nor the Marine Corps envisaged using the
Harrier as a fighter aircraft, even though Marine machines were wired for the
AIM-9 Sidewinder.
The Royal Navy, faced with the choice of a navalised Harrier or nothing,
decided upon VSTOL carriers. The major difficulty was to obtain the necessary
vessels. Fortunately, in the late 1960s a new class of antisubmarine cruiser, the
Invincible-class CVSG, was being designed.10 These already had a full-length
flight deck and an island (for helicopter operations); Hawker-Siddeley Aviation
was contracted to develop a minimum-change version of the Harrier to equip
them. The modifications included the provision of radar and a raised canopy for
better vision in air combat. The Sea Harrier entered service in 1979, some six
years after the idea for its method of launching—off a “ski ramp”—had been ar-
rived at.11
The decision to develop a VSTOL fighter for the Royal Navy was not met with
universal acclaim. Many felt that the Harrier offered little real military capability
beyond being able to be based close to the front line without prepared runways.
It was also noted that the proposed complement of aircraft for Invincible was less
than half that of the Ark Royal. However, although the withdrawal of all but Ark
Royal left the Navy with only around thirty fixed-wing aircraft, even this small
force could have been useful. In the end, the only concession to demands to re-
tain Ark Royal was the announcement that the name would be used for the third
Invincible-class ship.12 This did not appear to be a sensible solution to the under-
lying problem of a capability gap. By 1980, the Navy had Invincible and also Her-
mes, which had been converted from the commando carrier role into an interim
VSTOL vessel.13
Four years after Ark Royal was retired, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands.
The only way to recover the Falklands was through an amphibious operation,
and the Ark Royal would have proved invaluable. Although by comparison to a
U.S. carrier air wing Ark Royal’s aircraft complement was small, a fixed-wing
carrier would have provided the task force with strike aircraft, air defence
fighters with a beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile capability, and, crucially, air-
borne early warning (AEW) aircraft.14 As the conflict progressed, it was clear
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that all were desirable.15 As it was, the two aircraft carriers despatched (Hermes
and Invincible) carried fewer combat aircraft than Ark Royal had done.16 No air-
borne early warning capability was available, and the most potent weapon car-
ried by the Sea Harriers was the AIM-9 Sidewinder.17
It is hardly necessary to recount that the Sea Harriers performed beyond all
expectations, with not a single one being lost in air combat, while over twenty
Argentine aircraft were claimed as shot down. In addition, the RAF version of
the Harrier, then in its GR 3 incarnation, was successfully operated from the
deck of HMS Hermes in the ground-attack role. The Sea Harrier and Harrier
proved capable of operating in weather conditions that would have grounded
other carrier-aircraft types, assisted by their ability to recover vertically onto the
carrier deck rather than having to undergo the ordeal of arrested landings. Thus
the concept of the VSTOL (more accurately, “short takeoff and vertical landing,”
or STOVL) carrier was largely vindicated by the Falklands conflict. However, a
number of problems were identified.18
Lessons from the Falklands
The most obvious problem with the STOVL carrier was the lack of AEW aircraft.19
The lack of airborne early warning had made it possible for the Argentine pilots
(air force and naval) to conduct daring attacks on the British task force, with
minimal warning for defending combat air patrols (CAPs).20 As a result, the car-
riers had to be positioned farther from the combat area than was desirable.21
Further, the Sea Harrier’s light armament—two AIM-9s and two 30 mm ADEN
cannon—gave it only limited combat persistence.22 This had not been a serious
problem over the Falklands, but it was recognised that in different circum-
stances it might have been; after the war, this shortcoming was tackled with
the provision of twin missile-launcher rails, doubling the number of Side-
winders carried. Finally, although the Sea Harrier’s Blue Fox radar per-
formed beyond expectations, it was clear that a “look-down/shoot-down”
BVR capability was desirable.
None of these problems would have arisen with the old Ark Royal: its Phan-
toms had had beyond-visual-range capability; the endurance of its combat air
patrols had been extended through “buddy” refuelling (that is, from aircraft
other than specialised tankers) by suitably equipped Blackburn Buccaneers; and
airborne early warning had been provided by Fairey Gannet AEW 3s.
In the absence of conventional-takeoff-and-landing vessels, these lessons led to
the development of the Sea Harrier F/A 2, which remains today the operational
variant. The Sea Harrier F/A 2 is an impressive machine. Its performance in exer-
cises has been remarkable. The F/A 2 is certified for the full range of attack mis-
sions, but the deployment of Harrier GR 7 (roughly equivalent to the AV-8B
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night-attack variant) from RAF units for attack missions is now commonplace,
leaving the Sea Harriers for air-to-air operations.23 All RAF and Navy Harriers
are now under a single command, Joint Force Harrier. With the Sea Harrier tak-
ing responsibility for air-to-air missions and the GR 7, with a larger weapon
load, undertaking attack operations, the Royal Navy now has a suitable mix of
aircraft for its carriers.24 Experience has finally muted the criticism of the em-
ployment of STOVL vessels, at least in U.K. circles.25
The major problem facing the Royal Navy is that its carriers are too small.
They cannot carry large air wings; they struggle to carry more than twenty air-
craft. Thus, the Navy cannot have enough aircraft available on the scene of a cri-
sis. The comparatively small size of its air wings reduces the number of sorties
that can be generated, in turn reducing the carriers’ effectiveness. There are only
two carriers in service at any one time (the third being in “deep maintenance,” or
overhaul), which does not help matters. Consequently, although they are effec-
tive and have given good service, the Invincible-class carriers are not the best ad-
vertisement for STOVL types. The fact that the aircraft are good is obscured by
the limited operations that can be carried out. This has led to the view that the
STOVL aircraft carrier can in no way equal the versatility and flexibility of a
CTOL vessel. To be allowed to exploit STOVL’s full potential, the Royal Navy re-
quired larger aircraft carriers. Defence spending policies in the 1980s and 1990s,
however, meant that it was most unlikely to receive them.
Since the Invincible-class vessels are not due for replacement until around
2010, there has been until recently little consideration of what would follow
them. With the end of the Cold War, British defence policy entered a period of
confusion, as the government cut spending. Unfortunately, British military
commitments did not diminish. Beginning with DESERT STORM, British forces
became engaged in Iraq and Kuwait, as well as in the former Yugoslavia, protect-
ing the safe haven established for the Iraqi Kurds, and patrolling the Iraqi no-fly
zones. This was in addition to the tasks that they normally carried out. It became
increasingly clear that asking British forces to do more with fewer personnel and
less equipment was not a viable idea. This provoked the Labour opposition to
promise that it would embark upon a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) if it were
to be elected at the next general election. This duly occurred on 1 May 1997, and
the enormous Labour victory meant that the SDR was likely to pass through
Parliament without serious difficulties.
FUTURE AIRPOWER OPTIONS FOR THE ROYAL NAVY
The need for the United Kingdom to possess aircraft carriers has been questioned
by a number of sources in recent years. A variety of critics have suggested that
the British aircraft carrier is no longer necessary. Pundits in national newspapers
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argued that the aircraft carrier is an expensive luxury and that the money needed
for a new class of vessels could be better employed elsewhere.
The Strategic Defence Review and the Need for British Carriers
The SDR suggested otherwise. The review took longer to complete than had
been anticipated in some quarters (as a result, it is rumoured, of objections from
the Treasury), but it ultimately declared that the United Kingdom needed new
aircraft carriers. The SDR changed the emphasis for British naval forces, moving
away from the large-scale, open-ocean warfare for which it had been training for
the past fifty years to force-projection and littoral operations in conjunction
with the other two services. The SDR also made clear that the greatest impor-
tance would be attached to versatility and deployability.
It was obvious that the aircraft carrier would be integral to this vision. The
SDR laid down proposals to procure “two large aircraft carriers capable of oper-
ating up to fifty fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters” from all three services. It
should be noted here that what Britain considers a “large aircraft carrier” is dif-
ferent from what the United States does. For the Royal Navy, a “large” carrier has
been the size of HMS Eagle or the old Ark Royal (53,000 tons fully loaded), able
to carry between thirty and forty fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. This is
hardly “large” in comparison with the U.S. Navy’s aircraft carriers, since even the
Midway (70,000 tons fully loaded) was larger than the British vessels. Still, the
two carriers, scheduled to enter service in about 2012, will provide Britain with
the ability independently to deploy combat forces to trouble spots. This is im-
portant, since there are reasons for Britain to deploy independently. Britain’s
previous role as an imperial nation has left a legacy of close ties with former col-
onies. Some ten million British citizens live overseas, and there are thirteen de-
pendent territories for which Britain is responsible. The need to be able to
project military power to defend these interests or to provide aid to them is a
clear reason for procuring newer, more capable carriers. In many instances, the
infrastructure does not exist to support aviation operations in or around the
overseas territories; the only means of sending aviation assets to such regions
and then operating them is by means of a carrier deck.26
In addition to these direct responsibilities, Britain is a member of a number
of international organisations, most notably the UN, Nato, and the Common-
wealth. It is possible to envisage an attack on a Commonwealth country by a
neighbour leading to British intervention, either on the side of the nation at-
tacked or to impose or maintain a peace agreement. Although the SDR specifi-
cally denies that Britain seeks a role as world policeman, it asserts that there are
compelling reasons for Britain not to be isolationist in outlook. The level of Brit-
ish overseas investment, particularly in the developing world (where British
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investment amounts to the combined total of those of France, Germany, and It-
aly), demands that attention be paid to an ability to intervene in crises in these
areas. Britain’s dependence on worldwide trade makes it essential for Britain to
be able to defend its interests by the rapid projection of power to areas where
conflict threatens to destabilise or damage them.27
SDR foresees the close integration of all three services: “By 2015, the Review
expects further major change in modern warfare. Operations will no longer be
characterised as land, sea or air. There will instead be a single battlespace in
which land, maritime and air forces will be directed, targeted and supplemented
by a new generation of intelligence, surveillance, information and communica-
tions systems offering a steep change in military capability.”28
Although this view presumes the development of new equipment and new
technologies, the emphasis here is on the joint nature of future operations. This
has already been manifested in the creation of the joint Harrier force.29 This is
not all. The Royal Navy is adopting what is termed a “golf bag” approach to
carrier-based aviation assets. The task force commander (the “golfer”) chooses
the air assets (the “clubs”) needed to carry out the task at hand. The carriers
deploy with the necessary mix of aircraft and helicopters. This might mean that
the only helicopters carried would be the airborne-early-warning type, with an-
tisubmarine helicopters being based on other vessels (for instance, HMS Ocean),
if they were required at all. Thus the air wing might be made up of about sixteen
Sea Harriers plus AEW helicopters. Alternatively, there might be a mix of Harrier
GR 7s, Apache ground-attack helicopters, and a smaller number of Sea Harriers
for operations where air defence was secondary to supporting troops. Addi-
tionally, the RAF’s support helicopter force (now amalgamated into a joint com-
mand of army, navy, and air force transport helicopter assets) has operated the
Boeing Chinook from the Invincible class, so the carriers might be employed in a
role akin to that of the American amphibious assault ship (LPH). The provision
of a new carrier will make this “golf bag” approach even more viable, since it will
make more room for the aircraft required for the mission.30
The issue now at hand is what type of carrier the new vessel should be. Nei-
ther the Strategic Defence Review nor any subsequent official paper has speci-
fied this in any way. Various proposals are being sought from industry, and it is
unlikely that the type of vessel will be chosen until 2001 at the earliest.
The CV(F) and the FCBA
It is supposed that the “UK Future Aircraft Carrier,” or CV(F), will be of the
short-takeoff-vertical-landing type, flying a “future carrierborne aircraft,” or
FCBA, of some appropriate type. However, as far as is currently known, the
Royal Navy could end up with a conventional-takeoff-and-landing vessel,
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larger STOVL carriers, or what is known as a STOBAR ship—short takeoff
but arrested recovery.
The CTOL type would appear to offer a number of advantages, especially in
terms of the range of aircraft that can be embarked. Two suitable naval aircraft
already exist—although not yet in frontline service—to equip this sort of car-
rier, namely, the Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, and the Dassault Rafale M.
The Royal Navy’s previous decision to depend upon “buddy” refuelling suggests
that tankers would not be purchased and that strike/fighter types would likely
constitute most of an air wing of forty to fifty aircraft.
Nonetheless, the CTOL carrier seems unlikely. Arrested landings are regarded
as unnecessarily complicated by the Royal Navy after some twenty years’ experi-
ence of STOVL operations.31 There are other considerations. Steam catapults are
labour intensive, while an electromagnetic aircraft-launch system appears to
promise a reduction in the number of personnel involved. For a small force such
as the Royal Navy this might not be enough, however; its personnel levels are
such that any reduction in the complement of an aircraft carrier would be wel-
come. STOVL operations allow deck crews to be kept small; no catapult or ar-
resting personnel are required, and barriers are unnecessary. Furthermore,
electromagnetic launch might be too expensive or inadequately proven by the
time CV(F) has to be fitted out.
The key point that the Royal Navy’s conception of a large aircraft carrier is
different from that of the U.S. Navy must be noted once more. British aircraft
carriers, for instance, have tended to embark relatively few support aircraft. Ad-
vances in technology may allow support functions to be performed by heliborne
or tilt-rotor designs. Further, and perhaps most importantly, it is almost certain
that the CV(F) will not be nuclear powered.32
STOBAR Options
The short-takeoff-but-arrested-recovery design has a number of operational
problems. First, rapid flight operations are difficult unless an angled deck is em-
ployed. Even then, if the aircraft requires most of the flight deck to gain suffi-
cient velocity to fly, aircraft will be unable to land while launches are taking
place.33 A STOBAR carrier needs arresting gear, which, as noted, demands a large
deck crew at a time when the Royal Navy will be seeking to embark as small a
complement on the CV(F) as is viable.
Nonetheless, there is a reason for believing that the STOBAR option is not out
of the running. The Eurofighter Typhoon is currently the subject of a British
Aerospace study to assess its viability as a carrierborne aircraft, and it is quite
clear that although the study is at an early stage, it is being taken seriously.34 In
the past, attempts to convert land-based aircraft into carrier aircraft have not
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been entirely successful, particularly with regard to stresses imposed on the air-
frame—especially in landings, inasmuch as carrier aircraft typically strike flight
decks with greater force than land-based aircraft do runways. In the past, either
the airframe has not proved strong enough or the weight increases caused by
strengthening have imposed too-great penalties on performance.35
In the case of a STOBAR Typhoon, the considerations are a little different.
Structural strengthening would undoubtedly be required, but the weight in-
creases may be minimised thanks to advanced technology. The Typhoon’s ad-
vanced flight-control system could be programmed to reduce the stresses of
landing, particularly if integrated with a carrier-landing datalink. This would
have a number of advantages. For
instance, sudden pitching of the
carrier deck would be recognised
by the system, which would feed
in last-second control corrections,
ensuring that the aircraft landed
within set limits. This would permit the airframe to be strengthened only as
required for operations within those parameters—this, at least, is the theory
that the British Aerospace study will investigate. There is little doubt that the use
of thrust vectoring, already being planned for the Typhoon, coupled with a
high-lift wing design, could provide near-optimal short-takeoff-and-landing
capabilities for a “Sea Typhoon.” The use of a ski ramp would only enhance
STOL performance.
There is another reason why a STOBAR vessel employing the Typhoon might
not be out of the question—commonality. The Royal Air Force will be buying
232 Typhoons and has options for fifty more. The use of a navalised Typhoon
would simplify servicing and lower unit-procurement costs. In addition, the
United Kingdom would be the sole customer for the naval version; this would
put design authority into the hands of British Aerospace. Experience with up-
grading the RAF’s Jaguar strike aircraft (a collaborative project) has shown that
with a single design authority that is not obliged to consult a partner, costs go
down, and modifications arrive on time and on budget. In view of the chequered
history of the Typhoon’s design and its increased costs, a cynic could contend
that a navalised version unique to the United Kingdom, to be flown by a number
of RAF units as well as the Navy, would prove extremely tempting to the Minis-
try of Defence.36 It would certainly enhance the capability of a joint force built
around carriers. Reequipping the two Sea Harrier squadrons and the three Har-
rier GR 7 units (or an equivalent number of squadrons) with a navalised Ty-
phoon would ensure that there were more than enough aircraft available for the
CV(F).37
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Although it is currently unlikely that the Typhoon would ever become the
sole combat type in the U.K. inventory, its use in the strike role as an early re-
placement for the Tornado is not an impossible scenario. This could make a
navalised version more attractive, since it would slash servicing and training
costs, thanks to commonality.38 There are a number of pitfalls with an air capa-
bility employing just one type; still, the point is that a STOBAR Typhoon might
offer a number of cost benefits that a government concerned with defence
spending would be hard pressed to ignore.39
The Typhoon is not the only option. The Dassault Rafale M offers the advan-
tage of being already available. There is little doubt that it is a capable airplane,
and it has the swing-role flexibility offered by the Typhoon. Although the com-
monality aspect would be lost, the closer defence cooperation enjoyed between
France and the United Kingdom since the mid-1990s suggests that the Rafale
option would not face insurmountable obstacles. The RAF and French forces al-
ready run exchange programmes, and it is not impossible to envisage some form
of joint operational-conversion unit, along the lines of the now-defunct Tri-National
Tornado Training Establishment.
The precedents for such cooperation, however, are not altogether good. Euro-
pean defence projects have broken down over disputes about work sharing and
requirements.40 The Typhoon programme, after all, has been severely delayed.
The aircraft (as the Eurofighter) was meant to serve with the United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Spain, and Italy; the vigorous disputes over which country
should lead the design led to the project’s first acronym, FEFA (Future European
Fighter Aircraft), being rendered in some aviation journals in unflattering
ways.41 The concept-development stage of the Eurofighter saw the departure of
the French, who built the Rafale instead.42 The political wrangling that ensued
from increasing German opposition to the Typhoon delayed the in-service date
for the aircraft dramatically; meant to achieve initial operational capability in
the early nineties, the first Typhoon will not enter service with the Royal Air
Force until 2002. The costs of the programme have risen drastically as a result.43
While this experiece suggests that a combined European defence force is un-
likely in the near term, the idea of some degree of cooperation over CV(F) ought
not to be ruled out. The Royal Navy could purchase a ski-ramp-equipped
Charles de Gaulle–class carrier or two—although one hopes that any future ves-
sels of that class will have power plants that function as advertised and decks
large enough to accommodate their whole air groups. Although the Royal Navy
seems not to want a nuclear-powered vessel, it would appear that the cost advan-
tages (developmental and trials-related engineering expenses, etc., would be
small) of adopting a STOBAR Charles de Gaulle–class ship might outweigh this
objection.44 This would provide a European carrier capability; the Royal Navy
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would foot far lower development costs, since these would have been absorbed
by the French, and there would be commonality of aircraft types as well.
Consequently, the STOBAR option is plausible, with the choice between an exist-
ing aircraft type, the Rafale (which will be fully mature technology in 2012, but
not outdated), and the slightly newer–design Typhoon, which is generally reck-
oned to be more capable. If the Typhoon proves suitable for carrier use, the deci-
sion between the two types would be difficult, but the difficulty would not be of
the unwelcome sort. Whether, however, the short-takeoff-but-arrested-recovery
option is the best for the Royal Navy is another issue. There is a compelling rea-
son to suspect that Britain will procure another STOVL carrier—the Joint Strike
Fighter.
STOVL: The Preferred Option?
Notwithstanding the scenarios in which a STOBAR vessel might prove at-
tractive, there are strong reasons for the Royal Navy to continue to operate
short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing vessels. This contention arises both from the
nature of STOVL operations and from the United Kingdom’s involvement in the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The programmatic details of JSF are well known and
beyond the scope of this article; the upshot is that although there are technologi-
cal concerns, particularly with regard to the STOVL variant, cancelation seems
highly unlikely. With its clearly projected costs for each version, the JSF is not an
obvious candidate for the major overruns that lead to cancelation.
Furthermore, the Joint Strike Fighter is being relied upon to replace a huge
number of aircraft, in a number of air arms. Outside the United States, it is
the likely replacement for many F-16s and possibly F/A-18s. If the JSF is not
procured, some other type will have to be. For the U.S. Marine Corps, the loss of
the STOVL JSF—and in fact the programme is in jeopardy in the Defense De-
partment’s current Quadrennial Defense Review—would be a serious blow,
demanding either the updating of the AV-8B or a fundamental change in Marine
aviation doctrine. This vulnerability prompted Lieutenant General Fred McCorkle,
USMC, Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation, to comment, “This nation has all its
eggs in one basket.”45
If the Royal Navy chooses a STOVL vessel, all of its aviation eggs will be in the
same basket. It might therefore be said that the STOVL Joint Strike Fighter is a
programme that will be made to work, since failure cannot be regarded as an op-
tion for two major customers. Even so, there are potential technical pitfalls with
a supersonic STOVL type, and it is likely that the Marine Corps will be awaiting
the flight-testing results with some anxiety. This will also be the case for Britain.
Britain has become a full collaborative partner in the JSF programme, and it
has invested considerable sums in the project. It must be recalled that British
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defence spending has edged inexorably downward for the last forty years; it is
hard to envisage the JSF expenditure to date as a mere expression of interest in
the project. This said, the cancelation of P.1154, TSR 2, F-111K, and Nimrod
AEW 3 after prodigious expenditure makes procurement of the JSF less than a
certainty.
Even given general confidence, however, that the Joint Strike Fighter will en-
ter British service, a major concern remains: whether the STOVL JSF will work
as planned. Supersonic VSTOL aircraft have been attempted before, and the
competing design teams admit
that the risk attached to the
STOVL option is the greatest in
the entire JSF programme. Appar-
ently even simple and elegant
technological and engineering so-
lutions sometimes fail to work as advertised, and the inherent difficulties of
short takeoffs and vertical landings make this more of a risk. Since the STOVL
variant is only part of the programme, technical difficulties with it will not
wreck the Joint Strike Fighter. Most customers will employ the CTOL version,
and whether the STOVL variant works is not a concern to them. It is the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps and the Royal Navy that will suffer most if the STOVL JSF does not
become a reality.
If the STOVL variant runs into development problems or escalating costs, the
United Kingdom may well look for another carrier aircraft, employing the con-
ventional Joint Strike Fighter in a few squadrons to meet its commitments to the
programme. The problem here is that the choice of carrier platform will be
made before the STOVL JSF is proven (unless it suffers major problems that in-
stantly rule it out). If a STOVL platform is chosen with the intent to fly the Joint
Strike Fighter, but the aircraft fails, the Royal Navy will have little option but to
upgrade its Harriers. It may well be that attrition and the fatigue life remaining
for the Harriers precludes an upgrade; there is also the issue of whether it would
be better to use the Harrier GR 9 as the basis for an upgrade or to reopen the
GR 9 production line.46 Commentator Roy Braybrook has argued that the U.S.
Marine Corps and the RAF should not contemplate procurement of STOVL JSF
but should instead rely on an upgraded Harrier GR 9/AV-8B with “improved ra-
dar and long range missiles.”47 In the event of STOVL JSF cancelation, it is likely
that the GR 7/AV-8B would be used as the basis for the replacement type.
If the STOVL JSF does work, however, it will provide a number of clear bene-
fits. It will offer the Royal Air Force the capability to operate from austere loca-
tions, even without runways. With an apparently increasing British commitment
to peacekeeping—which usually occurs in areas where aviation infrastructure
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either has been destroyed or never existed—this is important.48 For the naval ele-
ment of a joint British force, JSF has several advantages over all other types in
operations from the CV(F). The most obvious are that short takeoff and vertical
landings remove the need for arresting gear, and for any launching system be-
yond the ski jump.
More generally, operations with the Invincible class have already demonstrated
the manifest advantages that STOVL has over CTOL. These can be characterised
as means of operability. First, because of the ski jump, a STOVL aircraft always
leaves the deck on an upward trajectory, preventing a potentially dangerous lack
of clearance between aircraft and ocean in rough seas with a pitching deck. Sec-
ond, the likelihood of a “fouled deck” (from which aircraft can be neither
launched nor recovered because others are in the way, either being moved or
suddenly broken down) is far less acute. The vertical landing capability allows
STOVL types to land even if their usual landing spots are blocked. There are no
“bolters” (forced last-instant decisions of pilots not to land) on STOVL vessels;
it has been proven that even when the carrier is blanketed in thick fog, with the
pilot unable to see the vessel, landing is possible. During the Falklands conflict,
one pilot returned from patrol to Invincible in just such weather conditions and
nearly out of fuel. A searchlight was shone upward from the carrier, through the
fog, and the pilot descended following the beam.49 Finally, the STOVL type can
land on vessels that are not designed to operate it. This was taken to extremes in
June 1983 by Sub-Lieutenant Ian Watson, who, through lack of fuel, could not
return to the carrier; he instead landed on a passing Spanish merchant ship, the
Alraigo. This saved an aircraft that would otherwise have had to be abandoned. It
is not difficult to envisage situations where the ability to land aboard other ves-
sels in a battle group would be advantageous.50 The United Kingdom has already
commissioned HMS Ocean as an LPH, and that ship could operate a small num-
ber of STOVL types if need be.51
Although it has now become something of a cliché in British circles, the
maxim “It’s far easier to stop, then land, than to land, then stop” has more than a
grain of truth to it. It describes the manner of short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing
operations perfectly. A 1992 report by the Center for Naval Analyses suggested
that naval STOVL aircraft could undertake 25 percent more sorties than a
conventional-takeoff-and-landing type over a five-hundred-nautical-mile radius
in a twelve-hour period; if the radius of action were reduced to 250 nautical
miles, the STOVL type could generate 40 percent more.52
To summarise, the STOVL vessel offers the ability to operate aircraft in
weather conditions that would not be acceptable for CTOL types; it reduces the
number of personnel required, by employing neither catapult nor arresting gear.
Accordingly, the STOVL vessel can be cheaper and generate more sorties than a
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CTOL carrier. For the Royal Navy, it is hard to see how there can be any objection
to continuing to use STOVL vessels when these offer such great efficiencies com-
pared to conventional types.
The major objection to STOVL appears to be that the Harrier and Sea Harrier
are essentially limited in their technological advancement. Even this is debatable,
however, since the technology of the Rolls-Royce Pegasus engine was advanced for
its day; Rolls Royce has carried out continuous upgrading of and research on the
engine, and further improvements are to be expected. As noted earlier, a key fac-
tor that is often overlooked when comparing the Sea Harrier and the more
up-to-date AV-8B/Harrier GR 7 with other combat aircraft is that the former
are fundamentally first-generation designs, employing 1950s engineering with
1980s modifications overlaid by 1990s technology. The only means of achieving
adequate vertical and short-takeoff-and-landing performance without unacceptable
weight penalties when the P.1127 prototype was designed was the single-engine
vectored nozzle. This imposed certain limitations on the size of the aircraft,
particularly on its internal volume. The Sea Harrier, Harrier GR 1/GR 3, and
AV-8A/C, therefore, were all small combat aircraft. The AV-8B/Harrier GR 7 im-
proved the airframe, avionics, and load-carrying capacity, but they were still tied
to the vectored-nozzle system. Perhaps its most notable limitation, if the least
relevant to operational efficiency, is that the vectored-nozzle engine does not al-
low supersonic flight.53 This has always received far too much consideration; su-
personic performance has for too long been regarded as something that fighter
and attack aircraft must have. The only two Western designs of note without it
since the late 1960s have been the A-10 and the Harrier family.54 It is notable that
these two types have always received only grudging respect (if any); even
highly impressive results in combat have not saved them from verbal “friendly
fire.” In the case of the Harrier, although General Norman Schwarzkopf an-
nounced that the AV-8B had been one of the key weapon systems in DESERT
STORM, there were more than enough people prepared to criticise the AV-8B
for its vulnerability to infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles rather than
point out its effectiveness. While there is truth in this criticism of the AV-8B, it
does not undermine the overall effectiveness of STOVL operations, and partic-
ularly not from aircraft carriers.
NOT AN OPTION BUT A NECESSITY
In light of all this, what is the best option for the Royal Navy for its future carrier
operations? The conventional-takeoff-and landing carrier seems the least likely
option, given the expense associated with the ship itself and the complement
required to support the air wing. The choice between short-takeoff-but-arrested-
recovery and short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing is more difficult to assess. If the
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STOVL variant of the Joint Strike Fighter performs as planned, it will be ex-
tremely difficult to argue in favour of STOBAR. Still, the issue of how good an
air-combat machine JSF is will need to be resolved before we can be absolutely
certain that the Royal Navy will take delivery of the type. It should also be re-
called that recent threats to the
F-22 programme led to assertions
that were F-22 procurement to be
reduced (or cut entirely), the JSF
would have to be redesigned to make it suitable for the air-superiority role.55 The
Typhoon is claimed (by both its manufacturers and independent experts) to be
the next-best air combat type after the F-22 (and less expensive), which may give
it an advantage over rivals for procurement by the Royal Navy.
In spite of this, STOVL JSF would appear to offer a level of operational flexi-
bility that neither a navalised Typhoon nor the Rafale could provide. The major
difficulty with the Joint Strike Fighter is uncertainty whether the STOVL variant
can be developed without major technical difficulties. We should know the an-
swer in the not-too-distant future, although it appears that the programme may
be subjected to some delay.56 If it works, the probability is that the JSF will oper-
ate from British carrier decks from 2012 as part of a joint Royal Air Force/Royal
Navy force; STOVL is clearly the most flexible and affordable option for a power
of Britain’s size. The difficulty is whether even the huge advances in technology
since the P.1127 metamorphosed into the Harrier and Sea Harrier have been
enough to advance STOVL from a proven but still developing system into a truly
flexible weapon system. If not, defence officials will have to consider the options
very carefully, and they will have to make some difficult choices.
One choice will not be available—to abandon the aircraft carrier entirely.
Britain has tried this once, and for all the later success of the Invincible class, it
had reasons to regret the decision, including a number of sunken vessels in the
South Atlantic. This bitter experience makes clear the lack of carrier-based
airpower would demand a fundamental shift in British foreign policy. There has
already been such a shift since the end of the Cold War, and not toward less in-
volvement. The current government purports to pursue an ethical foreign policy
(despite some awkward contradictions); it has made this intention clear with its
continuing support of action against Saddam Hussein, operations over Kosovo,
and the deployment of troops to East Timor. Although in all three cases Britain’s
contributions have not been the largest, they still represent a deployment of sig-
nificant proportions of British military resources.
The Strategic Defence Review does nothing to suggest that there will be a scal-
ing down of this support for humanitarian intervention and attacks against dic-
tatorial states. Britain’s new foreign policy paradigm demands flexibility and
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
“It’s far easier to stop, then land, than to land,
then stop.”
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 30
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/30
deployability. Even with the procurement of a strategic airlifter for the Royal Air
Force (after much confusion), deployability will still be heavily dependent upon
naval airpower.57 This is true now, and the CV(F) will be of immeasurable value
when it eventually arrives. If the design of the vessel and the aircraft type to be
operated from it are still far from clear, one thing is obvious. If Britain is to con-
tinue in the post–Cold War world in the role it has set out for itself, carrier-based
air power is not an option. It is a necessity.
N O T E S
1. See Derek Wood, Project Cancelled (London:
MacDonald and Jane’s, 1975), pp. 207–24.
The Admiralty did not appear to want the
P.1154 and ensured that its requirements for
the aircraft were almost diametrically op-
posed to the RAF’s needs.
2. Cynics could also suggest that the F-4K Phan-
tom clearly required a CTOL carrier, thus en-
suring that the new carrier would not be of
the smaller VSTOL types. Less cynically, it
could be pointed out that the Phantom was
obviously a great aircraft already. To take the
technical risk of procuring the P.1154 when
there was a suitable aircraft available ap-
peared pointless. Although the Royal Navy
operated only one squadron of Phantoms at
sea, this was a result of changing government
policy and the abandonment of conventional
carriers. Had the CVA-01 programme gone
ahead with full replacement of then-extant
carriers, at least five squadrons (and possibly
six) would have been required.
3. These modifications included an extendable
nosewheel strut to provide the correct angle
of attack on takeoff, given the shorter carrier
decks of the Royal Navy. This was mainly for
reasons of the increased thrust provided by
the Rolls-Royce Spey engine, but the political
imperative of generating jobs in the British
aviation industry demanded a high U.K.-built
content for the F-4K. The Spey was also in-
stalled in the RAF version, in spite of the fact
that the RAF did not want or need the engine;
the Spey had a slower afterburner-lightup
time and was less fuel efficient than the stan-
dard J-79. The net result of the Spey installa-
tion and the high amount of subcontracting
led RAF pilots, however much they loved the
aircraft, to describe them as the most
expensive, noisiest, and slowest Phantoms in
the world.
4. For the design of CVA-01, see David Hobbs,
Aircraft Carriers of the Royal and Common-
wealth Navies (London: Greenhill Books,
1996), pp. 249–50.
5. HMS Albion, Bulwark, Centaur, and Hermes
were all of the Centaur class, with origins as
light fleet carriers in the Second World War.
There were substantial variations in each ves-
sel, with Hermes often being regarded as a
separate class by itself. In the early 1960s,
Albion and Bulwark were converted to carry
Royal Marine commandos, deployed by heli-
copter; they were roughly equivalent to the
U.S. LPH in concept. Centaur was paid off in
1965 and used as an accommodation vessel.
Of the fleet carriers, Victorious was the oldest,
having entered service in 1941. It was modi-
fied extensively between 1950 and 1958, after
which it was arguably one of the most ad-
vanced vessels in any navy. Again, in compar-
ison with the carriers operated by the U.S.
Navy, the Victorious air group was limited,
with a maximum of thirty-six aircraft. Her-
mes could manage twenty-eight Sea Vixens,
Scimitars, and Buccaneers; by the 1970s,
however, only the Buccaneer was a truly via-
ble combat type. Thanks to typically parsimo-
nious defence spending, the Scimitar never
received the avionics fit it needed to become a
multirole aircraft. In its basic form it could
carry four 30 mm cannon and early guided
weapons, such as the Bullpup and AIM-9B.
6. Although Victorious might have managed to
take Phantoms, more than thirty aircraft
would have been a tight fit. Since at least ten
aircraft would have been AEW Gannets and
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Sea King and Wessex helicopters, this limita-
tion would have reduced the effectiveness of
the air group.
7. It was argued that this would be too costly,
but it is difficult to find any authoritative
source that accepts the validity of this
reasoning.
8. The only aircraft types in the RAF’s inventory
designed for such air defence work (apart
from the Hawker Hunter, which had begun
life as an interceptor but was by the late 1960s
used for ground attack) were the F-4 and the
English Electric Lightning. In the early to
mid-1970s, the RAF’s Phantom fleet was
committed to Germany in the strike role. Af-
ter the introduction of the SEPECAT Jaguar,
the Phantom was transferred to the air de-
fence of the United Kingdom and thus would
not be readily available to defend the fleet. In
any case, how the RAF was to defend carriers
in the middle of the Atlantic was never quite
explained. The F-4 could not manage this,
even with tanker support. Although the
Lightning must rank as one of the great
fighter designs (it gave an excellent account
of itself in exercises against the F-14, F-15,
and F-16 even in the late 1980s), its endur-
ance was appalling. Designed as a point inter-
ceptor, even with in-flight refuelling the
Lightning could not have maintained a com-
bat air patrol over the fleet. In actuality, air
defence of the Royal Navy was effectively left
to the U.S. Navy—one of whose carriers, it
was hoped, would be available to support
operations.
9. This had been trialed by the United King-
dom, West Germany, and the U.S. Marine
Corps in 1966, including landings on the USS
Independence (CV 62) and small-deck tests on
the dock transport USS Raleigh (LPD 1).
10. The CVSG had no arresting gear or catapults,
and the Navy began to present it to politi-
cians as a “through-deck cruiser,” which
would operate an air complement of antisub-
marine helicopters, with a few VSTOL air-
craft (obviously Harriers) to defend against
Soviet reconnaissance aircraft. The designa-
tion of the new class as a “cruiser” was barely
plausible—the ship was cynically referred to
as a “see-through cruiser”—and caused prob-
lems to begin with, since the type was initially
meant to carry not fixed-wing aircraft but the
Exocet antishipping missile to provide
offensive firepower. Had the CVSG been de-
signed to carry VSTOLs from the outset, it is
likely that it would have been bigger, to give it
a meaningful air group.
11. By 1972, although the decision to withdraw
conventional carriers was not likely to have
been reversed, it had been decided that a na-
val version of the Harrier would be accept-
able. Such a machine, while not offering the
capabilities of an F-4 or a Buccaneer, could at
least provide limited air defence for the
through-deck cruisers—now the Invincible
class—while they conducted their primary
mission.
12. There was considerable public support for
the Ark Royal after a BBC TV series on the
ship. Public feeling was so strong that the
planned HMS Indomitable was renamed.
13. The Hermes was withdrawn from British ser-
vice in 1985, after a period in reserve, and was
sold to India, where it is now the Viraat.
14. The Ark Royal’s air wing normally consisted
of twelve F-4 Phantoms, fourteen Blackburn
Buccaneers, three Fairey Gannet airborne
early warning aircraft, and six Sea King anti-
submarine helicopters. Two Westland Wes-
sex helicopters were also embarked in the
search-and-rescue role, and occasionally a
single carrier-onboard-delivery variant of the
Gannet.
15. It might also be pointed out that the Royal
Navy was subjected to savage cuts in the 1981
defence review. Under this, Invincible was to
be sold to Australia. Had the Argentine lead-
ership waited a few more months before in-
vading, Britain would not have had the forces
to mount the operation. Ironically, the man
who came up with the ruinous review,
Defence Secretary John Nott, was knighted in
the aftermath of the Falklands campaign. It is
arguable that without the review (which also
called for withdrawing the patrol ship Endur-
ance from the South Atlantic), Argentina
might have judged that invading the
Falklands was too much of a risk.
16. Later, after conversion to the commando car-
rier role, Hermes was fitted with a ski ramp,
allowing it to operate Sea Harriers, thus pro-
viding an interim vessel for use while the
three Invincible-class vessels were being built.
The air wing on both carriers was reinforced,
bringing the number of Harriers above the
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twenty-six fighter and attack aircraft em-
barked by Ark Royal.
17. Thanks to the support of the United States,
the Royal Navy was able to draw on Nato
stocks of the AIM-9L all-aspect variant rather
than use the then-standard AIM-9G.
18. The vertical takeoff requires far more fuel
and reduces payload; thus it makes much
more operational sense for the Harrier to be-
gin with a short takeoff run.
19. The only solution was to modify a number of
Sea King helicopters to carry the EMI
Searchwater radar in a large, inflatable ra-
dome mounted on the side. The modification
programme began while the conflict was in
progress, but the first conversion did not ar-
rive until the fighting was over.
20. The Argentine carrier, the Veinticinco de
Mayo, was not employed. A planned strike on
the British fleet from its deck was aborted for
lack of wind; shortly afterward, the cruiser
Belgrano was sunk by the fleet submarine
HMS Conqueror. The Argentine fleet did not
venture toward the Falklands again.
21. It was said that the British carriers were so far
east of the Falklands that their crews qualified
for the Burma Star.
22. It ought to be noted that the Argentine air
force’s Mirage and Dagger aircraft had much
the same problem. Even taking into account
the fact that they had longer journeys to and
from the combat zone, the air-to-air arma-
ment of the Mirage III and its variants was
not particularly impressive.
23. Peter E. Davies and Anthony M. Thorn-
borough, The Harrier Story (London: Arms
and Armour Press, 1996), pp. 161–8. Al-
though it is a potent machine, the Sea Har-
rier’s armament is limited. It invariably carries
two 190-gallon fuel tanks under the inner
wing pylons, as without them its range is pro-
hibitively short. This leaves room for just two
AIM-120s under the wings. Two more can be
placed under the fuselage, but if they are, the
30 mm gun pods have to be off-loaded; for
situations such as policing no-fly zones—
where the ability to fire warning shots is use-
ful—this is a problem. (This issue has been
ignored for ridiculously small financial gains
in the RAF’s forthcoming Typhoons, which
the current government intends not to equip
with a gun solely to save money on support
costs.) The Sea Harriers usually fly with a mix
of two AMRAAMs (advanced medium-range
air-to-air missiles) and two gun pods in these
circumstances, or replace the AIM-120s with
the AIM-9M Sidewinder. The Sea Harrier can
also carry ground-attack weapons, but the use
of the Harrier GR 7 from carrier decks has
seen a dramatic reduction in the use of the
Sea Harrier for attack missions. Additionally,
AIM-120s carried on the fuselage positions
have been damaged by heat and vibration. At
the end of the deployment of Sea Harriers in
support of Operation ALLIED FORCE (the
1999 Kosovo campaign), around half the
AIM-120s embarked upon Invincible had
been rendered unserviceable by this cause.
24. The Harrier GR 7 is a very different machine
from the Harrier of 1982. The “big wing”
Harrier has a far greater load-carrying capa-
bility than the Sea Harrier, with eight under-
wing hardpoints (two dedicated for the use of
Sidewinder), compared to the Sea Harrier’s
four. As recently seen over Kosovo, the GR 7
can easily provide self-designation for laser-
guided weapons, through the TIALD system,
mounted on an under-fuselage pylon. The
combination of Sea Harrier and Harrier GR 7
provides greatly increased flexibility for Brit-
ish maritime operations. The GR 7 (as well as
the GR 5 model, which preceded it) suffered
at first from a number of problems affecting
the engine and weapons. One of these prob-
lem areas was the new 25 mm ADEN cannon,
specially designed for the Harrier GR 5/GR 7;
after years of trying to integrate it with the
Harrier’s weapon system, it was decided to
abandon the idea. The considerably less ad-
vanced 30 mm ADEN (based on the German
30 mm cannon designs of 1944–45) still func-
tions perfectly, but it can only be carried by
the Sea Harrier. All the surviving GR 5 air-
craft have now been upgraded to the GR 7
standard.
25. This criticism usually revolves around the
capabilities of the Sea Harrier. In spite of its
upgrade, it must be recalled, the Sea Harrier
is a first-generation STOVL type, based on the
P.1127, which was never designed to carry a
war load. The Harrier GR 7, as an evolved,
second-generation type, gives better insight
into the potentialities of STOVL for naval use.
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26. It is not hard to posit such a scenario—for
example, had Italy not permitted the use of its
airfields for Nato operations against Serbia, the
only nearby alternatives were either not
Nato-compatible (e.g., in Hungary) or not
adequate (as in Albania).
27. The Strategic Defence Review, Command Paper
3999 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Of-
fice, 1998).
28. Ibid.
29. The Sea Harrier force is moving to the RAF
base at Cottesmore to be in closer proximity
to the RAF’s Harriers: two squadrons operate
from Cottesmore and two more from the
nearby base at Wittering, which is literally
just a few miles down the A1.
30. Richard Scott and Mike Wells, “Flexing Joint
Muscle: Mixed Air Groups aboard Carriers,”
Jane’s Navy International, December 1997,
pp. 14–22.
31. The provision of catapults and arresting gear
adds cost to the vessel, and the joint nature of
future operations means training of RAF pi-
lots to conduct carrier landings as an
unlooked-for complication that would add
expense, which many perceive as pointless
when STOVL types have worked so well for
the United Kingdom.
32. See David Foxwell, “New Waves of Sea
Power,” Jane’s International Defence Review,
February 1997, p. 34.
33. See the discussion section after David James,
“British Naval Doctrine and the Future
Equipment Programme,” in Maritime Avia-
tion: Light and Medium Aircraft Carriers into
the Twenty-first Century, ed. Peter Hore and
Thomas J. Hirschfield (Hull, U.K.: Univ. of
Hull Press, 1999), p.115.
34. See “Sea Legs for Typhoon?” retrieved from
the World Wide Web:
http://eurofightertyphoon.com.
35. This factor (among others, of course) led to
the adoption of the F/A-18 over the F-16 by
the U.S. Navy; the F-16 was felt not to have
the necessary development potential for
carrierborne operations. The Royal Navy has
experience with aircraft that are not strong
enough for carrier operations. Although the
Seafire (navalised Spitfire) was highly re-
garded, for instance, it was more prone to
landing accidents and downtime than other
types.
36. This is speculation on the part of the author,
who is not entirely convinced that procuring
navalised Typhoons would reduce the overall
unit cost of the aircraft. The costs of develop-
ing the aircraft might well be greater than the
savings made by having a single, national de-
sign authority.
37. The key issue here would be training pilots of
the RAF squadrons to land on carriers, dis-
cussed above, but perhaps more relevant is
the role portrayed for the Typhoon in RAF
service. It has already been mooted as a con-
tender—in modified form—for the Follow-on
Offensive Aircraft System (FOAS), which will
replace the Tornado GR 4. Defence spending
priorities may well cause more Typhoons to
be purchased to replace Tornados in some
squadrons before the FOAS is chosen. Since
the early 1990s, Ministry of Defence policy,
even if unstated, has been to reduce the num-
ber of types in the RAF’s inventory. The Buc-
caneer and Phantom were withdrawn some
years before schedule; the Jaguar fleet was
constantly targeted for retirement until the
Jaguar GR 3 upgrade added vastly improved
capability at a very low price. It also demon-
strated that requirements unique to one
country enabled the problems of collabora-
tive ventures to be swept aside with ease.
38. Currently, the RAF possesses the following
types in the following number of combat air-
craft squadrons (including operational con-
version units): Tornado F3, six; Tornado GR
1/GR 4, eight; Jaguar GR 3, four; Harrier GR
7, four; and Sea Harrier, three. The Typhoon
is scheduled to replace all the Tornado F 3
and Jaguar units. It is anticipated that the to-
tal of 232 will permit the formation of ten
frontline squadrons and a training unit to
teach both air-to-air and air-to-ground oper-
ations. If the Harriers were replaced with
navalised Typhoons, the number of “opera-
tional conversion units” (OCU—equivalent
to the U.S. Navy’s fleet readiness squadrons)
could be reduced from the current five to two
(one Typhoon, one Tornado).
39. A problem with this scenario might be
whether one OCU for the Typhoon would be
enough. The question of whether it would be
wise to rely upon one aircraft type would also
have to be considered.
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40. This is to say nothing of the creation of a
European defence force. A number of senior
European politicians have called for the for-
mation of European armed services. It should
be noted that British politicians are not
among them. It is probably fair to say that the
British electorate’s respect for its armed ser-
vices and its often suspicious attitude toward
foreigners (at least those who do not speak
English as their native language) make it un-
likely to take kindly to the politician who ini-
tiates the transfer of British forces to
supranational control. Aside from British in-
sularity (or xenophobia), there is consider-
able anecdotal evidence that the idea might
not work. It is not widely known, but some
French units in Bosnia refused to speak any-
thing other than French to their colleagues
(this from a conversation between the author
and a British officer who served in Bosnia).
French spirits rose when a French Canadian
unit arrived, but the differences between Ca-
nadian and “metropolitan” French were such
that the Canadians decided that they would
rather use English.
41. See the “Straight and Level” column in Flight
International on many occasions in the
mid-1980s for full explication of the term.
42. It is not unfair to say that the departure of
Avions Marcel Dassault was met with relief
from the other nations. Dassault has devel-
oped an unfortunate reputation for promot-
ing its own products at the expense even of
collaborative programmes with which it is in-
volved. This led to the Aeronavale (French
naval aviation) receiving the Super Etendard
instead of the SEPECAT Jaguar M, which was
arguably the better aircraft. See World Air
Power Journal, vol. 35, p. 68, for particular
reference to the Eurofighter Typhoon.
43. Ibid, pp. 54–97. The Eurofighter story became
almost farcical. When it was announced that
the aircraft was to be named the Typhoon,
objections by the Germans (who felt it tact-
less to name the aircraft after one that had
killed many Germans in the Second World
War) led to the compromise that it would be
known as the Typhoon only for export cus-
tomers. The RAF was thus faced with the
prospect of having the “Eurofighter” as its
main combat type.
44. The Charles de Gaulle suffered embarrassing
power-plant problems (related to auxiliary
engines, not the nuclear reactor) on its
maiden voyage, being forced to return to port
early. It was also discovered that the flight
deck was not large enough for its E-2C early
warning planes to manoeuvre safely. See
“Carrier Concerns,” Jane’s Navy Interna-
tional, March 1999, p. 8; and “Up Close:
Charles de Gaulle Finds Its Sea Legs,” Jane’s
Navy International, November 1999, pp. 10–1.
45. “Osprey Crash and JSF Doubts Hit USMC
Aircraft Plans,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19
April 2000, p. 11.
46. The Harrier GR 7 is to be improved to the
GR 9 standard with the addition of new
avionics.
47. See Roy Braybrook, “VSTOL: Reflections 40
Years On,” Air International, October 1999,
pp. 235–40.
48. Operations in such cases, though, are unlikely
to take the form of the 1970s and 1980s,
when Harrier GR 3s operated from forest
clearings using short runways of pierced steel
planking, or from shopping-mall car parks. It
is more likely that austerely equipped airports
would be employed instead, with the STOVL
capability removing the need for long, well-
maintained runways.
49. N. D. “Sharkey” Ward [Cdr., RN], Sea Har-
rier over the Falklands (London: Orion, 1993),
pp. 317–8.
50. See Davies and Thornborough, pp. 161–2.
51. Short takeoffs would not be possible, since
one of Ocean’s close-in weapon systems
would be in direct line of a takeoff run;
VTOL would be the only option.
52. Most recently cited in Combat Aircraft: The
International Journal of Military Aviation,
May–June 1999, p. 144.
53. Supersonic performance might be given to
the Harrier through the use of a technique
known as “plenum chamber burning.” This
has been under test for many years but has
never been introduced for operational
service.
54. There have, of course, been other, less well
known, types, such as the Italian/Brazilian
AMX (the obscurity of which seems a little
unfair).
55. See “Raptor under Threat,” Air Forces
Monthly, September 1999, p. 4. Also, see
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“United States Navy Today: Part 1, the Car-
rier Air Wing,” Air International, August
1999, pp. 100–6, where Tony Holmes posits
the view that “JSF is effectively a bomber with
a strong fighter capability, more f/A than F/a.”
56. “Osprey Crash,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, p. 11.
57. The SDR identified a need for a heavy-lift ca-
pability for the RAF and called for the interim
leasing of “C-17 class” aircraft to fulfill the
role. Much to commentators’ surprise, the
strategic airlifter was canceled in 1999. There-
after it became increasingly apparent, how-
ever, that UK defence commitments demand
this type of aircraft, and the requirement was
reinstated.
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TRANSFORMING THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
Rhetoric or Reality?
Thomas G. Mahnken
The leadership of the Defense Department has enthusiastically endorsed theproposition that the growth and diffusion of stealth, precision, and informa-
tion technology will drastically alter the character and conduct of future wars,
yielding a revolution in military affairs. President George W. Bush campaigned
on a pledge to transform the U.S. armed forces by “skipping a generation” of
technology. A month after assuming office, he promised in a speech at the Norfolk
Naval Base to “move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technolo-
gies that will support a new strategy.” He called for the development of ground
forces that are lighter, more mobile, and more lethal, as well as manned and un-
manned air forces capable of striking across the globe with precision.1
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated
during his confirmation hearings that his central
challenge would be to “bring the American mili-
tary successfully into the 21st century.”2 Soon after
assuming office, Rumsfeld commissioned Andrew
W. Marshall, the Pentagon’s premier strategic
thinker, to conduct a fundamental review of Ameri-
can strategy and force requirements. The review re-
p or ted ly recommended that the Defense
Department emphasize forces capable of fighting
and winning wars in Asia, with its vast distances and
sparse infrastructure, in the face of increasingly
challenging threats.3
Speaking at the U.S. Naval Academy in May 2001,
President Bush called for “a future force that is defined
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less by size and more by mobility and swiftness, one that is easier to deploy
and sustain, one that relies more heavily on stealth, precision weaponry, and
information technologies.” He also committed himself “to fostering a military
culture where intelligent risk-taking and forward thinking are rewarded, not
dreaded,” and to “ensuring that visionary leaders who take risks are recognized
and promoted.”4
The U.S. armed forces themselves have embraced—at least rhetorically—the need
to transform so as to meet the demands of information-age warfare. They have
fielded new capabilities, such as stealth and precision strike, and explored novel
approaches to combat, such as network-centric warfare and effects-based opera-
tions. Nevertheless, significant organizational barriers to the adoption of new
technology, doctrine, and organizations exist. The services have been particu-
larly reluctant to take measures that are disruptive of service culture, such as
shifting away from traditional platforms and toward new weapon systems, con-
cepts, and organizations. The Army’s attempts to field a medium-weight ground
force, the Navy’s development of network-centric warfare, and the Air Force’s
experience with unmanned air vehicles illustrate such difficulties. In each case,
efforts at transformation have faced opposition from service traditionalists who
perceive threats in new ways of war. For the Defense Department to succeed in
transforming the U.S. armed forces, it must both reallocate resources and nur-
ture new constituencies.
THE CHARACTER OF WAR IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Recent years have witnessed the rapid growth and diffusion of information tech-
nology. It is radically changing the structure of advanced economies, the nature
of politics, and the shape of society. It is also shifting the ways in which wars are
fought. What many refer to as the emerging revolution in military affairs (RMA)
is merely the military manifestation of the information revolution. The shape,
scope, and strategic impact of the revolution is uncertain. Still, the experience of
recent conflicts, together with trends in the development of technology, suggests
changes in the conduct of war on land, at sea, and in the air, as well as the grow-
ing use of space and the information spectrum for military operations.
One trend that is already apparent is the ability to achieve new levels of military
effectiveness by networking together disparate sensors, weapons, and com-
mand-and-control systems. Rapid advances in information and related technol-
ogies already allow military forces to detect, identify, and track a far greater
number of targets over a larger area for a longer time than ever before. Increas-
ingly powerful information-processing and communication systems offer the
ability to distribute this data more quickly and effectively. The result is a dra-
matic improvement in the quantity and quality of information that modern
8 6 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
90
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 30
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/30
military organizations can collect, process, and disseminate. In the future, as in
the past, forces that can secure a superior understanding of their own disposi-
tions, those of their adversaries, and the features of the battlefield will be at a
considerable advantage.5
In a number of instances, the U.S. armed forces have attempted to explore
how improvements in situational awareness can increase combat effectiveness.
From September 1993 to September 1994, for example, the U.S. Air Force con-
ducted an experiment that pitted
eighteen F-15Cs equipped with
Joint Tactical Information Distri-
bution System (JTIDS) terminals
against unmodified F-15s. JTIDS
provided a datalink that allowed
each modified F-15 to share its
sensor and threat data with all the others. Their unmodified opponents were
supported by E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft but
could share information only by voice radio. The enhanced situational aware-
ness provided by JTIDS allowed the modified F-15s to achieve an exchange ratio
that was in their favor by a factor of around 2.6.6
The increasing use of information technology portends a significant shift in
the balance between offense and defense, fire and maneuver, and space and time.
Militaries that harness the information revolution are already at a marked
advantage in comparison to those that do not. The Gulf War hinted at the battle-
field advantages that accrue to armed forces that capitalize on stealth, informa-
tion, and precision weaponry. Nato’s air war over Serbia stands out as another
demonstration of at least the tactical effectiveness of advanced military
technology.
The integration of information technology into military forces is also chang-
ing the relationship between fire and maneuver. Networking long-range sensors
and weapons allows us to concentrate fire from dispersed platforms on a com-
mon set of targets. The U.S. Navy, for example, has examined the “Ring of Fire,” a
concept for focusing dispersed naval fire on shore-based targets.7 Networking
thus allows the potential massing of effects without massing forces. It could also
reduce vulnerability by denying an adversary the ability to target forces with his
own long-range strike systems, while increasing the tempo of military opera-
tions by reducing the delay between observation and action.8 By operating faster
than adversaries, a networked force may effectively deny them battlefield op-
tions.9 These trends favor networked forces that are small, agile, and stealthy
over hierarchical organizations that are large, slow, and nonstealthy. Should the
U.S. armed forces exploit these trends, the United States will gain increased
M A H N K E N 8 7
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tactical, operational, and—potentially—strategic leverage over potential
adversaries.
While the United States currently enjoys a considerable lead in exploiting the
information revolution, it is hardly alone in attempting to do so. Indeed, the list
of militaries interested in information-age warfare is long and growing. Some
may develop strategies to deny foes the ability to project power into their spheres
of influence.10 Others may challenge the United States in space or the informa-
tion spectrum. Moreover, their ability to do such things is growing. The director
of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for example, has testified that Russia and
China, as well as other smaller states and nonstate actors, are pursuing capabili-
ties to disrupt, degrade, or defeat American space systems.11 Similarly, one recent
article assessed that twenty-three nations have the ability to launch informa-
tion-warfare attacks.12 Failure to meet such threats could lead to a military that is
increasingly irrelevant to the types of wars that the United States will fight.
Past revolutions in warfare have changed not only the character and conduct
of combat but also the shape of the organizations that wage war. The emergence
of new ways of war has altered the importance of existing services, and combat
arms triggered the rise of new elites and eclipsed previously dominant ones.
During the first half of the twentieth century, for example, naval aviation as-
sumed a central role in war at sea. As the aircraft carrier displaced the battleship
as the centerpiece of modern navies, naval aviators challenged the traditional
dominance of surface warfare officers. During the same period, the advent of
land-based aircraft created new elites within armies and eventually spawned
new military services. Armored forces usurped the roles of cavalry in armies
across the globe. The information revolution portends similar organizational
turbulence as the character of war on land, at sea, and in the air changes and as
combat spreads to space and the information spectrum.
THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AND THE EMERGING RMA
The Department of Defense has declared its recognition of the need to change
radically the structure of the U.S. armed forces in order to embrace the informa-
tion revolution. The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review committed the depart-
ment to transforming its forces. As then–Secretary of Defense William Cohen
put it:
The information revolution is creating a Revolution in Military Affairs that will
fundamentally change the way U.S. forces fight. We must exploit these and other
technologies to dominate in battle. Our template for seizing on these technologies
and ensuring military dominance is Joint Vision 2010, the plan set forth by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military operations of the future.13
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The congressionally mandated National Defense Panel argued even more
strongly in favor of the need to transform U.S. forces. The panel’s report urged
the Defense Department to “undertake a broad transformation of its mili-
tary and national security structures, operational concepts and equipment,
and . . . key business processes,” including procurement reform.14 It recom-
mended, among other things, that
the department accord the high-
est priority to a transformation
strategy designed to prepare the
United States to confront the new
and very different threats of the
twenty-first century. It also argued
that the department should place greater emphasis on experimenting with a va-
riety of systems, operational concepts, and force structures.
In 1998, the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
designated U.S. Joint Forces Command (or JFCOM, formerly Atlantic Com-
mand) as the Defense Department’s executive agent for joint experimentation.15
Since assuming this responsibility, JFCOM has explored the concept of “rapid
decisive operations,” including attacks against critical, mobile targets—a mis-
sion that places a premium on nearly simultaneous sensor-to-shooter data flows
and high-speed, long-range weapons.16 The command plans to hold large-scale
exercises to test new operational concepts in 2002 and 2004.
Beyond such initiatives, however, the Defense Department has yet to implement
its announced commitment to transform its forces. The American armed
forces today look much the same as they did ten years ago, only smaller. They
have emphasized improving their ability to accomplish current tasks over ex-
ploring new ways of war. Similarly, most major acquisition programs of the last
decade have represented incremental improvements to current systems. The ser-
vices have fielded relatively few new weapon systems; of these, only a tiny frac-
tion, such as the B-2 stealth bomber, could have major impacts on the conduct of
war.17
Advocates of transformation point to the need to shift from a force based
upon major weapon systems to one based upon networks. They argue that
precision-guided weapons, platforms to collect enormous amounts of informa-
tion about the enemy, and command and control systems to direct one’s own
forces will play increasingly important roles in warfare. While the services have
invested increasing amounts of money in information technology, budget data
on major acquisition programs suggest that the U.S. military services continue
to have strongly platform-centric approaches to procurement. More than 75
percent of the Department of the Navy’s major-acquisition budget for fiscal year
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2002 is committed to large, traditional platforms—for instance, a new class of
submarine (SSN 774), carrier-based aircraft (the F/A-18E/F), various surface
ships (DDG 51 and LPD 17), and the tilt-rotor V-22 for the Marine Corps. U.S.
Army and Air Force programs show comparable emphases upon platforms.18
Rhetoric about transformation has yet to be reflected in weapons the services
acquire, let alone the way they acquire weapons. The Army’s attempts to trans-
form itself into a medium-weight force, the Navy’s experimentation with
network-centric warfare, and the Air Force’s investment in unmanned combat
vehicles all illustrate the difficulties associated with exploring new approaches
to combat.
The U.S. Army and the Medium-Weight Force
The Army faces the challenge of transforming itself from a tank-heavy force de-
signed to protect Western Europe from the armored columns of the Warsaw Pact
to one capable of responding to contingencies worldwide on short notice. Oper-
ation ALLIED FORCE, Nato’s war against Serbia, highlighted the Army’s lack of
units that are light enough to move quickly yet heavy enough to strike hard. The
experience prodded the Army chief of staff, General Eric Shinseki, to launch an
effort to reconfigure the Army into a more mobile yet still lethal force. In Octo-
ber 1999 he announced a goal of transforming the service into a “medium-
weight” force capable of deploying a five-thousand-man brigade anywhere in the
world within ninety-six hours. As he put it, “We must provide early-entry forces
that can operate jointly, without access to fixed forward bases, but we still need
the power to slug it out and win decisively.”19 He designated two brigades at Fort
Lewis, Washington, as test beds for exploring new concepts and organizations.
These units have traded in their tracked M1A1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley
fighting vehicles for wheeled LAV III infantry fighting vehicles leased from Can-
ada. They are also examining innovative new tactics and organizations. In No-
vember 2000, the Army awarded a four-billion-dollar contract to build the
“Interim Armored Vehicle,” a new generation of light, wheeled vehicles with
which to equip the new medium-weight units.
A key element of the Army’s transformation is the Future Combat System, a
network of light—and possibly unmanned—vehicles that would replace tanks
and self-propelled artillery in medium-weight units. Planners intend that the
new vehicle will weigh no more than twenty tons (compared to the seventy-ton
M1 Abrams), so that it can be transported aboard the Air Force’s most numer-
ous transport aircraft, the C-130. Because it will lack the armor to slug it out
with enemy tanks, its effectiveness will depend on its ability to identify and
engage enemy forces before they can engage it.20 The Army’s plan for the Future
Combat System is quite ambitious: the service plans to choose a design before
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Shinseki leaves office in 2003; production is to begin in 2010; and the system is to
be fielded by 2012. The General Accounting Office has, however, expressed
concern that key technologies may not mature quickly enough to meet such a
timetable.21
The Army’s transformation plan is not without its detractors. The merits of a
medium-weight force composed of wheeled vehicles remains to be
demonstrated. Moreover, the prospect of a medium-weight force threatens the
traditional emphasis upon armor as the centerpiece of ground combat, a notion
that has defined the service for the past six decades. Indeed, it challenges the very
definition and purpose of armored units. It is therefore hardly surprising that
both active-duty and retired armor officers and enlisted men have been vocal in
their opposition to the replacement of the tank with lighter wheeled vehicles.
Many are particularly uncomfortable with the prospect of trading their heavily
armored tanks for more vulnerable, if more mobile, vehicles.22
Nor is it certain that the Army will maintain its current course. This is not the
first time that the Army has attempted to transform itself. Indeed, it has exam-
ined the structure and organization of its combat units on twelve separate occa-
sions over the last sixty years, accumulating a track record that is at best mixed.23
It remains to be seen whether the current effort will survive General Shinseki’s
retirement.
The U.S. Navy and Network-centric Warfare
The U.S. Navy faces the challenge of transforming itself from a fleet designed to
fight in the open ocean to one that can dominate the littorals and project power
ashore. Like the other services, it must also define its roles in space and cyberspace.
To carry out these tasks, the Navy has sought to link weapon, sensor, and com-
mand and control systems—that is, to wage network-centric warfare. The Ma-
rine Corps, for its part, is exploring new methods of power projection and
attempting to come to grips with the challenges associated with military opera-
tions in urban terrain.
The Navy’s track record of innovation is checkered. The demise of the Arsenal
Ship highlights the barriers to innovation within the service. The Arsenal Ship, a
vessel built to commercial standards and manned by a small crew, would have
packed enough firepower to stop an armored column. Despite enjoying the sup-
port of Admiral William Owens (the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff),
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda (the Chief of Naval Operations), and General
Charles Krulak (the Commandant of the Marine Corps); the program lacked in-
stitutional support within the Navy. Critics raised questions about the utility
and effectiveness of the ship. In addition, the ship lacked a constituency within
the Navy. Indeed, it appeared to threaten a number of constituencies inside and
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outside the Navy. Some surface warfare officers and aviators saw it as a threat
to the aircraft carrier, while submariners saw it as stealing a mission they them-
selves wanted. Still others disliked the idea that the Arsenal Ship’s considerable
firepower could be at the disposal of a ground commander. These communities
attempted to undermine the case
for the Arsenal Ship. Indeed, Ad-
miral Boorda was forced to move
the program from the Navy to the
Defense Advanced Research Pro-
jects Agency in an attempt to pre-
serve it. The ship’s opponents were aided by people in industry and Congress
who had stakes in the status quo. As one former congressional aide put it, the Ar-
senal Ship “was a threat to the carrier, and that was a threat to Newport News
Shipbuilding. And that, in turn, was a threat to the Virginia [congressional] del-
egation.”24 In November 1997 the Navy killed the program, which a year earlier it
had declared one of its highest priorities, due to “insufficient funds.”
At a deeper level, it appears that the Arsenal Ship challenged the Navy’s tradi-
tional notion of command. The vessel was essentially a truck designed to bring
ordnance within firing range of targets. It would have lacked the sensors to tar-
get its own weapons, and it would have possessed only a minimal self-defense
capability. Officers who had for years aspired to command destroyers, cruisers,
and aircraft carriers likely did not relish the thought of becoming truck drivers.
Nonetheless, in recent years the Navy has begun exploring concepts that would
replace large platforms with a network of smaller and less vulnerable systems.
The Navy Warfare Development Command (in Newport, Rhode Island) and the
Naval Postgraduate School (in Monterey, California), for example, have exam-
ined STREETFIGHTER—a family of small platforms designed to gain and sustain
access to the littoral region in the face of a strong resistance, or “access denial”—as
well as CORSAIR, a small aircraft carrier.25 Further, the Navy Warfare Develop-
ment Command, stimulated by the performance of HMAS Jervis Bay in East
Timor, is exploring the use of fast catamarans to deploy and sustain amphibious
forces. Other Navy innovators have proposed converting Ohio-class SSBNs to
carry special operations forces and large numbers of land-attack cruise missiles.
Such ideas have predictably drawn fire from officers who see them as a threat
to existing surface ship programs. STREETFIGHTER in particular represents a
challenge to the Navy’s current approach to force structure, which emphasizes a
relatively small number of large, highly capable ships.26 Rather than conducting
rigorous analysis of the benefits and limitations of such platforms,
STREETFIGHTER’s detractors have tended to engage in ad hominem attacks. Vice
Admiral Dan Murphy, the commander of the Sixth Fleet, was remarkably blunt
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in his criticism of STREETFIGHTER: It is “a wild idea. . . . There is nothing behind it.
There is no analysis. You know, [Vice Admiral Cebrowski] dreamed up a bumper
sticker, but in fact what he is talking about, to go into the littorals to get into the
tough situation, to fight your way through and deliver power is exactly what we
are doing [with DD 21].”27 More recently, big-ship admirals have begun deriding
STREETFIGHTER vessels. As one admiral put it, “If the next major naval battle is
fought in [Newport’s] Narragansett Bay, Streetfighters will be decisive.”28
Nor have the Development Command’s efforts influenced the Navy’s acquisi-
tion plans in any concrete way. Navy programs are currently dominated by in-
cremental improvements to existing surface ships and aircraft. The service has
yet to allocate any funds to procuring small, highly maneuverable ships such as
STREETFIGHTER. Nor is that situation likely to change in the near future. In 2006,
the Navy plans to begin building the CVX, a new aircraft carrier. It is therefore
not surprising that the Defense Department’s top strategist has chided the Navy
for failure to field experimental platforms.29
The U.S. Air Force and Unmanned Air Vehicles
The Air Force, a service historically defined by the technology of manned air-
craft and dominated by fighter pilots, now faces the challenge of unmanned
aerial vehicles, as well as military operations in space and cyberspace. In each
case, the dominance of fighter pilots within the service has stymied innovation.
Rhetorically, at least, the Air Force sees itself in the vanguard of the RMA. As
one recent article proclaimed triumphantly, “During the past decade, the U.S.
Air Force has undergone a major transformation—a series of revolutionary
changes so profound they have altered the face of modern warfare.”30 It has been
a world leader in the development of stealth, precision-guided munitions, and
the use of space to support military operations. As the official Air Force report
on Operation ALLIED FORCE put it:
The air war over Serbia showed that the Air Force has embraced the RMA—not only
in its acquisition strategies for emerging technologies, but in the way it used those
technologies during this conflict. . . . The United States Air Force . . . showed that it is
a leader in the revolution in military affairs by leveraging new concepts to support
future joint and coalition efforts. . . . The air war over Serbia offered airmen a
glimpse of the future, one in which political leaders turned quickly to the choice of
aerospace power to secure the [Nato] Alliance’s security interests without resorting
to more costly and hazardous alternatives that would have exposed more men and
materiel to the ravages of war.31
Like the other services, the Air Force has begun to adapt conceptually and
organizationally to the needs of the new security environment. It has reorga-
nized itself into “expeditionary air forces” to project and sustain combat
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power more efficiently. It has also developed the “Global Strike Task Force”
concept, as a way of countering an adversary’s strategy for denying access to a
combat theater.32Along with the Navy, it is exploring such innovative con-
cepts as “effects-based operations,” an idea that endeavors to link explicitly
the application of military force to strategic objectives.
In fact, and notwithstanding its innovative concepts, the Air Force has as a
whole been slow to embrace new ways of war. The hurdles it has faced in integrat-
ing unmanned airborne vehicles (UAVs) into its force posture are illustrative.
The service has, at least superficially, welcomed unmanned vehicles. It cur-
rently operates two squadrons of RQ-1A Predator medium-altitude-and-
endurance UAVs. Controlled by ground-based operators, these aircraft transmit
electro-optical, infrared, and synthetic-aperture-radar imagery via satellite
to ground stations in the United
States or the theater of operations.
It is also acquiring the RQ-4
Global Hawk, a high-altitude,
long-endurance unmanned air-
borne vehicle designed to fly
12,500 nautical miles at an alti-
tude of up to sixty-five thousand feet and remain aloft for thirty-six to forty-two
hours. Advocates of the system argue that it is capable of replacing the venerable
U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force has formed a UAV Battle Lab to ex-
plore a number of novel operational concepts for the employment of unmanned
vehicles. Perhaps more telling is the fact that in 1997 the Air Force awarded a
UAV operator the Aerial Achievement Medal—roughly on a par in prestige with
the Air Medal—for safely landing a damaged UAV at the Mostar air base in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Last fall, the Air Force rolled out the first prototype “unmanned combat air
vehicle” (UCAV), the X-45A. The aircraft, to be controlled by a ground-based
operator, is designed to fly as high as forty thousand feet, have a thousand-mile
range, and carry twelve miniature bombs.33 Its primary mission will be to attack
enemy air-defense sites and pave the way for manned aircraft. The Air Force has
also tested a weaponized version of the Predator as a rudimentary unmanned
combat air vehicle.
Support for unmanned vehicles within the Air Force has, however, been luke-
warm. The service’s modernization focus is upon a new generation of manned,
short-range fighters to replace its existing ones; unmanned vehicles (and manned
bombers as well) are being shortchanged. For comparison, the Air Force plans to
spend nearly seventy billion dollars on the F-22 fighter aircraft and (along with
the Navy and Marine Corps) at least two hundred billion more on the Joint
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Strike Fighter; the UCAV budget stands at a mere $126 million.34 In response to
perceived foot-dragging on the part of the Air Force, Congress has passed legis-
lation requiring that one-third of the nation’s deep-strike capability be un-
manned by 2010.35
The cultural barriers against embracing unmanned vehicles are substantial.
UAVs have been in use for decades, but the Air Force has yet to exploit them fully.
Over the past two decades, the Defense Department has spent two billion dollars
on unmanned airborne vehicles—roughly the cost of a single B-2 bomber,
one-tenth the money it spends on manned combat aircraft in a single year. As
a result, UAV technology remains far short of its potential.36 Indeed, in 1993
Congress created the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office to manage
unmanned-vehicle programs after unsuccessfully prodding the Pentagon to take
them more seriously. The Air Force formed its UAV squadrons only after the Army
threatened to take the mission—and the associated resources—away from it.
The pilot culture that dominates the Air Force is another obstacle. While Air
Force UAV operators must be pilots, tours with UAV squadrons are designated as
nonflying assignments and are thus less than desirable. As an incentive for serv-
ing two years with a Predator squadron, the Air Force has been obliged to give
pilots the subsequent opportunity to fly a new type of aircraft, which would im-
prove their career chances.37
The emergence of UAVs and UCAVs has created growing tension between pi-
lots and supporters of unmanned systems. Many pilots see the UCAV as a threat.
As one officer put it, no one “has ever succeeded in picking up a woman in a bar
by saying he commanded a wing of drones.”38 While humorous, such sentiment
illustrates the barriers to adopting new approaches to combat. This situation is
analogous to that in the 1950s, when the advent of intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles threatened the manned-bomber community.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The services have so far failed to match the rhetoric of transformation with ac-
tion. While each claims to embrace new ways of war, none has yet demonstrated
a sustained commitment to fundamental change. Nothing shows this more
clearly than their acquisition budgets. Service funding is still dominated by in-
cremental improvements to traditional systems; radically new technology, doc-
trine, and organizations have received smaller resources. None of this should be
surprising. Large bureaucracies such as the U.S. armed forces are designed to
minimize uncertainty, including that brought on by large-scale change. And
new is not always better. Yet the U.S. armed forces face the imperative of adapt-
ing to the new and different challenges the United States will face in coming
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years. Should they fail to do so, they could find themselves becoming increas-
ingly irrelevant.
It would be wrong to view the services as uniformly opposed to fundamental
change. Rather, each service is split between traditionalists and elements who
are enthusiastic about new ways
of war. One recent survey of the
U.S. officer corps revealed signifi-
cant splits over the character and
conduct of future wars as well as
over the urgency of change.39 The
Defense Department needs to identify and nurture forward-looking constituen-
cies. The starting point should be an intellectual map of the services, one that
identifies and locates both support for and opposition to new mission areas.
Such a map could assist the Defense Department’s leadership in channeling
resources to those portions of the services that are most enthusiastic about
emerging warfare areas. It could also assist the department in evaluating the ade-
quacy of military career paths.
The Defense Department also needs to devote additional resources to experi-
mentation. In particular, the services should advance from the stage of war-gaming
innovative concepts to acquiring small numbers of the weapon systems involved
and developing concepts and organizations for their use. The Navy, for example,
should purchase a squadron of STREETFIGHTERs to form an operational test bed
for network-centric warfare. The Marines, for their part, should establish exper-
imental units dedicated to projecting power in the face of capable access-denial
defenses and to conducting military operations in urban terrain.
More generally, the Defense Department should begin redistributing re-
sources away from legacy systems of declining utility and toward new ways of
war. The Pentagon should scale back or cancel weapons that are heavy or have
limited mobility, highly detectable signatures, and limited range; it should in-
crease funding for long-range precision strike, stealth, and C4ISR* systems. The
department should also increase substantially the funds it devotes to research
and development.
Today’s defense budget is split fairly equally between the services. While such
an arrangement minimizes interservice friction, it is not particularly conducive
to innovation. Indeed, there is a strong argument to be made that interservice
competition can be an engine of change. One way to promote innovation would
be to force the services to compete for funds based upon their ability to meet
current and anticipated operational and strategic challenges. These challenges
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would include the need to assure access to regions of critical importance to the
United States; gain and maintain information and space superiority; protect
against nuclear, biological, chemical, and information attack; and conduct mili-
tary operations in urban terrain. In order to ensure that the American armed
forces meet these emerging challenges, the secretary of defense should set aside a
significant portion of the military’s procurement budget for innovative
programs.
The service secretaries are a potentially powerful but generally underutilized
constituency for change. They have it within their power—through control of
promotion boards and officer assignments—to have enduring impacts on their
services. They should wield this power to ensure that officers associated with
emerging warfare areas, such as space and information warfare, enjoy opportu-
nities to rise to senior leadership positions.
The United States leads the world in many of the technologies that are driving
the information revolution, as well as many of the weapons that the revolution
has spawned. Transforming the armed forces will require the Defense Depart-
ment not only to continue to acquire advanced weapons but to develop the orga-
nizations and doctrine needed to employ them effectively. That attempts to do
so have encountered resistance is not surprising. Change is by definition a dis-
ruptive process, one that creates winners and losers. Still, the U.S. armed forces
must change radically—adding new capabilities and shedding old ones—if they
are to meet the challenges of the emerging security environment.
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NEW INSIGHTS FROM OLD BOOKS
The Case of Alfred Thayer Mahan
Jon Sumida
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783,which appeared in 1890, is widely regarded as the first important study of
the relationship between naval affairs and international politics. Mahan subse-
quently published twenty-odd additional volumes that extended and elaborated
the views presented in this book. On the present occasion, an article based upon
the traditional summary of Mahan’s main ideas could be justified as an obliga-
tory nod to the U.S. Navy’s intellectual heritage, or as an act of faith in the ca-
pacity of patristic writing to inspire strategic
insight. Recent scholarship, however, has demon-
strated that Mahan’s thinking about sea power has
been fundamentally misunderstood. This article
will thus examine three areas where the new inter-
pretation of Mahan affects consideration of prob-
lems that are of interest today. The first is naval and
military cooperation when fighting in inland or
coastal waters; the second is the nature and role of
naval supremacy with respect to a complex world
system of trade; and the third arises from the re-
quirements of higher naval education in a period of
rapid technological change. In other words, Mahan’s
work will be related to jointness and power projec-
tion from the sea, the expansion of the global econ-
omy, and the “revolution in naval affairs.”
There are three main arguments. First, Mahan
believed that when one side in a conflict possessed
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absolute sea command or in special cases even temporary local control, naval
operations in direct support of land forces could be of decisive importance. Sec-
ond, Mahan maintained that naval supremacy in the twentieth century would be
exercised by a transnational consortium acting in defense of a multinational sys-
tem of free trade. Third, Mahan was convinced that the transformation of naval
materiel by radical technological change had not eliminated tactical and strate-
gic uncertainty from the conduct of war, and that the improvement of executive
ability through the rigorous study of history should therefore be the basis of na-
val officer education.
Mahan is often portrayed—because of misreadings of fragments of his writ-
ing, or all too often upon no reading of the original texts at all—as a purveyor of
truisms about naval strategy and doctrine. The resulting caricature is frequently
either misapplied or dismissed as outdated. This article, which is informed by
the study of all of Mahan’s major publications and surviving correspondence,
should remind us of the merits of the adage, “When you want a good new idea,
read an old book.”
A COMPLEX PICTURE OF THE INTERRELATED DYNAMICS
Alfred Thayer Mahan was an officer in the Union navy during the Civil War. He
was never a participant in a major battle, but his active service included many
months of inshore work in small warships enforcing the blockade of the Con-
federate coast. Nearly two decades after the end of hostilities, Mahan accepted a
commission to write a book about naval operations on the Caribbean coast and
up the Mississippi and Red Rivers in the war. In addition to drawing upon his
own experience during this conflict, Mahan studied memoirs and documents,
and corresponded with veterans from both sides. The completed work, which
was entitled The Gulf and Inland Waters, was published in 1883. Several years af-
ter the appearance of Influence of Sea Power upon History and its two-volume se-
quel, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, which
came out in 1892, Mahan produced a biography of the admiral who had com-
manded most of the Union operations described in his first book. Admiral
Farragut, which was published in 1897, gave Mahan another opportunity to
present his views on fighting in littoral and interior waters that involved cooper-
ation between the army and navy.
During the American Civil War, the lack of a fleet meant that the Confederacy
could not mount an effective challenge to Union control of the high seas. More-
over, the naval weakness of the southern states exposed their vital internal
riverine communications and major ports to seaborne assault. Over the course
of the four-year conflict, the territorial integrity and economic vitality of the
South were compromised by the integrated action of the Union army and navy,
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which established Federal control of the Mississippi and captured New Orleans
and Mobile. Mahan’s two accounts of these campaigns demonstrate that he pos-
sessed considerable knowledge of the special characteristics of “brown water”
fighting, appreciated the necessity of connecting the activity of land and naval
forces, and recognized that the success of joint operations had been a major con-
tributor to the ultimate Union victory.
In books written before and after the Farragut biography, Mahan criticized
Admiral Horatio Nelson’s advocacy of amphibious operations in support of land
campaigns and, in general, opposed overseas expeditions. But these views were
applied to circumstances in which
the opposing side possessed—or
was supposed to possess—the ca-
pacity to dispute sea command.
Mahan reasoned that in such a
case any attempt to project power
from water to land risked naval assets that were needed to preserve the general
control of the oceans, upon which all depended. When the maintenance of mar-
itime lines of communication was not an issue, he had no objection to using na-
val force in combination with an army to achieve a military objective, and he
well understood that such action could have great strategic value.
Indeed, Mahan attributed his initial inspiration—for the idea that naval su-
premacy was of much larger historical significance than was generally recog-
nized—to his reflections on a historical case involving the use of uncontested
command of the sea to achieve decisive military success. In his memoirs, he re-
called that in 1885 he had chanced upon Theodor Mommsen’s history of ancient
Rome. While reading this book, Mahan had been struck by the thought that the
outcome of the wars between Rome and Carthage would have been different had
the latter possessed the ability, as did the former, of using the sea as an avenue of
invasion instead of moving its armies over land.
After some reflection, Mahan decided to apply the example of the victory of a
state that could use naval force effectively over one that could not to the history
of European wars in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This resulted
in the first of the “influence of sea power” volumes, in which Mahan closed the
introduction with a lengthy examination of the naval aspects of Rome’s defeat of
Carthage. He ended the main narrative of The Influence of Sea Power upon His-
tory with an account of the British defeat at Yorktown in 1781. The outcome of
this battle had been determined by the reinforcement of American and French
armies by sea, and also by French naval control of surrounding waters, which
had prevented a British fleet from relieving the besieged British army. The
Yorktown disaster had prompted negotiations that ultimately ended the war and
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established American independence. In the book that made his reputation,
Mahan thus used the survival of what was to become imperial Rome and the cre-
ation of the United States as powerful historical testaments to the transcendent
value of naval force in support of military operations.
But The Influence of Sea Power upon History also introduced a set of proposi-
tions about the relationship between the economic basis of national strength
and the development and effective use of a navy. Seaborne trade, Mahan main-
tained in his first best-seller, was a critically important generator of wealth. In
the event of war, a nation that could protect its own maritime commerce while
disrupting that of its opponent could shift the balance of national resources de-
cisively in its own favor. A fleet capable of winning and keeping command of the
sea was required to accomplish both of these tasks. In peace, therefore, a great
state was well advised to do everything it could to build the strongest possible
navy. Over time, the cumulative effect of sound naval policy and strategy in
peace and war was economic prosperity and territorial aggrandizement.
Naval force structure and deployment were also important variables. Cruiser
attacks on scattered shipping, Mahan believed, were incapable of inflicting pro-
hibitive losses on a large merchant marine. Blockade of the enemy’s main
ports—implemented by a fleet of battleships capable of defeating any force that
was sent against it—was the only way to accomplish the complete or near com-
plete stoppage of overseas commerce required to achieve a significant strategic
effect against a great maritime power. It was for this reason that Mahan made the
number of battleships the measure of naval potency, and the destruction of the
enemy battle fleet through decisive engagement—for the purposes of either se-
curing or breaking a blockade—the main operational objective of naval strategy.
These interrelated arguments addressed major concerns of Mahan’s own
time. From the 1880s, the general expansion of European navies in response to
increasing imperial rivalry was accompanied by intensive debate over the rela-
tive merits of a naval strategy based on commerce raiding by cruisers, as op-
posed to one based on command of the sea by battleships. In addition, the
advent of steam propulsion and metal hulls had vastly increased the efficiency of
maritime transport, which in turn caused a sharp upturn in overseas commerce
and the wealth generated by this kind of activity. Mahan’s choice of European
great power conflict during the late age of sail as the vehicle for his argument also
favored discussion of the general struggle for naval supremacy in preference to
case studies of combined operations along coasts and rivers. So although
Mahan clearly recognized the importance of power projection from sea to
land, it was his examination of the contest for command of the sea, and its
political-economic consequences, that created the immediate and wide audience
for The Influence of Sea Power upon History and later publications. The resulting
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association of Mahan with arguments exclusively about naval supremacy dis-
torted perceptions of his identity as a strategic theorist, setting the stage for mis-
leading comparisons with writers (such as C. E. Callwell and Julian Corbett)
who focused more on the relationship of land and sea power. But a far greater
problem was created by the serious misunderstanding of the basic character of
Mahan’s rendition of European naval history in the age of sail, a misperception
that led to faulty inferences about Mahan’s fundamental views on grand strategy.
The “influence of sea power” series began in the mid-seventeenth century
with a situation in which three major maritime states—France, the Netherlands,
and England—were roughly balanced with respect to naval prowess and accom-
plishment. It ended in the early
nineteenth century with the wars
of the French Revolution and Em-
pire, during which Britain’s Royal
Navy more or less ruled the waves.
In addition to the two works
named previously, which provided an overview of the entire period, Mahan
wrote two supporting case studies: a biography of Admiral Nelson, and an ac-
count of the War of 1812. In terms of “plot,” the entire series could be read as the
story of the rise of Britain’s naval supremacy and its consequent achievement of
economic and political preeminence in Europe. In terms of “moral,” the series
seemed to say that Britain’s sustained and aggressive use of a large fleet to obtain
territory, wealth, and power could be emulated by any state that had the mind
and will to follow its example.
Mahan, it appeared to many, had intended his analytical history to be a grand
strategic primer for his own times, and in particular for the government of his
own country. He was indeed a proponent of a much strengthened U.S. Navy. It is
thus not hard to imagine that he hoped that his homeland would become the
world’s greatest power in the twentieth century by the same means that Britain
had used to achieve this status in the period covered by his histories. The fact
that the United States ultimately rose to the top in large part through the effec-
tive use of naval supremacy has only reinforced the propensity to draw such in-
ferences about Mahan’s underlying motive.
But careful consideration of Mahan’s actual writing in the “influence of sea
power” series, of his political-economic outlook, and of his punditry about the
future course of world politics makes it impossible to accept the foregoing
characterizations of his account of naval warfare in the late age of sail and of its
intended application to the twentieth century. The first installment of the “in-
fluence of sea power” series is about the failure of France to exploit its maritime
assets properly, a failure that in Mahan’s view allowed Britain to achieve major
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successes in war virtually by default. Mahan chose to close the book with a dis-
proportionately lengthy account of the American Revolution, a conflict in
which sound French policy and deployments resulted in Britain’s defeat and the
loss of a vast and rich colonial territory. In the wars of the French Revolution and
Empire, in contrast, the navy of France was compromised from the start by po-
litical upheaval and institutional disintegration. The second installment was
thus about Britain’s use of naval supremacy to contain a militarily preeminent
France through a strategy of attrition. Mahan did not hold that the ultimate
outcome had been preordained—that is, that naval supremacy as such guaran-
teed victory. The triumph of Britain, given the evenness of the balance between
the opposing sides, he argued in both the second and the third installments,
depended upon extraordinary operational naval leadership—in the person of
Nelson. In the concluding fourth installment, Mahan’s main theme was that in-
adequate American naval strength was the fundamental explanation of diplo-
matic failure before the War of 1812 and of naval operational impotence, with
all its attendant serious strategic drawbacks, during the conflict.
Britain and British naval strategy did not, in short, represent the focus of the
“influence of sea power” series. Mahan’s histories did not constitute a simple
morality play about a single state acting according to a prescribed general course
of action; they offered instead a complex picture of the interrelated dynamics of
naval and maritime commercial activity on the one hand, and international pol-
itics on the other. Mahan’s essentially liberal political-economic views, more-
over, led him to reject the mercantilist conception of a world consisting of
competing players with mutually exclusive interests. Mahan believed that free
trade between nations promoted increases in the volume of international ex-
changes of goods, which worked to the benefit of all participants. The great
expansion of French overseas shipping after the War of the Spanish Succession,
he argued in the first installment of the “influence of sea power” series, was at-
tributable to peace and the removal of restrictions on commerce, not to govern-
ment initiatives. In the second installment, Mahan observed that sea power was
an organism that included not only organized naval force but free maritime en-
terprise. While the former depended upon state funding and direction, the latter
thrived in the absence of government interference. During the wars of the
French Revolution and Empire, Mahan maintained, the British state was able to
exploit the prosperity produced by an international sea-based mercantile system
that it could protect but did not possess. Britain was not, in other words, the
owner of sea power but its custodian.
Mahan believed that Britain had been both the defender and main benefi-
ciary of seaborne trade in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries be-
cause its parliament had been dominated by a small group of men with close
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ties to maritime commerce. Such an oligarchy had been predisposed to heavy
spending on the navy, producing a fleet strong enough to defend a merchant
marine that carried a large proportion of the world’s overseas trade. Over the
course of the nineteenth century, however, the democratization of the British
political system undercut the ma-
nipulation of government policy
by a mercantile elite. As a conse-
quence, Mahan argued, the Brit-
ish state of the late nineteenth and
twentieth century lost the will to
finance a navy capable of defending what had become a much larger and in-
creasingly multinational system of oceanic economic exchange. Moreover, in
Mahan’s view, no single democratized power would be capable of assuming such
a burden. For this reason—and because he was convinced that free trade condi-
tions provided large benefits to all major maritime countries—Mahan con-
cluded that in the twentieth century, naval supremacy would be exercised by a
transnational consortium of navies. The basis of such a system, he insisted,
would not be formal agreement but the absence of important conflicts of politi-
cal interest, coupled to a common stake in the security of a highly productive
form of economic activity. Mahan was thus convinced that Britain and the
United States would cooperate without recourse to a treaty and that in such a re-
lationship the latter would serve as the junior partner. To play even this support-
ing role effectively, Mahan insisted, America needed a larger navy. He did not
advocate the creation of an American navy that was stronger than every other
unless the British navy was weakened by inadequate financing or by war with a
European competitor.
Mahan offered his views on the future course of international affairs in sev-
eral book-length monographs and in periodical articles that were later collected
and published as books. In them Mahan contemplated a range of possible
courses of events. These included the containment of an expansionist Russia by
an international coalition, war between Britain and Germany, and even a cata-
clysmic collision between European and Asian civilizations. What he did not do
was apply a crude reading of the great-power contests of the late age of sail to the
industrial future and thereby imagine the rise of a hegemonic United States
through offensive naval warfare and mercantilist economic policy. While his
realist temperament prompted him to argue that war and the threat of war were
likely to be facts of life for the foreseeable future, Mahan did not rule out either
the possibility or desirability of general peace founded upon the workings of an
international system of free trade. In such a world economy, he was confident,
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the energy and entrepreneurial spirit of the American people would enable
them to compete successfully.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the onset of industrialization
transformed naval materiel within the span of a generation. When Mahan was a
midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy, just before the American Civil War, he
was trained on wooden sailing ships armed with muzzle-loading guns. By the
time he retired from the service at the end of the century, steel warships pro-
pelled by steam and equipped with breech-loading weapons of much larger size
and power had become standard. The sudden obsolescence, as a result of rapid
technical change, of much of what had constituted traditional naval fighting
practice and the virtually worldwide sense that what now really mattered in war
was the possession of the latest, and therefore most capable, naval armaments
undermined the self-confidence of naval executive leaders. Conversely, naval of-
ficer technicians could celebrate the wonders of technical improvement and
claim that the critical importance of qualitative advantage in materiel made
their activity central to the efficiency of the Navy. Moreover, administrative
burdens had been magnified by the management needs of the new technology
and also by the expansion of the American fleet that had begun in the 1880s;
these factors created a large class of naval officer bureaucrats with pretensions
to higher status not directly connected to traditional requirements for com-
mand at sea.
The relative decline of naval officer executives alarmed Mahan. By dint of in-
tellectual patrimony and personal experience in the greatest conflict ever fought
by his service up to his time, he had decided opinions on the paramount value of
effective leadership in war and how it might be developed. Mahan’s father, Den-
nis Hart Mahan, a distinguished professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West
Point, had believed that great executive leadership was of crucial importance in
war. The elder Mahan had observed that at critical junctures, commanders
would be confronted with complex, contingent, changing, and contradictory in-
formation, which meant that decision making could never be reduced to the
mechanistic application of rules or principles. Development of the tempera-
ment required for sound judgment under such circumstances, Dennis Hart
Mahan was convinced, could be aided by the study of detailed and analytically
rigorous operational history. There can be little doubt that this outlook was im-
parted to his son, and thereafter reinforced by the younger Mahan’s direct obser-
vation of command decision making in the Civil War. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s
first publication, in 1879, was an essay on naval education in which he attacked
what he regarded as the overemphasis on technical subjects and called for much
greater attention to the study of what amounted to the liberal arts. Such an ap-
proach, he maintained, would develop the moral qualities that officers required
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to be able to make decisions in the face of danger and uncertainty. The vital role
of moral strength with respect to executive command, along with the appropri-
ate means of improving it in naval officers, became a theme in Mahan’s later
writing that was no less important to him than his examination of the relation-
ship between naval affairs and international politics.
In The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Mahan argued that although tactics
changed as the character of armaments altered, the validity of the basic princi-
ples of strategy were relatively unaffected by technical progress, and human
character was an absolute, a constant. History, therefore, might have little to say
of current applicability to tactics
but a great deal that was pertinent
to strategy and operational com-
mand. Mahan devoted as much
attention in the main narrative of
this work to the strategic direc-
tion of naval operations as he did to his grand strategic argument about the rela-
tionship between naval supremacy and the course of international politics. He
also made a few observations about the critical effect of individual moral char-
acter on the exercise of naval command. In later installments of the “influence of
sea power” series, he remained no less attentive to strategic questions and,
through his treatment of Nelson’s leadership qualities, wrote at length about the
moral dimensions of executive decision making in war.
In several of his articles, Mahan maintained that the essence of effective com-
mand comprised rapid and judicious risk taking and full responsibility for out-
comes. This set of characteristics was alien to the scientific mentalité of the
engineer, who dealt deliberately with the discovery of certainty about physical
matters through controlled experiment, and to the bureaucratized mindset of
the administrator, who countenanced delay and fragmented accountability. In
peace, an executive leader had few if any opportunities either to display his ca-
pacity for war command or to acquire experience that would enable him to
develop it, while technicians and bureaucrats flourished in the pursuit of engi-
neering innovation or administrative expansion. For Mahan, therefore, serious
naval history, of the kind that he had produced in the “influence of sea power”
series, served two major practical functions. First, it reminded the navy of what
executive war command was and why it was important; second, it provided a
sound educational basis for developing that capacity in officers who had no war
experience. The latter task was accomplished through stories about naval deci-
sion making in war, narratives that prompted readers to imagine the psychologi-
cal dynamics as well as material circumstances that condition the direction of
operations in real conflicts.
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Mahan lacked the powers of technical ratiocination that were needed to eval-
uate properly a complex engineering problem, such as capital-ship design. His
criticisms in the early twentieth century of the all-big-gun battleship, therefore,
failed to take into account several significant factors that exposed his analysis to
swift and thorough destruction. But neither was Mahan a naval technological
Luddite. If he was a critic of many of the claims made for mechanical innova-
tion, it was because he was convinced that such progress had not eliminated un-
certainty from decision making in war, and that the decadence of the naval
executive ethos that had resulted was thus a dangerous weakness. His antidote to
the technological determinists of his time, however, was history rather than po-
litical science; he believed that the verisimilitude afforded by detailed narrative
about things that had actually happened could engage the minds and feelings of
students of command in ways that summarized lessons or abstractions could
not. Mahan’s preference for historical representation over the construction of
explanatory systems when dealing with the past is in line with much that has
been argued recently by proponents of chaos and complexity theory. Further, his
remedy for moral dilemmas—confidence in intelligent intuition—is one that is
supported today by the findings of cognitive science. Viewed in light of these
modern, cutting-edge inquiries into human learning and behavior, the writings
of Mahan may be regarded as not just relevant but revelatory.
A COGNITIVE POINT OF DEPARTURE
For nearly a hundred years, Alfred Thayer Mahan’s pronouncements on naval
affairs and international politics were too famous to be ignored but also too
extensive, difficult, and complicated to be easily understood as a whole. From
the start, most writers on naval history and strategy misperceived his work, and
successive generations compounded the errors of their predecessors, creating a
large literature whose shortcomings further obstructed access to the meaning of
the original texts. As a consequence, Mahan’s basic ideas have been misrepre-
sented as follows: first, sea control was always the central question of naval strat-
egy; second, the ideal of national grand strategy was the achievement of naval
supremacy as the prerequisite to international economic and political pre-
eminence; and third, success in naval warfare depended upon the correct appli-
cation of certain principles of strategy. These propositions add little to current
naval discussions, which consider the American possession of sea control and a
monopoly on superpower status virtually as givens, and which are preoccupied
by the transformation of fighting practice through radical technological
innovation.
The major arguments of Mahan that can be found through comprehensive
and rigorous critical examination, however, are very different from what has
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been supposed. Moreover, the issues that prompted him to put pen to paper
were remarkably similar to those of today. He began both his naval and writing
careers dealing with joint operations in coastal waters. Mahan was confronted
by the rapid expansion of a global system of free trade; by uncertainty about
what America’s proper naval role under such conditions should be; and by a
“revolution in naval affairs” that was occasioned by the replacement of pre-
industrial by industrial naval armaments and that in turn raised large questions
about the nature of wartime command and the education of those who would
exercise it.
Mahan’s contemplation of these problems produced the following conclusions.
First, close cooperation between land and sea forces is essential for the success of
joint operations, whose outcomes can determine the victor in a major war. Second,
because the cost of building and maintaining a navy that is strong enough to
command the seas unilaterally will be too high for any single power, sea control in
the twentieth century and beyond would be the responsibility of a transnational
consortium of navies. Third, great advances in technology do not diminish reliance
upon the good judgment of naval executive leaders, who could best be prepared for
effective high-level decision making in war by the proper study of history.
Identifying Mahan’s true basic attitudes toward power projection from sea to
land, naval supremacy, and the relationship between technological change and
naval officer education does more than correct academic error. What have been
believed to be Mahan’s ideas created a body of theory that still—whether
through acceptance, modification, or rejection—forms part of the thought
processes of most senior naval officers. Changing what has for so long been a
cognitive point of departure, therefore, has significant implications for anyone
concerned with the future of naval policy. Mahan has been widely regarded as
the discoverer of what he supposedly believed were universal truths about naval
strategy that were to be applied directly. The fact is, however, that Mahan’s prop-
ositions were observations about particular phenomena rather than general les-
sons. When dealing with Mahan, the focus of inquiry should therefore not be his
statement of principle or delineation of precedent but his choice of issues, and
the complexities of the historical cases that were his main subjects. The crucial
linkages between his past and our present, in other words, are not to be found in
his conclusions but in his questions and his conduct of the inquiry. These are
still worth engaging, because Mahan faced problems that were similar to those
that confront navies today, and he brought to them a powerful intelligence that
was informed by rich experience and wide reading. History was the venue for
Mahan’s scholarly labors, because he understood both the limits of theory and
the power of narrative when it came to matters of human behavior and social
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organization under the conditions of war. There is much more that can and
should be written about the general and particular aspects of navies and naval
power, but approaching, let alone matching, the intellectual standard of Mahan’s
pioneering achievement will not be easy.
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THE COAST GUARD AND NAVY
It’s Time for a “National Fleet”
Colin S. Gray
The U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy have been, are, and will remain com-plementary. They are not competitors. However, notwithstanding the dis-
tinctiveness of their missions and functions, in practice their duties overlap.
There is a zone of activity wherein the services share maritime geography and
foci of concern. Because the Coast Guard operates shallow-draft warships, it can
be misrepresented as the coastal or shallow-water navy of the United States.
Similarly, because the Navy supports the Coast Guard when necessary and feasi-
ble, perception of naval enthusiasm for such support (and beyond) can feed
ill-founded anxiety that the Coast Guard is in peril of imperial absorption by the
much larger service. A well-ordered U.S. defense community, confident in its
understanding of the emerging strategic environment and prepared to pay the
freight for national security, would provide little fuel for these essentially foolish
apprehensions. However, this article is propelled by
the appreciation that even though the Coast Guard
and the Navy are natural and necessary allies, trends
exist today—both internal to each service and, even
more, in their contexts of operation—that could
strain their relationship.
As we shall see, it is not surprising that most of
the sources of difficulty in the interservice rela-
tionship stem from questions about missions and
equipment pertaining to the Navy, rather than to the
Coast Guard. The latter does not face challenges to
its roles, missions, and relative importance that are
so radical as those that stalk the Navy. The Coast
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Guard, understandably, is occasionally anxious lest some of its duties be outsourced,
privatized, or picked up by a Navy looking for self-justifying tasks. However,
those periodic perils (real and imaginary) fade nearly into insignificance when
compared with the vulnerability of the Navy to shifts in defense-intellectual
fashion and foreign-policy mood. The Coast Guard’s potential (domestic) crit-
ics are largely toothless tigers; the Navy’s are not. The centerpiece of this discus-
sion, then, is the future relationship between the Navy and Coast Guard in light
of their common status as sea services of the United States, under the conceptual
umbrella of a “national fleet.”
That relationship cannot be considered in isolation, however. Both services
must shape their interconnection with reference to powerful contextual factors.
Whether or not Navy–Coast Guard relations constitute a love match, each needs
the other. Trends point with a uniform logic to the common sense contained in
the idea of a national fleet. What the Navy lacks by way of blue-water challenge
from a pressing “high end” threat finds ample compensation in opportunities
and problems posed by the emerging information-led revolution in warfare. An
unmistakable trend afflicting the all-high-end U.S. Navy is a declining number
of ships. Fleet size is not everything, but—as the last Chief of Naval Operations
reminded us—“numbers do matter.”1 Especially do numbers count when op-
erations of all kinds must be conducted worldwide by a rotational deployment
pattern.
Just as the Navy’s operational tempo has become unsustainably high for a
peacetime rotational fleet, so the Coast Guard is obliged to cope with a higher
demand for its services. The uses made of the sea, which taken all together con-
stitute the principal driver of Coast Guard activity, have risen, are rising, and are
projected to rise much farther yet. Quite aside from its national defense mission,
the Coast Guard has a basket of traditional duties, a collection expanding in va-
riety, quantity, and quality of challenge.
THE ARGUMENT
We will examine in some detail the current and anticipated conditions and cir-
cumstances of the Navy and the Coast Guard, and also the terms by which and
ways in which they can best complement each other. First, however, it is useful to
break the rules of dramatic construction and reveal the five points that, together,
represent the “argument” of this article. These points are not particularly re-
markable or even controversial (except for the fifth). Rather, as we will see after
setting the argument, actual and potential controversy on a major scale attaches
to the character of the “contexts” (political, military, intellectual-doctrinal, soci-
etal, and so forth) within which the services must operate over the decade ahead.
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For the Navy in particular, there is much scope for dispute as to the requirements
in military and strategic effect that U.S. foreign policy will place upon it.
First: The U.S. Navy needs to be all that it has to be as a war-fighting instrument.
Indeed, it is as the exemplar of naval prowess that the Navy supports the foreign
policy of the global superpower. Given that major naval combatants, with
midlife refits, may well be in com-
mission for thirty or forty years,
contemporary defense-intellectual
fashions and fads, even today’s
“best guesses” about the strategic
future, should be treated with
some reserve. Much as nominal, back-of-the-envelope answers to, say,
ballistic-missile-defense queries can always be manufactured promptly on
demand (how long does it take to produce a vugraph?), so high-end naval
power—in general and specifically—can quite easily be dismissed as yesterday’s
unaffordable and irrelevant answer to the bold novelties of tomorrow. The past
century has seen great combat fleets “sunk” virtually by torpedo-firing flotilla
craft, erased by airpower, sidelined or destroyed by nuclear menace, and now
relegated to deep-reserve status by “asymmetric” anti-access capabilities that
could, allegedly, lock out most of the U.S. Navy from an enemy’s maritime
approaches.
Let us note that in the twentieth century great navies survived strategic chal-
lenge from new classes of threats deriving from the subsurface, aerial, space, and
electronic environments. The smart money says that the U.S. Navy will be as suc-
cessful in the future as it was in the past at riding the erratic waves of revolutions
in military affairs, and that predictions of its imminent strategic relegation will
prove as ill judged in the future as before.2 Because “history is geography,” as
Jacob Burckhardt wrote with only modest exaggeration, the U.S. Navy cannot
responsibly be regarded as just one player on an infinitely fungible national se-
curity team.
Second: Insofar as practicable, the Navy should leave coast guarding to the Coast
Guard. If naval warships happen to be in the right place at the right time and
have no truly urgent and stressful national-defense missions to perform, then by
all means let them contribute to security at sea in its fullest and broadest sense.
However, just as the warships with orange and blue stripes can fight but are not
expected to excel in the conduct of naval warfare, so the gray hulls of the Navy
certainly can function as surrogate coast guard but are not expert in that role.
Moreover, as the Navy continues its up-market movement with acquisition of
supercapable and superexpensive destroyers and cruisers, so it will have ever
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fewer (leading to zero) relatively small and cheap general-purpose warships
(that is, frigates) appropriate for shallow-water duties short of naval war.
Given the authoritative status of the national fleet “treaty” of 21 September
1998 between the Navy and the Coast Guard, it is troubling to find that the Navy
Strategic Planning Guidance with Long Range Planning Objectives of April 2000 is
all but oblivious both of the Coast Guard’s skills and of the limitations of the
Navy itself.3 The NSPG sees no tension between arguing soundly that “insuffi-
cient numbers entail strategic risk as well as excessive personnel and operational
tempos” and reaching close to coast-guarding domain.4 Describing the “day-to-
day engagement” activities of the Navy, it argues that
this engagement process also encompasses the spectrum of military operations other
than war (MOOTW), which repeatedly employs naval forces in missions such as hu-
manitarian disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace sup-
port missions, enforcement of embargoes and no-fly zones, counterproliferation
measures, and rapid reaction to terrorism. Future forces also must be prepared to
support law enforcement agencies to deal effectively with non-military challenges to
our national security, such as illegal immigration, illegal drug trafficking, and other
international criminal activity.5
There are times when what U.S. policy most needs for its support is what
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., usefully terms “formidability—e.g., as manifest bigness,
obvious speed, devilish appearance, and demonstrated cunning.”6 However, as a
general rule, sending an Arleigh Burke–class guided-missile destroyer like the
USS Cole into the Arabian littoral is akin to “sending a man out to do a boy’s
job.”7 A U.S. Navy properly and jointly directed in strategic terms should focus
on the higher-risk tasks that fit logically and prudently with its trends in equip-
ment acquisition, leaving as many extramilitary maritime security tasks as pos-
sible to the Coast Guard.8 Of course the Navy could undertake many
coast-guarding jobs, and in many countries navies do just that (Britain’s Royal
Navy, for example).9 However, that has not been the American way, and given
the fact that the United States has the world’s best coast guard (as well as the
world’s best navy, by far), there is every reason for exploiting the duality of its sea
services.
Third: The national fleet treaty of 21 September 1998 is no more than common
sense. The “Treasury Fleet,” later the Coast Guard, has served in or with the U.S.
Navy in all of America’s wars that have had maritime dimensions. The concept
of a national fleet can raise paranoid fears in both services, but in fact it dignifies
what has been the American experience: the Navy and Coast Guard have fought
as a national fleet. The Navy’s anxiety that the Coast Guard would use the
national-fleet idea as a license to hunt for more missions, more force structure,
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and more money at the Navy’s expense is amply matched by Coast Guard
nervousness lest the national fleet should become a “bear hug,” extinguishing
organizational independence, even autonomy. Neither fear is well founded, but
both need exposure and recognition.
The fact of the matter is that on its current course regarding technical choices
and force structure, the U.S. Navy is opening more and more space between the
shallow-draft multimission warships that major Coast Guard
cutters are and its own newly “low end” destroyers (DDs) and
guided-missile destroyers (DDGs). Should the Navy, improbably,
elect to pursue variants of the STREETFIGHTER concept, then
indeed it would be back in the business of small (and more ex-
pendable) warships. At present, though, that point is strictly spec-
ulative. It is no stretch to reason that a navy acquiring DDG 51s
(Arleigh Burkes) and intending (and hoping) to buy DD 21s as the
low end of its fleet mix is likely to be size challenged. The concept, and one hopes
the practice, of the national fleet provides an important, actually essential, part
of the answer to the challenge of too few “frigates.”
Fourth: The Coast Guard should be recapitalized by rapid implementation of its
planned Integrated Deepwater System (IDS). For an acquisition cost in the range
of fifteen to twenty billion dollars over twenty years, the Coast Guard will re-
place and modernize with a new class of maritime security cutter, long-range
aircraft, and C4ISR.* This modernization is necessary to enable the service to
cope with the expanding demands of its maritime safety, environmental protec-
tion, and law enforcement roles, as well as its national defense duties.
Coast Guard maritime security cutters will not be frigates, but these catego-
ries of warship do bear more than a casual similarity. Writing at the end of the
Cold War, Eric Grove informed us that a frigate is a “combatant of about 1,750
to 3,000 tons usually optimized for ASW [antisubmarine warfare] but with gen-
eral purpose capability; essentially intended for the escort of noncombatant
shipping, although useful for patrol and limited offensive operations, capable of
oceangoing transits and tasks; usually air capable [operating helicopters].”10
Oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates (FFGs) displace around four
thousand tons and the Coast Guard’s Hamilton-class high-endurance cutters
(WHECs) about three thousand. That is to say, some Coast Guard cutters are
frigate-sized warships. They can be made as frigate-like as the Coast Guard
prefers, politically is permitted, and can be afforded. Looking to the future, how-
ever, when the Navy ceases to have FFGs in commission, no one will be in any
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danger whatsoever of mistaking a hull with an orange stripe—even one from the
top end of the catalog—for a nine-thousand-ton DDG.
Service sentiment aside, the national fleet of the United States needs some
more or less frigate-sized and modestly priced general-purpose warships. If
the Navy cannot afford to operate them, given the military logic of its
high-end-procurement strategy, it should be a cause for rejoicing that the Coast
Guard, prudently modernized, can take up some of the slack. If a modernized
Coast Guard is to complement the Navy in a national fleet—or simply in joint
warfare—it requires equipment that not only is complementary but can operate
seamlessly with that of the other armed services. Whether or not some in the
Navy regard the Coast Guard as a necessary evil (or regrettable necessity!), all
can agree that a modern Coast Guard, if it is to sail and fly on national-defense
duties, must not be a net liability to operational and tactical commanders. A
Coast Guard recapitalized by the IDS has to be able to function with the Navy as
a tactically and technically reliable team player, working by the same rules of
network-centricity.11 Needless to say, it comes down to money, doctrine, plan-
ning, and training.
Fifth: As an armed service, the Coast Guard probably should relocate to the De-
partment of Defense. There is no general law governing the proper character or
bureaucratic location of a coast guard. Each country does it its own way. More-
over, what arrangement is suitable may vary, depending upon trends in roles and
missions of both the service in question and host institutions. The U.S. Coast
Guard, consolidated as such in 1917, lived under the aegis of the Treasury De-
partment until 1967. Since then it has been a part of the extended empire of the
Department of Transportation. Cases can be made for “no change” (stay in
Transportation), some form of independent agency (the Federal Emergency
Management Agency?), a move to the Justice Department, or—as suggested
here—a move to Defense. There are problems with each alternative. Suffice it at
this point to argue that the military benefits that should flow from the Coast
Guard’s being fully recognized, and treated bureaucratically, as one of the five
armed services match trends in Coast Guard duties, facilitates the vital na-
tional-fleet concept/treaty/plan, and should promote vital commonalities in
C4ISR, inter alia. (An interesting case can be made for moving the service to the
Justice Department, but—considered overall—Coast Guard activities fit better
within the Defense Department, or DoD.) The challenge, of course, would be to
identify ways to reap the military benefits of Defense family membership while
retaining the distinctively law-enforcement and regulatory, civilian-lifeguard,
and resource-protecting character and ethos of this uniquely dual-focused
service.
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CONTEXTS
The future force structures of the Navy and the Coast Guard, and the terms and
conditions of their relationship, will be shaped vitally by the several contexts
that give them meaning. Four contexts dominate: domestic (resource), foreign,
military, and (nonnaval) maritime. The fourth, “(nonnaval) maritime,” refers to
a broad understanding of the uses of the sea; its inclusion here is essential, be-
cause it accommodates the many activities and trends by which are created pub-
lic demand for coast-guarding services. While the Navy and the Coast Guard are
complementary and can be fashioned at the margins so as to take cost-effective
account of each other’s assets, they are nonetheless driven by the beats of very
different drummers. At least forty or so of the world’s “navies” are really greater
or lesser coast guards, but that is not, and cannot be, the case for the global su-
perpower. In fact, as our argument explains, the military context for the U.S.
Navy is changing in ways that accelerate its distinctiveness from the Coast
Guard. This is not a criticism; it is just the way things are in the military realm at
the beginning of the new century.
We should note that our current strategic condition is not exactly the first
period in modern history when the greatest navy of the day had to cope with the
challenges of what became a long political peace (to borrow from Edward Gibbon)
and an accelerating technological revolution. C. J. Bartlett, in his now-classic
study of British sea power in the four decades from the fall of Napoleon to the
Crimean War, writes:
Many were the calls upon the [British] government after 1815 for cuts in official
spending, for tax concessions, and for money for other purposes. A weak ministry
would neglect such demands at its peril. Naval supremacy could not be sacrificed,
nor would the country have allowed such a thing, but many savings short of that
point might be exacted.
Earlier he advises that
the formulation of naval policy is perhaps best viewed as a fluctuating, intermittent,
triangular struggle, with three main considerations, sometimes in opposition, deter-
mining the decisions. These considerations may be described as domestic, foreign,
and naval.12
The Domestic-Resource Context
In long periods of peace, especially when the character of war is being rapidly al-
tered by new technologies, strategic rationality rarely governs defense policy.
Among the reasons why this should be so is the uncomfortable fact that strategic
need is inherently contestable—whereas, there is by definition a shortage of con-
vincing reality-tests to sort good ideas from bad ideas. Why does the United
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States, with more than a nine-trillion-dollar gross domestic product, spend ap-
proximately $290 billion annually in its Defense Department budget? Is roughly
3 percent of GDP the “correct” resource allocation? Historical scholarship and
common sense tell us that the overall level of U.S. defense expenditure in peace-
time is driven by public mood. For a while, at least, the United States can afford
to spend on defense literally whatever it takes to see off the foe of the moment.
Americans today assuredly could (and almost certainly should) choose to
spend close to $400 billion. But this economic feasibility could be translated into
political demand (voiced by the people’s tribunes in Congress) only by a mood
swing, triggered by a shift in threat
perception. Although the armed
forces, including the Coast Guard,
enjoy high public approval rat-
ings, the nation is not about to
write them a very much larger
check—not, at least, until the
need appears to be demonstrated
by real-world events. Careful de-
fense analysis probably can show
quite plausibly that the country can and should spend that extra hundred billion
a year on national defense, but to advocate as much is to “whistle Dixie,” absent
some indisputable revelation that the military machine is broken or inadequate.
(We won the Cold War and the Gulf War, didn’t we?)
The politics behind U.S. defense expenditure since World War II have pro-
duced an irregular cycle, a “wave train,” of surging and then falling outlays as the
tide of popular alarm has risen and receded.13 If we ignore the direct costs of the
Vietnam War, we find that there have been two surges—one truly great, the
other merely major—in the U.S. defense budget over the past half-century. The
first, a tripling of the DoD budget fueled by the shock of Korea in 1950, allowed
the country to arm properly (and then some) to wage the Cold War seriously.
That was the “wave” that bought the “real Strategic Air Command,” not to men-
tion a nuclear-armed navy and army. The second financially significant “wave”
began to rise in the final year of Jimmy Carter’s presidency and climbed usefully
through and beyond the mid-1980s (the Ronald Reagan years), as plans and
contracts eventually led to actual expenditures.
Great new ventures in U.S. national defense, including candidate revolutions
in military affairs and military technical revolutions, may be conceived in the
lean years between “waves” (think of carrier warfare, amphibious warfare,
long-range bombing, armored warfare);14 to be transformed, however, from
ideas into capabilities they have to catch and ride a “wave.” The Strategic Defense
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Initiative, for example, missed the Reagan budget wave. The United States will
deploy a multilayered ballistic-missile defense architecture on a scale suitable to the
threat only if the idea rides some future swell in the defense-budget wave train.
The budgetary context of the future of the Navy and the Coast Guard, and
particularly the future of their relations, is therefore as follows. First, the defense
budget currently is in the trough between waves; the level is rising, but not sig-
nificantly. (In today’s dollars, the DoD budget has declined from $436 billion in
fiscal 1985 to $291 billion in 2001; the Navy budget has dropped over the same
period from $150 to ninety-plus billion.) Second, there will be a new wave, or
surge, in the budget the next time Americans are persuaded that they face a clear
and present danger. That new wave will very rapidly raise all boats. The lesson of
the early 1950s and early 1980s is that Congress and the White House will want
to fund virtually whatever is ready to be purchased (and, of course, much else
besides). If ballistic-missile defense is arguably ready, or ready enough, it will be
bought on an impressive scale.
If this historically and culturally based argument has merit, it means both
good and bad news for the U.S. Navy. The bad news is that until there is a fairly
dramatic, and self-evident, deterioration in the security environment, ninety to
a hundred billion dollars (in fiscal 2001 currency) will be the politically authori-
tative and enduring support level. It does not much matter who is in the White
House: no administration is going to effect a step-level jump in dollars for the
Defense Department, let alone for the Navy in particular, unless something sig-
nificantly and unexpectedly nasty occurs in the world. The good news, how-
ever—if one dares put it that way—is that the defense budgetary wave train is
assuredly still working. It is a thoroughly safe bet that sometime in the next few
decades the country will decide—probably rapidly and on the basis of scant
strategic analysis—that it must have a much larger, at least more capable, navy.
The political challenge is to be ready to mobilize when the moment arrives and
meanwhile to make such investment as is possible in the $90–$100 billion fleet,
so as to minimize regret later on.
After all, strategic history has a way of delivering crises and wars for which
countries and armed services are less than optimally ready. Recall that the U.S.
Navy was ready for war by late 1943, not 1941–42, and that Hitler’s Kriegsmarine
had been hoping to be “game fit” by 1949, certainly no earlier than 1946. Bartlett
captures the point in his treatment of the Royal Navy after the Napoleonic Wars:
Respect for this principle [to maintain naval supremacy] did not prevent ministers
from living upon “capital” accumulated in the past, from economizing in stores and
new ships in the interest of domestic politics and finance, or from putting the imme-
diate calls upon the Navy before future security. . . . Altogether it is doubtful whether
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any power with a parliamentary constitution, with Britain’s insular position and a
history of territorial inviolability for so many generations, could maintain in time of
peace a fleet prepared in every particular for a large-scale war. The test should not be
perfection but the adequacy of the fleet to deal with an unexpected emergency: not
whether sufficient money and effort had been expended but whether economy had
been pushed too far.15
The Foreign Context
The second context is, confusingly, both a cause and effect of the first. What
Americans allocate to national defense is a function not only of events in the
outside world, the course of international history, but also of the policy they
choose to follow. Foreign policy can age far more rapidly than ships and aircraft.
The new carriers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, Marine weapon systems, or
maritime security cutters that we debate today may well be staple elements of
the national fleet beyond mid-century, meeting the strategic demands of foreign
policy (and domestic policy, for the Coast Guard). But what do we really know
about the “out-decades” of the century we have just entered? Perhaps more to
the point, does it really matter what we do and do not (and cannot) know? Can
we simply register a few grandly sweeping political assumptions about the U.S.
role in the world of tomorrow and then, having checked that box, sail smartly on
to what we find genuinely interesting—a possible revolution in naval affairs,
ship design, network-centricity, the perils of combat in the littoral, and so forth?
Because we are speaking of the future of the Navy and Coast Guard, we must
consider the foreign-policy driver of U.S. defense in a strictly functional way.
Just as naval analysis needs to be contextualized by the perspective of maritime
strategy (a healthy dose of Julian Corbett), so strategy requires a political con-
text.16 Are the Navy and Coast Guard to be so confident in political assumptions
about the future of world politics and the U.S. role (and derivative missions)
therein as, in effect, to regard foreign policy as a given? We have characterized
domestic-resource context as an irregular wave train, with occasional great and
not-so-great budgetary surges, triggered by the ringing of security alarms.
Can the Navy shape long-term acquisition programs (such as the DD 21) with
only generic foes in mind? Surely, distinctive geopolitics might imply distinctive
geostrategy (for instance, China’s strategic geography is dramatically different
from Russia’s). If so, defense planners today should have no difficulty ac-
knowledging, at least in principle, that the relative importance of naval power in
joint warfare should vary with the identity, and hence geography, of the enemy;
and that the utility of different kinds of naval capabilities should vary with
the character of combat specific to adversaries and places. Geography does mat-
ter.17 It may have seemed to be overridden when U.S. naval power reached into
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landlocked Afghanistan in 1998 to try to touch a rogue among rogues, but as a
strategic enterprise the exercise was not entirely satisfactory. Technology is not
synonymous with strategic effect.
Some of the contemporary speculation about the future of the U.S. Navy is
highly intriguing but deeply flawed—specifically, by apparent unfamiliarity
with the enduring lore of global strategy. Jan Breemer, a leader of the “Monterey
school,” for example, argues that “naval strategy is dead,” while others note that
ours is a “golden age of United States sea power.”18 On the first assertion, one
might be moved to quote Mark Twain’s wry comment that reports of his death
were greatly exaggerated; as for the second, all golden ages without exception
fade and pass away. Characteristically, golden ages bear the seeds of their own
demise. They glitter most brilliantly when they have already endured many years
and seem likely to endure for many more—but are in fact nearing dissolution.
The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance records that “the Navy assumes that no
peer competitor on a global scale will arise prior to 2020.”19 That assumption is
probably correct, though the qualifying phrase “on a global scale”
merits watching. Nonetheless, consideration of the foreign and
the (nonnaval) maritime (see below) contexts of the twenty-first
century reduces confidence in the “golden age” argument. There
are at least two torpedoes in the water racing to destroy that view.
First, the whole history and logic of international relations tells us
that the United States will not be permitted to exercise unchal-
lenged a benign hegemony on behalf of the existing global “or-
der.” One may attempt to argue that the present course of events shows a
profound transformation away from the dangerous competitive practices of the
past, but the evidence is weak and assuredly inconclusive.20 Second, and as a stra-
tegically logical corollary to the first point, it would be absurd to suggest that the
greater among America’s enemies in this new century will concede, without con-
test, to U.S. sea power—writ large, the right to use the seas at will. It is about as
prudent a thing to suggest today as it would have been in 1815.
Let us be crystal clear: If it continues to be important, indeed vital, that the
United States be able to use the seas for commercial and military purposes, then
its rivals and enemies must inevitably be motivated to contest that ability—di-
rectly or indirectly, symmetrically or asymmetrically. Little comfort should be
drawn from the fact that the U.S. Navy is currently the “last man standing.” Re-
sources, time, and strength of political motivation will find a way to challenge
that status. Mahan was as correct for 1890 as he was for 1990, and prospectively
for 2090, when he wrote, “Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dan-
gers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and
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cheaper than by land.”21 Whatever technological erosion Mahan’s claim has suf-
fered with the passage of 110 years has been only marginal.
Of course, the U.S. Navy is not opposed today by any other navy with
global pretensions. But that is not a profound, or even particularly significant,
observation. The most basic reason for this “golden age” of U.S. maritime com-
mand is eminently temporary: world politics has been shaking down from the
Cold War, is in an interwar period of uncertain duration, and no polity or coali-
tion now existing has both the political incentive and the readily mobilizable
base to challenge the U.S. maritime imperium. The Navy Strategic Planning
Guidance makes its claim only to the year 2020. It is highly improbable
(though not inconceivable) either that the United States will be permitted to
enjoy a Second American Century untroubled by serious competition or that a
major foe, probably a coalition of foes, will be content to concede the high seas
as a sanctuary and highway for such commercial and military activity as the
United States chooses to conduct. The current understandable focus on operat-
ing “from the sea,” “forward from the sea,” and even “beyond the sea” should not
lead to a self-indulgently static view of the future of international politics.
American defense theorists have to avoid intellectual capture by the “grammar”
of contemporary military affairs at the expense of longer-range strategic thought
that is properly contextualized politically.22
Let us close this part of the discussion with a historically based caveat for
those susceptible to “golden age” fallacies. Such errors misled both the imperial
Athenians and Britons, and they have induced others, like the continentalist
Spartans and Germans, to acquire fleets (leading the latter to a strategically un-
successful outcome).23 In this century, the greater among America’s foes are not
likely to concede all operations in the entire maritime realm beyond coastal wa-
ters to the authority of the U.S. Navy. This brings us to the inherently contestable
military context of guesswork about future warfare.
The Military Context
Navy–Coast Guard relations in the framework of the national-fleet concept have
to be shaped, in their military aspects, principally by the military future of the
Navy. That future has implications for the Coast Guard, but national defense is
only one among the roles of that service. We have to be careful lest in a search for
cost-effective complementarities between Navy and Coast Guard we underplay
the vital point that the first duty of the latter is excellence as a coast guard. If the
U.S. government decided, foolishly, that the overriding job for the Coast Guard
was to assist the Navy, it would be sensible to fold the Coast Guard wholly into
the larger service.
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The U.S. Navy takes its tune, or at least should, from control (even command)
of the high seas. Evolution in the grammar of sea war, and of war generally, will
from time to time suggest shifts in
emphasis among subsurface, sur-
face, air, space, and indeed
land-based naval assets. What is
significant as a matter of broad
guidance for planning, however,
is that the first duty of a navy, in
this case the premier navy, is to
control sea lines of communica-
tion—to allow or deny access to
the sea, thence across it, and fi-
nally to the land, where humankind lives.24 Whether or not today we judge it
probable that any foe of the United States will try to build a high-seas fleet over
the next half-century that might mount a challenge for maritime command,
thereby hazarding a Trafalgar or Midway, is not at all the point. The true point is
that the more powerful of the nation’s foes in the future are certain—yes, cer-
tain—to need ways to defeat or sideline the U.S. Navy. Much as the European
Nato members were always unenthusiastic in the Cold War about strategies
geared to “win” a war, as if on points, in Europe, so America’s enemies would
prefer to do more than just deny to U.S. military power their own littorals. So-
phisticated fortress design usually included outworks, to act as attriting and dis-
tracting breakwaters. Contemporary China, for example, like imperial Japan
before it, understands the concept of area denial very well indeed.
The military context for the U.S. national fleet comprises so rich a set of
topics that it can be treated here only in summary fashion. First of all, the great
RMA debate of the 1990s is over. By historical analogy, it is in the condition
reached in the nuclear debate by the early 1960s: the debaters are out of fresh
inspiration; the intellectual offerings have become overelaborate; the real world
of strategic history has provided little new stimulus; and antithesis has done its
work, leading to some synthesis. Scholars differ on whether an information-led
RMA is a seismic military revolution, meaning a wave to be ridden but not
directed, or merely a military technical revolution, to be “made” by dedicated
revolutionaries in the face of atavistic forces. We must not forget that these terms
are no more than the conceptual inventions of imaginative people; we should
not take them too seriously. Competent theorists always can invent and deploy
exciting-sounding concepts to explain the necessity for the navy they prefer. The
RMA family of ideas is inherently biased in favor of the novel. Also, it is worth
noting that the recently advertised “revolution in naval affairs” has less to do with
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Since the last Quadrennial Defense Review,
I’ve said—and believed—that a force of 305
ships—fully manned, properly trained, and
adequately resourced—would be sufficient for
today’s requirements—within acceptable levels
of risk. But . . . mounting evidence leads me to
believe that 305 ships are not likely to be
enough in the future.
ADMIRAL JAY L. JOHNSON, USN, 1999
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military science than with a political reality: that the (somewhat) blue-water
Soviet naval challenge to U.S. maritime superiority was terminated by radical
change in its domestic political context.
Second, a U.S. Navy planning “to boldly go” (to use a split infinitive institu-
tionalized by a famous television series) where great navies have feared to sail,
into coastal waters—at least to operate forward from, and beyond, the sea—needs
to be alert to a logical paradox of conflict that Edward N. Luttwak has all but
made his own.25 In the same way that a United States apparently omnicompetent
in conventional warfare motivates enemies to find, if they can, asymmetrical
strategic “equalizers” (such as weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and po-
litical warfare), so a U.S. Navy shaped significantly for littoral warfare should ex-
pect foes to investigate other regions in which to seek its embarrassment.
Third, whether in coastal waters or on the high seas, the navy of a superpower
that aspires to protect commerce and international order globally has no re-
sponsible choice other than to pursue excellence virtually wherever military
science takes it, however serendipitously. (Remember the trireme;26 recall HMS
Dreadnought and then Queen Elizabeth.) Athens and Britain had
structurally similar problems in translating naval strength into
strategic advantage, but they were both entirely sound in policies
of maritime supremacy.27 Such supremacy alone did not ensure
their security—which is why we read Corbett as well as
Mahan—but it was the keystone of their strategies.28 The U.S.
Navy in the twenty-first century, following Pericles and Jackie
(properly, Admiral Sir John) Fisher, has to be and remain unarguably
“second to none.” In an important sense, it does not fashion itself to defeat the
navies of today’s (absent) enemies; rather does it plan to control the sea, and es-
pecially the high seas—failing which any discussion of littoral warfare is strictly
moot—against all comers, in all combinations, and with any style of combat.
Politically and strategically, this is the nature and character of the U.S. Navy with
which the Coast Guard must cooperate in a national fleet.
Fourth, twenty-year expectations should not drive forty-year capabilities.
The current naval debate is pervaded with some doubtful orthodoxies that are
probably just plausible fallacies. For example: naval strategy is dead; naval
warfare is now just warfare, not even an especially distinctive category of it, and
accordingly naval vessels are simply vehicles more or less interchangeable and
competitive with those based on land (or in space); and blue water is “American”
by history’s definitive strategic verdict. Perhaps victory in three great wars
(two hot, one cold) prompts this supposition. Unfortunately, the most recent
victory—all but an accident in geopolitical and geostrategic terms (the demise
of the erstwhile other superstate)—is being interpreted as a lasting condition in
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its naval implications.29 Devotees of the proposition that the high seas are per-
manently American should ask themselves on what basis they judge themselves
superior in predictive talent to the statesmen of the 1920s who failed to foresee
the 1930s, or of the 1970s and early 1980s who missed the grand Soviet collapse
of 1989–91.
Finally, technological change drives tactics, shapes operational art, and can
imply strategy. However, certain inherent strengths and limitations of sea power,
and naval power, have proved remarkably resilient in the face of technological,
social, economic, and political change. The demise of navies has been much an-
ticipated but appears no more imminent today than it was half a century ago. In
fact, as Sam Tangredi has argued (and we will suggest in the maritime context),
current trends in globalization are augmenting, not shrinking, the relative im-
portance of sea power in general, and therefore of navies and coast guards in
particular.30 Modern military science has not so homogenized military affairs
that physical geography is strictly yesterday’s dimension of war and strategy.
Ships can loiter menacingly as no other form of military power can. The (admit-
tedly expensive) self-defending, mobile airfield that is a fleet carrier (and its es-
corts) means—to paraphrase the tag line of a once-famous 1970 movie—never
having to say one is sorry to, ask political permission from, or consult the sensi-
tivities of, a local friend.
Of course, there is much that the Navy and Marine Corps cannot do, or can-
not do well—as both are continually reminded by the Army and Air Force as
well. That, we must add, is one reason why there is a U.S. Coast Guard. We can il-
luminate with a four-way discriminator what each of the four environmentally
specific services—and, distinctively, the Coast Guard—brings to the banquet in
contrast to the Navy. We ask:
• What each can do uniquely
• What each can do well
• What each tends to do poorly
• What each cannot do at all.
As best one can tell—and the historical evidence is truly impressive—naval
power is in no danger whatsoever of being overtaken by a technological, or any
other, revolution. Mahan and Corbett are classics not only of sea power but also
of strategy. Much of their explanation of the strategic utility of navies and of sea
power is as valid today as it was a century ago.
The (Nonnaval) Maritime Context
The three contexts discussed thus far have leaned heavily toward consideration
of the future of the Navy in the national fleet alliance. The fourth context shifts
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the focus to the Coast Guard. It so happens that we can be as certain about trends
in the nonnaval uses of the sea, and therefore in the demand for distinctively
coast-guarding services, as we are necessarily uncertain about the major prob-
lems that could test the Navy in combat. The guesswork involved in naval plan-
ning is nearly absent from forecasts bearing upon the Coast Guard—because the
primary focus of the service is not the national defense duties legally laid upon it
but marine safety, maritime law enforcement, and marine environmental pro-
tection. Whatever (say) China attempts, the U.S. Coast Guard will have to try to
cope with an expanding domain and the growing severity of challenges in its
unique role as the country’s policeman at sea (and on shore). What do we know
about the future of non-national-defense demands upon the Coast Guard?
The pressure on America’s maritime frontier is increasing and will continue
to increase.31 It ranges from a huge foreseeable growth—probably a tripling—in
the volume of legitimate maritime trade by 2020 (95 percent of U.S. exports and
imports now move by sea); a boom in illegal migration by sea; an increase in
marine drug smuggling; and greater demands on the resources of the sea, in-
cluding fisheries and mineral deposits. The general picture of growth is clear
enough. Those who guard the maritime approaches know that more and more is
required of them, aside from their also-growing list of defense-related duties.
The bare statistics on Coast Guard activity are awe inspiring. The American
public is reminded of the Coast Guard when a white hull with the orange and
blue stripes is seen in the context of an air crash at sea or the interception of a
boat with illegal drugs or immigrants. The big picture, however, is
that the service responds each year to approximately fifty thou-
sand distress calls, saves perhaps five thousand lives outright, and
provides help to a hundred thousand other people in emergen-
cies. Every year, roughly eight hundred Americans lose their lives
in marine accidents. Seventy-eight million Americans a year now
use recreational vessels, a figure predicted to rise by 65 percent
over the next twenty years. Relatedly, cruise ship fleets will double
in that period; individual vessels will carry five or six thousand people and dis-
place up to 142,000 tons, fifty thousand more than the carrier Nimitz. Consider
the sheer scale of another key current Coast Guard activity: each year the service
conducts safety inspections of thirty-four thousand U.S. vessels, nineteen thou-
sand foreign vessels, and seven thousand fixed marine facilities on and off shore.
The relevant trends are almost entirely in the direction of heavier burdens,
and the reasons are all but self-evident. For one, the world’s population is likely
to expand by a staggering two billion by 2020. For another, the United States is
a giant economy (nine trillion-plus dollars) with gigantic maritime responsibil-
ities, including guardianship of the world’s largest offshore exclusive economic
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zone (or EEZ, at 3.36 million square miles); U.S. economic performance is
critically dependent on the high seas and its own coastal and internal waterways.
Everywhere we look we find an increase in pressure on marine resources and, of
course, on those charged with their protection. For just one example, fisheries
law-enforcement boardings by the Coast Guard increased from 9,440 in 1994 to
14,173 in 1998. No fewer than twenty-six thousand commercial fishing boats
operate in U.S. waters. The context of pressure on the Coast Guard, in fact, most
vividly emerges from the juncture of these two factors: the predicted growth in
world population translates to an annual demand for perhaps 110 million tons
of protein from fish, while only eighty-two million is likely to be prudently
harvestable. It follows that the Coast Guard, charged with protecting the world’s
largest EEZ, with 20 percent of the world’s estimated fish resources, is going to
be kept very busy.
The litany goes on. The next twenty years will see an expansion of oil imports
(by sea, of course) to the United States, from today’s 40 percent of domestic con-
sumption to 66 percent of an even larger total demand. There will be more ship-
ping, larger and faster ships with smaller crews, and many more people taking
their leisure on, and traveling (by ferry) through, U.S. ports and waters. With re-
gard to drug traffic, for example, at least 70 percent of the total drug flow into the
United States now travels part of the way by sea.
The fact is that each of the three segments of the Coast Guard’s portfo-
lio—justice, transportation, and defense—is registering noticeable growth. The
service, uniquely, is responsible for law enforcement at sea (being the only
armed service exempt from the restrictions of posse comitatus), leads in marine
safety in all respects, and has a noteworthy clutch of maritime defense assign-
ments. Therefore the significance to the nation of the Coast Guard is in effect
that of the sea itself. Only those who do not appreciate how vital is the sea to the
safety, prosperity, and well-being of the United States will find difficulty in un-
derstanding why an obsolescing Coast Guard matters deeply.
A NATIONAL FLEET
As noted at the beginning of this article, the Navy has entered the new century
perilously thin in numbers of surface warships, a condition currently pro-
grammed to worsen markedly. Pessimistic projections show as few as ninety
ships (all “high-end”) by 2020. The service has descended in a decade from a
total of 592 ships to 316 today and is headed below three hundred. But times
alter needs. The Navy has looked hard at what it may require to enforce access
from the sea through the coastal waters of enemies, and it has unsurprisingly
concluded that numbers matter.
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Today the service is examining ways to square the circle—how it can increase
the number of its surface combatants while carrying through a revolution in
ship propulsion (integrated electric drive, which enthusiasts claim should prove
as significant as the shift in the nineteenth century from sail to steam), all
without breaking the bank.32 The much discussed, though as yet little endorsed,
STREETFIGHTER concept of small but highly competent coastal warships is a
notable sign of the times.33 By the Navy’s own sensible admission, the plainly
predictable scarcity of surface warships and attack submarines threatens the in-
tegrity of policy and strategy. Mean, potent STREETFIGHTERs may or may not be
part of the strategic solution, but the thirty-five to forty maritime security cut-
ters that the Coast Guard plans to acquire over the next twenty years have to be.
The present high and medium-endurance cutters, patrol aircraft, and com-
munications systems of the Coast Guard are generally old, becoming obsoles-
cent, and in some regards already inadequate. In the apposite words of the
Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral James M. Loy, “Our
ships and aircraft that operate offshore are among the oldest of all
the world’s fleets of similar platforms—38th of 41. The personnel
and maintenance costs of keeping these ancient craft running
grow increasingly prohibitive.”34 The point is not that obsolescent
equipment cannot do as good a job as more modern equip-
ment—that is obvious—but that it will increasingly be unable to
do the job at all. Smuggling craft, for example, already outrun or
otherwise evade Coast Guard vessels, and their radar cross sections defeat the
old search radars on the cutters. Similarly, the maintenance problems of aging
ships and aircraft affect endurance on station, especially far from shore.35
The need to recapitalize the deep-water assets of the U.S. Coast Guard draws
urgency, then, both from the ever-more-challenging scale and quality of tradi-
tional coast-guarding tasks and from the need to operate effectively with the
other U.S. armed services. The sharpness of this problem has been highlighted
usefully by the Coast Guard’s Assistant Commandant for Operations, Rear
Admiral Ray Riutta. He confides that “the biggest challenge I have . . . is to make
sure that I do not field assets that are so slow, defenseless, and technologically
outdated as to be albatrosses around the necks of the Navy’s forces with which
we sail.” 36 To underfund (as today) the Coast Guard while its duties expand is to
produce an entirely predictable result: its equipment and people are worked
harder than is wise; retention, equipment life, and readiness rates suffer; and a
crisis gathers.
To sustain operational tempo in the near term, spare parts are cannibalized
from working equipment. That practice is now standard for the Coast Guard’s
fleet of thirty C-130s. Some planes are kept flying, but at the cost of reducing an
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already lean force structure, demoralizing overworked personnel, and lowering
retention rates of experienced service members. (Between 1994 and 1999, the
availability of Coast Guard C-130s dropped from 80 percent to an unacceptable
60 percent.) Cannibalization means that at least one of the aircraft assigned to
each of the Coast Guard’s five air stations is likely to be a “hangar queen.” These
planes, of course, are in no sense “extra”; stripping them for parts means patrols
not conducted or backup not available; the consequence can be lives needlessly
lost at sea and laws not properly enforced. The issue is easy to explain. Admiral
Loy simply states the facts when he says: “The unfavorable trends in aircraft
availability, parts inventories, and crew experience challenge our ability to provide
mariners in distress with the rescue services Americans have come to expect.”37
The national security community typically shows as little interest in the Coast
Guard as did the Clinton administration (understandably, the jury is out on the
Bush administration).38 Many of the problems described here lend themselves to
elementary and inexpensive solution. Again to quote Admiral Loy, speaking on
the same occasion, “Many of our readiness issues are the sort of problems that
really can be solved by throwing money at them. Twelve or thirteen million dol-
lars to restore our parts inventories to where they were a few years ago would be a
nice place to start.” Both intellectually and financially the Coast Guard operates
beneath the notice of most political leaders. In 1998 the White House ap-
proached Congress for an emergency supplemental budget augmentation to im-
prove the readiness of the armed forces. The administration’s request did “not
include a nickel for the Coast Guard,” even though the service had participated
in its development and shared the readiness problems of all the other services.39
It would be a serious mistake to assume that the crisis described may produce,
at worst, a graceful degradation of performance—“merely” more lives lost at sea,
more pollution not prevented or punished, more drugs brought in by “go-fast”
boats, and more fish stocks illegally run down.40 A persistently underresourced,
aging Coast Guard could also mean large and exceedingly unhappy events: an-
other Exxon Valdez disaster, a super–cruise ship aided too late, or a nuclear de-
vice transported by sea undetected into the United States.
Aside from all this, the Coast Guard has to be ready to place itself in harm’s
way in active war zones. It is not the mission of the service to win and keep con-
trol of the sea; that is the job of the Navy. However, the Coast Guard does have to be
able to operate seamlessly with the Navy and the other armed services. As the
Navy heads for mastery of information-led network-centric warfare, it must
help the Coast Guard to function within that framework.41 The C4ISR regime
needs to be common to all of America’s services, not just a “high-tech” four.
1 3 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
134
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 30
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/30
The emerging picture is one of national security under increasing stress at
sea. The Defense Department and the Navy admit—in the national fleet “treaty”
signed with the Coast Guard—that the fleet is too small and that accordingly
the Coast Guard has to reequip itself for duties farther offshore.42 Forty-one
deep-water cutters were a useful adjunct to the (almost) six-hundred-ship Navy
of the 1980s. Today, as the Navy copes with austerity and technical revolution by
concentrating its capabilities in fewer ships, optimized for high-intensity con-
flict, those cutters assume a new significance. By 2020, the Navy will have no frig-
ates left, and all its destroyers will be large and expensive. There will be no small,
general-purpose warships—a yawning void between the fourteen Cyclone-class
(PC 1) patrol boats on the one hand and the fifty-seven Arleigh Burkes and the
new DD 21s on the other.43 This trend could change in the future, particularly if
the service pursues some variant of the STREETFIGHTER coastal warship, but
certainly it is not going to change rapidly. The Navy intends to replace no fewer
than eighty-eight Oliver Hazard Perry frigates and Spruance destroyers with
thirty-two DD 21s (really mini–Arsenal Ships, close in concept to the monitors
of yesteryear), beginning with the first DD 21 in 2008 and about three ships a
year thereafter. By 2020, as noted already, Navy surface warships might well
number scarcely more than ninety.
The interconnecting parts of the compounding maritime crisis, however,
suggest a workable solution. For once, the law of unintended consequences
should work in favor of U.S. national security. If the Navy expects to be short of,
or even lack entirely, frigate-like warships of the future, the Coast Guard can
help fill the gap; it need only reequip itself in a way that it ought to anyway for
the better conduct of nondefense duties. The concept is that of a national fleet:
the idea that the Navy and Coast Guard are complementary and synergistic, that
they are especially cost-effective when yoked in tandem.
The concept is bureaucratically new, but it is well established in historical
practice; no break with law or tradition is contemplated. The Coast Guard is le-
gally an armed service, and its cutters have always been more or less well-armed,
shallow-draft warships.44 The question is how much “war” equipment Coast
Guard warships should be capable of carrying. That question has yet to be
answered in detail, but as a matter of guiding principle it is answerable today;
indeed, the agreed concept of the national fleet settles the most pertinent issue.
In political fact, of course, matters are not so simple. At present the Coast Guard
must compete within the Department of Transportation for respect and dollars;
within the administration for provision within the balanced budget; and in the
face of a Navy all too willing to offer cast-off equipment (frequently overage and
therefore expensive to maintain, crew, and operate; or otherwise excellent craft
like the Cyclones, inappropriate for the Coast Guard’s blue-water tasks).
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The zone of reasonable disagreement about the Coast Guard’s duties and
equipment is not extensive. There is no uniquely right number of Coast Guard
cutters, no unquestionably correct timetable for their replacement, and cer-
tainly no unarguably optimal equipment for them. Probably it is
intelligent to think about a flexible, mixed fleet of deep-water
cutters, perhaps with “plug-in” capabilities. Not all cutters would
be available for combat zones, though obviously the more that are
equipped to survive in a hostile environment—at least under the
wings of other armed forces—the better. Also, the sea services
need not decide soon and definitively precisely how “warship-like”
new cutters should be. What matters is that cutters and aircraft be
so designed that modular adjustments of combat power can be effected as re-
quired over operating lifetimes that could extend into the second half of the cen-
tury, and that Coast Guard C4ISR allow interoperability with all the other
services.45
All of this brings us to the only point in the argument not extensively sup-
ported thus far—that the Coast Guard, as an armed service, should seriously
consider a move to the Department of Defense. The case can be put negatively or
positively, and it is quite persuasive either way. The negative argument empha-
sizes the increasingly poor fit of the Coast Guard in the Department of Trans-
portation. Too many of its missions and tasks—aside from safety of maritime
passage, a core concern of the Coast Guard—lie far outside the charter, interests,
and even culture, of Transportation. This is not a criticism of that department
but an acknowledgment that the Coast Guard and its current administrative
parent have evolved in different directions.
The positive argument for relocation to Defense is that America’s security en-
vironment increasingly requires the four armed services in that department to
operate against irregular and unconventional foes. At the same time, the varied
missions of the Coast Guard are requiring it to equip for, and perform, opera-
tions more military in nature. Whatever may have been the case in the past, the
total job of the Coast Guard today is more complementary to those of the other
armed services than it is to the Department of Transportation.
None of this denies the uniqueness of the Coast Guard among the armed ser-
vices. As noted earlier, it is exempted from posse comitatus, and it is the federal
policing agency at sea and on the coasts. Coast Guard people are lightly armed
military professionals, many of whose tasks are notably nonmilitary (ship in-
spection, port safety, marine resource protection, safety of navigation, and so
forth). However, an unmistakable practical convergence is under way: the Coast
Guard’s defense mission is growing, while the national security agenda of inter-
est to the Defense Department is widening.
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Of course, there would be problems for the Coast Guard within Defense.
However, the difficulties look distinctly manageable; they should be dwarfed by
the advantages. The Coast Guard probably cannot fit snugly into the Defense
Department (or anywhere else), but it can fit well enough there, provided the
problems are understood and addressed. For instance, the essential recapitaliza-
tion of the Coast Guard must meet distinctive Coast Guard operational needs; it
must also capture complementarities and synergisms with the Navy. That would
surely be easier to arrange within Defense than from outside. The material and
strategic advantages, in general, could be huge. In Defense, the Coast Guard would
be perceived and treated as what it truly is, the country’s fifth armed service.
Further, it would be able to participate more effectively in logistical, procure-
ment, and personnel arrangements. Recent, indeed current, experience makes
plain that the skilled people who are the Coast Guard increasingly suffer adverse
disparities with respect to Defense Department personnel in benefits and allow-
ances (though not pay). This fifth armed service has to try to recruit and retain
professionals in competition with other services better able to look after their
people; as it is, the Coast Guard can make up the difference only by siphoning
money out of the equipment and operating budgets. In the Defense Depart-
ment, the Coast Guard’s people would be treated as what they are, members of
the U.S. armed forces.
The risks in all this are not trivial, but neither are they truly daunting.
Above all else, a Coast Guard within DoD would need to preserve its distinctive
warrior-policeman culture. There would be some areas of disagreement with
other services. For example, it is probable that the Coast Guard’s expanding role
as guardian of marine resources would fuel tension with the Navy, whose
priorities have been rather different.46 So be it: America needs both perspectives.
There is every reason to be optimistic that the service could retain its (some-
what) policeman-like reputation and yet function, and be seen to function, as
a full member of the armed forces team. Perhaps a civilian assistant secretary of
defense for the Coast Guard would be useful in achieving that balance.
Alternatives such as relocation to the Justice Department or conversion to
something like the Federal Emergency Management Agency are interesting, and
the arguments for them have merit, but they do not yet compete seriously with
the Defense option. Looking to the decades ahead, the Coast Guard inevitably
will be more of an armed service with a difference than a maritime police force
with a difference. At the least, it is time for this subject to be aired publicly.
The dominant conclusion is that the Navy and the Coast Guard are natural com-
plements and that this complementarity should be expressed practically in a
“national fleet” that is not mere rhetoric. It is surely beyond argument that the
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Navy cannot often afford to devote exceedingly scarce (and frighteningly expen-
sive) assets to operations other than war. For its part, the Coast Guard, limping
along on between four and five billion dollars per annum, could not take up
naval—which is to say war-fighting—duties even if it so wished (which it does
not). Even the next great surge in the defense budget (ideally by that time includ-
ing the Coast Guard), which would presumably put the Navy back in the frigate
business, would not promote serious difficulty vis-à-vis the Coast Guard. A
rising budgetary tide would raise all boats—gray hulls and orange stripes.
If—realistically, when—the American public becomes alarmed once again about
defense, both the Navy and the Coast Guard (for its national-defense duties)
assuredly will be bolstered.
Those who have the leisure to read history and strategic theory, and who are
not immersed in the short-term issues and crises of government, have a duty to
try to sort the enduring from the ephemeral. Officials lack the time (and, having
chosen to be officials, probably the inclination) for such reflection. The whole
subject of Navy–Coast Guard relations is in need of just such conceptual,
strategic, and historical contextualization. In the heat, excitement, and urgen-
cies of interservice issues, with their large budgetary ramifications, significant
truths can slip out of sight. One is that, like the Athenian and British navies of
the past, the U.S. Navy has an international “ordering” function that obliges it to
dominate the most demanding possible conflict. The Navy is therefore prudent
in investing in naval supremacy on the high seas, even though no plausible com-
petitor is in view today.
Some concepts du jour hide their real obsolescence behind fashionable buzz-
words, novel-seeming theories of future warfare, and mood swings, either opti-
mistic or pessimistic. Donald and Frederick W. Kagan deftly skewer one such
flawed view:
The absence of “global peer competitors” does not make the world safe for the
foreseeable future—it only makes it uncertain and difficult to understand. When
Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 it was not a “global peer competitor.” Nor was
Germany in either world war. Still less was North Korea in 1950, North Vietnam in
the 1960’s, Saddam Hussein in 1990, or Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 when they un-
leashed attacks that compelled American military intervention. None of these states
posed an imminent threat to the continental United States. The concept of “global
peer competitors” is the thinking of the Cold War and is not relevant to debates
about future American national strategy.47
When the nation considers carefully the domestic, foreign, and military
contexts of Navy–Coast Guard relations, much that is uncertain can be settled.
The proposition that the sea services of the United States should behave as
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complementary parts of a national fleet is true to their several natures and func-
tions. It need not provoke controversy.
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SET AND DRIFT
DOCTRINE MATTERS WHY THE JAPANESE LOST AT MIDWAY
Jonathan B. Parshall, David D. Dickson, and Anthony P. Tully
Dallas Isom’s article “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost” [Naval War
College Review, Summer 2000, pp. 60–100] is laudable for its use of Japanese
sources and for the interesting points it raises. In particular, we applaud Isom’s
interviews with Japanese survivors, which contribute new and useful informa-
tion regarding Japanese aircraft rearmament procedures. This new data is cru-
cial to building an accurate account of the events that transpired aboard the
Japanese carriers on the morning of 4 June 1942. However, in our opinion, Pro-
fessor Isom’s arguments appear to rely too much on a rather rigid (and highly
debatable) interpretation of Japanese communications: namely, exactly when
did Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo received transmissions from scout plane 4,
launched by the cruiser Tone. In addition, while Isom’s rearmament information
(which he puts forward as central to Nagumo’s in-
ability to launch his anticarrier strike before being
fatally attacked) is clearly important to understand-
ing the Japanese side of the battle, we feel that he did
not carry his operational analysis far enough. As a
result, we cannot accept his conclusions.
At the time of Isom’s writing, we were engaged in
a reappraisal and rewriting of the Japanese account
of Midway as a result of our own work in identifying
wreckage from the carrier Kaga.1 A key part of our
approach was to build an accurate model of the op-
erations of the Japanese carrier striking force. As we
will show, the disaster that befell the Japanese carrier
force hinged neither on whether Nagumo received
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Tone 4’s message at 0740 or at 0800, nor on how quickly the armorers in the Japa-
nese hangars could do their work. Rather, the fate of the Japanese Mobile
Striking Force (Kido Butai) revolved around what was happening on its flight
decks. Armed with a knowledge of Japanese carrier doctrine, as well as the oper-
ational information from the battle, one can reach an accurate assessment of the
state of readiness of Nagumo’s force at the time of the climactic American attack
without resorting to Isom’s indirect method.
A major error in the Isom article is that it repeatedly misstates what aircraft
actually were on the Japanese flight decks. In several places, Isom presumes that
the Japanese antiship strike force was on the flight decks when it is demonstrable
that those aircraft were still in their hangars. This presumption carries forward
the (mistaken) conventional view
that the Japanese had spotted their
antiship strike force on the flight
decks shortly after the initial Mid-
way attack force had taken off and
had only briefly moved these antiship strike aircraft below for the purposes of
rearming them or recovering the first-strike wave. As will be shown, this is the
root of the fundamental misunderstanding of circumstances at the time the car-
riers were struck.
In fact, both Japanese doctrine and the operations of the Japanese combat air
patrol (CAP) fighters would have kept the reserve strike planes securely below in
their hangars until they were definitely needed. Not only that, but because of
Japanese hangar design, the window of time necessary to lift, spot, and launch
the aircraft was substantially longer than has been previously understood. As a
result, given the frenetic nature of Japanese CAP operations after about 0800
(particularly aboard Akagi and Kaga), it is unlikely that many of these sec-
ond-wave aircraft were ever spotted on the flight decks before the fatal American
dive-bomber attack commenced at 1020.
This point cannot be overemphasized, because from the conventional belief
of what was on the flight decks flow nearly all Western interpretations of the bat-
tle. To put the matter succinctly, at the time Akagi, Kaga, and Soryu were struck,
their flight decks were more empty than occupied. This is almost the reverse of the
standard view, which has the Japanese flight decks packed with strike aircraft
awaiting takeoff. There were aircraft on deck, but most were CAP fighters, not at-
tack aircraft. There were also fewer aircraft on deck than is generally supposed.
Though potentially startling, this is less a “revision” than a correction and careful
restating of the existing historical record. We will show that official Japanese sources
on the battle have been aware of this for some thirty years.
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These errors in both the conventional Western interpretation and Isom’s
article cannot be addressed without first developing a sense of how the Japanese
conducted carrier operations. Unfortunately, standard English-language histo-
ries of the battle of Midway have
not well understood Japanese car-
rier operations. From the common
misperception that Japanese naval
aviation was derivative of Western
(primarily British) practice, Western writers typically believe that the Japanese
carriers of World War II behaved much like their Western counterparts. In fact, they
did not. Japanese carrier operations contained elements of both U.S. Navy and
Royal Navy practices. However, as a result of differences in physical design and
operational doctrine, by the late 1930s Japanese carriers fought in a fashion all
their own. Without understanding these points of divergence, understanding
Nagumo’s actions is likewise impossible.
Before the days of modern angled flight decks, a carrier flight deck could be
doing only one of three things: spotting aircraft, launching aircraft, or recover-
ing aircraft. To this list most American writers would be quick to add “parking
aircraft” and “servicing aircraft.” However, it is important to understand that the
Japanese avoided performing these activities on the flight deck. Japanese carriers
did not use permanent deck parks in the fashion of the U.S. Navy. While tempo-
rary deck parks were established forward of crash barriers during recovery oper-
ations, they acted only as transitional “overflow” mechanisms until returning
aircraft could be moved below decks.2 Furthermore, while the Japanese could
service aircraft on the flight deck (Japanese carriers were equipped with refuel-
ing points around the deck edge, for instance), most fueling occurred in the han-
gars. Likewise, except for arming dive-bomber aircraft, the Japanese serviced
planes in the hangar as well.3
Japanese carrier design is also notable for its use of enclosed hangar decks. In
contrast to U.S. carriers, whose hangars could be opened to the elements by roll-
ing up metal screens along their sides, Japanese hangars were fully enclosed by
storerooms, workshops, and crew spaces, with no natural ventilation. This
meant that aircraft engines were never warmed up below.4 This is in direct con-
trast to American practice, where aircraft commonly were warmed up in the
hangars, brought to deck, and immediately launched. These factors had impor-
tant ramifications during the battle of Midway and imposed severe restrictions
on Japanese operational tempos.
In order to spot a strike force on the flight deck and launch it against the
Americans (assuming it was already armed), Nagumo’s ships had to perform a
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complex series of operations. Some tasks could be done in parallel, some only
sequentially, and each entailed fixed or variable time costs. These included:
• Bringing the aircraft up to the flight deck (sequential: approximately one
minute per plane).5
• Spotting the aircraft, unfolding its wings, and chocking wheels (conducted
mostly in parallel with elevator movements, but five sequential minutes are
added to account for these movements).6
• Warming up engines (sequential: fifteen minutes minimum for the entire
force).7
• In the case of dive-bombers, arming the aircraft (largely concurrent with
engine warmup, but could take as long as twenty minutes).8
• Delivering final briefings to the pilots (again, mostly in parallel with
elevator movements, five sequential minutes minimum for the entire
force).9
• Moving crew to planes and performing final preflight checks (five
minutes).10
• Launching the strike (sequential: fifteen to thirty seconds per plane).11
Taken together, it is apparent that spotting a twenty-one-plane strike for
launch would take around forty minutes total, and another five to ten minutes
would be required for the launch.12 If the deck spot contained dive-bombers, the
spotting time would be perhaps five to ten minutes longer, because these planes
had to be armed during engine warm up. This timing is directly confirmed in of-
ficial Japanese sources.13 The need to warm up engines on the flight deck, dic-
tated by Japanese hangar design, reveals itself as a major hindrance to Japanese
operational tempos. Unfortunately, warm-up could not be shortened—aircraft
casualties were the inevitable outcome of slighting this activity, and needless
losses had to be avoided at all costs.14 Thus, if Nagumo was to attack the Ameri-
can strike force, he needed to find an unbroken forty-five-minute window of op-
portunity on all four flight decks during which to spot and then launch his
strike.15
The final piece of the puzzle is found in the activities of the Japanese combat
air patrol that morning. An examination of Akagi’s flight operations reveals the
basic point:
0430—launch Midway attack force
0445—launch initial combat air patrol (three fighters)
0543—launch CAP (three fighters)
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0655—launch CAP (three fighters)
0659—recover CAP (three fighters)
0710—launch CAP (five fighters)
0720—recover CAP (one fighter)
0726—recover CAP (one fighter)
0736—recover CAP (three fighters)
0750—recover CAP (two fighters)
0808—launch CAP (three fighters)
0832—launch CAP (four fighters)
0837–0900—recover Midway attack force plus three CAP fighters
0910—recover CAP (one fighter)
0932—launch CAP (five fighters)
0945—launch CAP (three fighters)
0951—recover CAP (two fighters)
1010—recover CAP (three fighters).16
The other carriers were involved in similar activities, albeit at different
times.17 The important point is that recovery operations absolutely required a
clear flight deck aft. Aircraft could not be spotted aft while aircraft were landing,
nor would they usually be spotted aft during fighter takeoff operations.18
This information enables us to appreciate several things. First, it is clear that
Akagi was very busy on the morning of the fourth. The constant American air at-
tacks from 0700 onward necessitated a continuous cycling of the Japanese CAP
fighters above Nagumo’s formation. It was very difficult to find a spot to squeeze
in forty minutes of uninterrupted deck time to spot a strike, let alone launch it.19
This is a crucial realization in determining what was possible aboard the Japa-
nese carriers and in analyzing Nagumo’s decision-making process.
Second, upon closer examination it is apparent that Akagi’s 1010 CAP recov-
ery dictates that there cannot have been many strike planes on its deck when it
was fatally bombed at 1025. Fifteen minutes would not have been sufficient time
to bring its twenty-plane strike to the flight deck, let alone spot them, brief the
pilots, and warm up engines.20 Thus, the common belief that the American
dive-bomber attack found the Japanese flight decks practically chock-a-block
with strike planes revved up and waiting to take off is clearly untrue. The aircraft
on deck were primarily CAP fighters.
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As it turns out, this latter observation, while perhaps shocking to an
American audience steeped in the popular lore of this battle, is directly sup-
ported by official Japanese sources. In Japan, a clearer picture of Japanese Mid-
way operations began emerging in the 1970s, with the publication of the official
Japanese war histories (known as
Senshi Sosho) and other substan-
tive works. Unfortunately, it is
only very recently that some of
these works have been translated
into English. Senshi Sosho explic-
itly states that at the time of the attack, every Japanese carrier had its attack air-
craft in the hangars; the only aircraft on deck were either CAP fighters or, in the
case of Soryu, strike force escort fighters that were being launched to augment
the CAP.21
Third, this operational information casts doubt on whether Nagumo’s re-
serve strike force was ever on deck in the first place. The conventional wisdom
has always been that when Lieutenant Joichi Tomonaga’s Midway attack force
was launched, the reserve antiship strike force was immediately brought up to
the flight decks and spotted. In fact, this would be contrary to typical Japanese
operational patterns, which would have preferred to keep the strike in the han-
gars until needed. It is absolutely certain that this force was not on deck during
the 0800–0820 time frame, when Nagumo was making some of his most crucial
decisions. Attacking B-17s photographed the Japanese formation during this
period, and their pictures of Soryu, Hiryu, and Akagi show no strike planes on
deck, only a handful of fighters. This is corroborated by Japanese records that
show the force launching additional CAP fighters during this time.
With this information in hand, we now turn to several of the assertions in
Isom’s article. For instance, regarding Nagumo’s supposedly tardy receipt of
Tone 4’s message and its dire implications for subsequent Japanese preparations,
Isom states (p. 75), “It should thus be apparent that if the rearming operation
was reversed at this point—at 0745—it would not have taken much time to re-
store the torpedoes on half the planes from which they had been removed and
respot all the planes on the flight decks of the two carriers, perhaps only about
thirty minutes.” In light of the need for forty minutes just to respot the strike,
not to mention the time needed to rearm, this gives a grossly optimistic impres-
sion of Nagumo’s chances of launching a strike before Tomonaga’s returning
force would begin to occupy the flight decks at 0837.
Isom later states (p. 77), “Thus, at about 0920 operations to respot the
second-wave strike force on the flight decks could have begun, had the torpedo
planes been rearmed with torpedoes. Had the countermand order been given at
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0745, as the standard scenario holds, the torpedoes almost certainly would have
been restored by 0920.” The ability of the Japanese carriers to begin a respot at
0920, had they been rearmed or not, is highly questionable given the high tempo
of CAP operations and their mo-
nopolization of the flight decks.
At this point in the battle, Japa-
nese records clearly show, the
Japanese were alert to a constant
stream of incoming American
strikes. Until the coast was rea-
sonably clear and his CAP well stocked with fresh fighters to last through the
spotting process, Nagumo cannot have been expected to spot his strike. Akagi’s air
officer (hikocho) in charge of flight operations, Commander Shogo Masuda, as
well as the other experienced air officers around Nagumo (such as Mitsuo
Fuchida and Minoru Genda) could not have helped impressing this point upon
the admiral.
Even more questionable is Isom’s subsequent statement (p. 78) regarding the
state of Carrier Division 1 at 1000. When the attack was over at 1000, “about ten
minutes of work still remained to rearm the last division of Akagi’s torpedo
planes, and even more time was needed for Kaga’s. The torpedo planes that had
been rearmed were brought up to the flight decks, beginning around 0920, but at
least a third remained in the hangar decks at 1000. By 1015, the rearming had
probably been completed on Akagi, and the last torpedo planes were being
brought up and spotted on its flight deck. Had the whole strike force been ready
to go at 1000, it, along with Zero escorts, could have been launched during this
fifteen-minute window between attacks on the Mobile Force.”
This is wrong on several counts. First, we know that Akagi landed a CAP
fighter at 0910 and two more at 0951, meaning that even if there had been strike
aircraft on deck at 0920 (which we think highly unlikely in any case), they had to
have been moved back down into the hangar by 0951. Also, Isom clearly does
not factor in the immutable time costs associated with spotting and engine
warm-up—a “fifteen-minute window between attacks” simply does not suffice.
In fact, in this case Isom also ignores Nagumo’s own estimate that the strike force
would be ready at 1100, although a 1030 takeoff was hoped for, if things went
well. Launching at 1000, though, for all the reasons cited above, was never even
remotely in the cards, and Nagumo knew it.
Furthermore, the assertion that two-thirds of Akagi’s torpedo planes were on
deck at 1000 is clearly wrong. Akagi had landed CAP nine minutes earlier, at
0951, and would do so again at 1010. Isom’s assertion is also directly contradicted
by Senshi Sosho, which states that at the time of the 1025 attack all of Akagi’s
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strike aircraft were in the hangar. This is further corroborated by Richard Best,
lead dive-bomber pilot against Akagi, who states that when he dove for his at-
tack, the only aircraft on deck were Zeros.22
Isom makes a different error regarding rearmament activities aboard Carrier
Division 2 (Hiru and Soryu). He writes (p. 79), “[the strike aircraft] could be re-
armed on the flight deck as well as in the hangar deck. (It appears that only half
of each squadron was lowered to the hangar deck after the 0715 rearming order,
thus saving elevator time.)” Furthermore, he states (p. 80), “Most, if not all, of
those [strike aircraft] had probably been changed back to armor-piercing bombs
by very soon after 0830; at least half of each squadron on Hiryu and Soryu was
already on the flight decks at 0830.”
Again, his statement is at odds with the photographic evidence obtained
between 0800 and 0815, which shows no strike planes whatsoever on either car-
rier’s flight deck. In addition, it is known that Soryu launched CAP at 0710, and
recovered CAP at 0730. Hiryu recovered CAP at 0700 and 0740, launched CAP at
0825, and was recovering CAP again at 0840. Thus even if strike planes had be-
gun to be promptly brought up on Hiryu after the American B-17s departed at
0815, they would have had to be stowed below again by 0840—the window of
opportunity was not long enough to have performed warm-up and launch.
Isom repeats this error later when he states (p. 81), “At 0830, when Nagumo
had to make a decision whether to launch an attack on the American force or
postpone it, we have seen that he had ready no torpedo planes and no Zeros
for escort. But he did have dive-bombers on Hiryu and Soryu available. They
could have been launched fairly quickly.” Again, this is incorrect, as the B-17
photographs and other evidence incontrovertibly demonstrate. The Japanese
dive-bombers were all in their hangars at the time and would have taken another
forty minutes to put into action, even if they had been rearmed.
Isom’s concluding point, and his central thesis (p. 89), “considering how close
[Nagumo] came to launching his attack before being bombed at 1025, every
minute saved could have made a significant difference in the outcome of the
battle,” is shown to be incorrect by the cumulative weight of the evidence at
hand. It was not the inefficiency of Japanese communications (which is debat-
able) that doomed Japanese hopes in the battle but the inefficiency of Japanese
flight operations. Nagumo was nowhere near ready to launch by 1025; in fact, he
had probably barely begun preparations to do so. Even assuming Akagi had be-
gun lifting its strike aircraft to the flight deck immediately after its CAP was re-
covered at 1010, Akagi would not have been ready to launch its strike for forty
minutes more (1050) and could not have gotten it completely airborne before
1100. Kaga was in a slightly better state, having last launched six CAP fighters
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at 1000, but it was hampered because of its larger torpedo bomber wing
(twenty-seven aircraft) to lift and spot.
It is no coincidence that after the devastating American attack on the other
three Japanese carriers, Hiryu’s actual operational tempo corresponds very
closely with the hypothetical earlier timetable for Carrier Division 1 we have just
put forth. The flagship of the aggressive Rear
Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi can be presumed to
have launched its own strike as quickly as pos-
sible after the 1022–1027 debacle. Yet in the
event it only managed to get that strike aloft by
1057, directly supporting the idea that its own
deck-spotting activities had barely begun when
the other three carriers were being attacked. In-
deed, if the conventional view were true, planes
should have been quite literally zooming off
Hiryu’s flight deck at 1025 even as its compatri-
ots were struck. Clearly, they were not, and this
point is often overlooked.
The picture that emerges from this analysis
is of a rather conservative admiral operating
within the constraints of 1942 Japanese carrier
doctrine. In contrast to the standard American
accounts that have the Japanese observing the
feeble American attacks (poorly executed and
delivered piecemeal) with a measure of contempt, the operational tempo of
Nagumo’s CAP reveals something rather different. Regardless of whether they
accorded the American attackers much respect in terms of technique, the Japa-
nese command was certainly concerned about the aerial assault, both for its dis-
ruption of the force’s timetable and for the overt danger posed by the attacks
themselves. Upon close reading of the Nagumo report and other Japanese
sources, there is no question that Nagumo and his staff knew the peril they were
in. One good hit on any of the carriers could have disastrous consequences, and
each of the carriers had survived near-misses during the morning.
Considering this, Nagumo probably thought he was playing it safe—keeping
the strike aircraft in the hangars until the worst of the danger was past, keeping
the flight decks clear to support constant CAP operations, and repelling
American attacks with the best weapon available, his fighters. When the at-
tacks abated, he expected to spot a coordinated combined-arms strike force on
the decks of his two carrier divisions and then deliver a crushing blow to his op-
ponent. Unfortunately for the Japanese, their desire to launch an integrated
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attack force from all four flight decks deprived them of flexibility in the face of
the enemy.
Because of the remarkably small cannon-magazine capacities of the Zero
fighter, defensive CAP operations necessitated frequent landing, rearming, and
launching of engaged fighters. Nagumo clearly appreciated the danger in which
he would place his ships during deck spotting of strike force aircraft, in that it
created a window of time during which no additional CAP could be cycled. As a
consequence, his options were more constrained than has been previously un-
derstood—spotting an offensive strike meant hanging his CAP out to dry for
nearly an hour at a time when American attacks were constant. As it was,
Nagumo’s defensive approach very nearly paid off, as only the final American at-
tack delivered telling damage. Indeed, it can be argued that had Nagumo played
it a little safer, by putting additional CAP aloft, he might have saved Akagi, Kaga,
or Soryu from the American dive-bomber attack.23
Japanese carrier doctrine of the time did not specify what to do when sud-
denly faced with an enemy force within the enemy’s striking range while one’s
own armed and fueled aircraft were still in their hangars.24 This was a doctrinal
failing—although in fairness, both the Japanese and Americans were grappling
with this issue. Later in the war, it would have been considered imperative upon
detection of an enemy force to immediately launch as many aircraft as possible
(whatever their armament) against it. If nothing else, this would get the aircraft
out of the hangars, where they presented a dire threat to the carrier itself. Indeed,
by 1944 the Japanese Combined Fleet developed just such a command for the
signal books in the event of a sudden enemy detection.25
In conclusion, we applaud Professor Isom for his efforts in bringing Japanese
sources to the fore of the Midway discussion, as well as his presentation of valu-
able information regarding Japanese rearming procedures. It is also important
to bear in mind that he was laboring under the conventional belief that the
second-wave strike was spotted and ready to launch on the flight decks, rather
than below in the hangars. However, his interpretation of Japanese operations
focuses almost exclusively on what it took to arm an airplane and fails to account
for the fundamentals of how the Japanese got that plane spotted on the flight
deck and then into the air. The article also overlooks the relationship between
defensive CAP activities and the inability to mount offense strikes. Its view of
carrier operations is therefore both limited and at odds with a great deal of what
we know to be true about how Japanese carriers actually fought. Without an ad-
equate appreciation of these factors, a proper assessment of Nagumo’s com-
mand options and performance cannot be constructed.
Editor’s note: Professor Isom responds on pp. 158–63 of this issue.
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N O T E S
1. The authors assisted Nauticos Corporation in
identifying a large section of wreckage from
the Kaga, discovered at a depth of seventeen
thousand feet in September 1999. As a result
of this project, the authors are currently
working on a forthcoming book that will ex-
amine in detail the operations of the four Jap-
anese carriers at Midway, bringing new
Japanese sources to light in the process.
2. The Japanese referred to this process as “con-
tinuous stowage” (renzoku shuyo) and prac-
ticed it from the 1930s onward. From an
unpublished manuscript by Mark Peattie,
tentatively entitled “Sunburst: The Rise of
Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909–1941,” used
by permission of the author; Air Technical
Intelligence Group [hereafter ATIG], Report
2, Bureau of Aeronautics, 1946, p. 2.
3. It should be noted that our comments pertain
to early-war Japanese carrier design and doc-
trine. As such, some of our remarks may, at
first glance, appear to be at variance with
such sources as U.S. Naval Technical Mission
to Japan [hereafter NavTech] Report A-11
(Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1946),
which discusses Japanese naval aviation
equipment and carrier design. However, it
must be remembered that the goal of the
NavTech reports was to gather information
after the war to improve the U.S. Navy’s own
practices. As such, its primary area of interest
was documenting late-war Japanese doctrine
and equipment, rather than chronicling the
development of that doctrine per se. For in-
stance, carriers such as the late-war Unryu-
class (which was a derivative of the original
Hiryu design) did indeed have the ability to
perform more operations on the flight deck
than their predecessors, and by 1944 Japanese
doctrine had evolved to view the flight deck
in a different light. However, it must be re-
membered that these doctrinal changes were
the direct result of battle experience (much of
it negative) gained early in the war at places
such as Midway. As a result, the way Japanese
carriers operated in 1942 was different in cer-
tain respects from the way they operated in
1944.
4. ATIG Report 2, p. 3, and ATIG Report 5, p. 3.
This was due to the inability of the forced-air
ventilation systems used in the hangars to
cope with the exhaust from multiple aircraft.
NavTech Report A-11, p. 9.
5. Aircraft were usually brought to the flight
deck via a single elevator for several reasons.
Japanese aircraft were segregated by type and
stowed in specific portions of both the upper
and lower hangars. Fighters were typically
stowed forward, dive-bombers amidship, and
torpedo bombers aft. Fighter aircraft, requir-
ing shorter runoffs, were sensibly stored for-
ward, where they were also more immediately
accessible. Spotting Akagi’s antiship strike
therefore would have required lifting the tor-
pedo aircraft using the aft elevator, and the
Zeros from the fore. Elevator cycles varied
depending on raw elevator speed and whether
the aircraft was being delivered from the up-
per or lower hangar. Akagi and Kaga’s eleva-
tors were older, slower models requiring
cycles longer than one minute to the lower
hangar, and they therefore took longer to
perform their evolutions than the newer ships
of Carrier Division 2. This was particularly
unfortunate in light of Kaga’s large torpedo
plane squadron.
6. Spotting sometimes required relatively long
lateral deck pushes, though the spotting of
one aircraft could occur as another was being
brought to deck. Nevertheless, a certain
amount of “jockeying” was required during
such operations.
7. Initial engine start-up was accomplished by a
crewman, while air crew were receiving brief-
ings. Detailed information on Japanese take-
off procedures was provided by Mr. Nisohachi
Hyodo, an expert on Japanese aircraft ord-
nance, in a letter to Jon Parshall dated 7 Feb-
ruary 2001.
8. Hyodo states that Japanese aircraft carriers
were equipped with enough bomb carts to re-
arm one-third of the carrier’s complement of
dive-bombers at a time. Rearmament occurred
on the flight deck, immediately prior to en-
gine warm-up. Both the Japanese 242 kg
high-explosive bomb and the 250 kg semi-
armor-piercing bomb used the same mount-
ing hardware, speeding the process of
switching between these weapons consider-
ably. Even so, five to six minutes per plane
would be required and would have to be re-
peated three times to arm the entire force, for
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a total of about twenty minutes. To this must
be added the time required to load and move
the ordnance across the flight deck. Hyodo to
Parshall, 7 February and 10 February 2001.
9. This was conducted on the flight deck near
blackboards attached to the side of the island.
10. This included an assistant air officer
(sho-hikocho) visiting each aircraft in the
strike force to ensure that it was running
properly. Hyodo to Parshall, 7 February 2001.
11. The fastest Japanese combat launching on re-
cord to this point in the war had been for
Pearl Harbor, when the carriers launched air-
craft at the rate of one every twenty-eight sec-
onds. Gordon Prange, At Dawn We Slept (New
York: Viking Press, 1991), p. 490. ATIG Re-
ports 2, p. 2, and 5, p. 3, cite optimal takeoff
intervals as being ten seconds.
12. As corroboration of this estimate, one need
only look at the operational tempo of the
Pearl Harbor Striking Force six months ear-
lier. During that attack, the Japanese were
able to spot the second wave attack force of
171 aircraft for launch in fifty-five minutes
from when the first attack wave and the for-
mation’s CAP fighters were finished launch-
ing at 0620. In this attack, the six Japanese
carriers were spotting an average of twenty-
eight aircraft per ship, as opposed to the aver-
age twenty-one planes Nagumo’s Midway
force would have spotted. Using the model
we have developed, and adding an additional
seven to ten minutes for extra elevator cycles,
as well as a longer warm-up time in the early
morning air, the figure of fifty-five minutes
agrees well with our estimate. Prange, pp. 490–2.
13. Japan’s official war history series, Boeicho
Boeikenshujo Senshibu (originally Boeicho
Boeikenshujo Senshishitsu, and often referred
to in its abbreviated form Senshi sosho [war
history]), was published by Asagumo
Shimbunsha. The Midway volume, Midowei
kaisen [Battle of Midway], published in 1971,
states on page 289, “Provided that the strike
forces were fully equipped, it would have
taken no less than 40 minutes to get them out
of the hangar to the deck and then finish
preparation for launch.” We are grateful to
Nisohachi Hyodo and Takashi Koganemura
for their assistance in these matters.
14. Takeoff from a carrier required using full
military power. Radial aircraft engines were
(and still are) built with very thin cylinder
walls to extremely tight tolerances, and they
required uniform distribution of heat and lu-
bricant to maintain efficient operation. If not
properly warmed up, a radial engine was
likely to blow up outright under full power.
We are grateful to Eric Bergerud and Clint
Bauer for their insights on this crucial issue.
15. It must be remembered that the Japanese op-
erated the aircraft of their carrier groups in a
much more integrated fashion than Western
navies could at this point in the war. Japanese
carrier divisions were trained to combine
like-type squadrons into divisional strike
teams. Thus, during the initial strike against
Midway, the Type 99 dive bombers from
Akagi and Kaga formed a single attack unit,
likewise the Type 97 attack bombers from
Soryu and Hiryu. Consequently, the time re-
quirements of rearming procedures, and cer-
tainly deck-spotting activities, were likely to
be similar among the carriers of a division,
meaning that information concerning a par-
ticular carrier can give us clues as to the state
of its divisional counterpart as well.
16. Reconstructed from “Mobile Force’s Detailed
Battle Report 6,” translated and published in
1947 by the Office of Naval Intelligence as
“The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway,
OPNAV P32-100” (often referred to simply
as the “Nagumo Report”), pp. 13–20, as well
as “Battle Report of Battle of Midway” (ex-
tract translation from document 160985B—
MC 397.901, U.S. Naval Historical Center,
Operational Archives Branch, Washington,
D.C.). All times are given in local (Midway)
time. We are grateful to both John Lundstrom
and Mark Horan for their expertise and assis-
tance in developing a highly detailed and ac-
curate picture of Japanese CAP activities.
17. Ibid. Kaga, as the other big flight deck in
Nagumo’s force, carried an equally large CAP
burden.
18. Any strike force spotted aft would likely have
contained a fighter escort of some sort, re-
quiring Zeros to be brought up from the for-
ward section of the hangars via the forward
elevators, thereby obstructing the flight deck
for takeoffs in any case.
19. The Japanese Type 0 fighter was not con-
strained by range or fuel capacity but rather
by its cannon ammunition. Each Zero carried
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only sixty rounds for each of its two 20 mm
cannons, which constituted the main offen-
sive armament necessary to bring down the
large American attack aircraft. As a result,
Japanese fighters had a tendency to “shoot
their bolt” quickly during combat. The im-
portance of cannon ammunition cannot be
overestimated—Mark Horan, contributor to
A Glorious Page in Our History (Missoula,
Mont.: Pictorial Histories, 1990), has pointed
out to us that casualties among the attacking
American squadrons are strongly correlated
with whether the Japanese fighters they en-
countered carried fresh loads of cannon am-
munition. Japanese doctrine normally called
for two-hour fighter patrols (ATIG Report 2,
p. 2). During the morning’s air battles, at
least seventeen CAP fighters ended their mis-
sions after an hour or less, some after as little
as twenty-six minutes in the air. This evidence
indicates that the Japanese were cycling their
fighters frequently in order to keep them fully
munitioned.
20. Akagi’s strike force was to consist of eighteen
Type 97 (Kate) torpedo bombers and three
Zero fighters. Kaga’s contribution was to be
twenty-six Kates and three Zeros, Soryu’s
eighteen Type 99 (Val) dive-bombers plus
three Zeros, and Hiryu’s eighteen Vals plus
three Zeros.
21. Senshi sosho, Midowei kaisen, pp. 372–8.
22. Best, in an interview with John Lundstrom,
April 2000. Best stated that during the time of
his attack, six to seven aircraft were on the
flight deck, and they were clearly Zeros. Fur-
thermore, Best commented that the Zeros
were using most of the flight deck for run-off
room. As he was attacking, a Zero was in the
process of taking off.
23. Commander Aircraft Battle Force, “Current
Tactical Orders and Doctrine, U.S. Fleet Air-
craft, vol. 1, Carrier Aircraft,” ser. USF-74,
rev., 20 April 1941.
24. Given the enclosed nature of Japanese han-
gars (which amplified explosive effects upon
the ship’s structure of internal bomb hits),
Japanese carriers with planes in the hangar
were in an even more dangerous position
than if they had planes on the flight deck.
Having no planes aboard when struck was, of
course, optimal.
25. Japanese “Mobile Fleet Doctrine,” promul-
gated 28 March 1944, under “Air Combat,”
paragraph 9, states: “When enemy aircraft
carriers are discovered at close range the
command ‘Send up ‘Q’ ’’ will be given. At
this time every ship will quickly send up the
airplanes standing ready on deck. The
hikokitai [carrier air group] will assemble in
the air and will fly off to the attack organized
in the fixed hikokitai [i.e., standing Table of
Organization].” Translations of these doc-
trinal works, recovered from the sunken
cruiser Nachi in Manila Bay in 1944, are in
the personal collection of David Dickson.
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THE PERILS OF PAPERLESS SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE LATEST
DEFENSE BUSINESS TREND
Patrick J. Geary
In a document released in November 1997, Defense Reform Initiative: The Busi-
ness Strategy for Defense in the 21st Century, then–Secretary of Defense William
Cohen stated, “To carry out our defense strategy into the 21st century with
military forces able to meet the challenges of the new era, there is no alternative
to achieving fundamental reform in how the Defense Department conducts
business.”1 One initiative spelled out in the document concerns how Defense
Department business practices are related to the management of technical data
supporting defense weapons systems.
Citing how recent improvements in information technologies have allowed
the business world to conduct numerous operations in a paper-free environ-
ment, Secretary Cohen brought attention to the need for the Department of De-
fense (DoD) to move in the same direction. This department-wide initiative
calls for 85 percent of all DoD technical manuals and 80 percent of all technical
drawings to become electronically accessible. It is designed to achieve significant
benefits: “By integrating paperless technical data management with electronic
commerce for business information, DoD will eventually be able to support all
major weapons systems in a paperless environment, from the initial design
phase through production, operation, and maintenance.”2
If fully implemented, the initiative promises such specific benefits as: a reduc-
tion in the cycle time for production contract awards; a reduction in the time to
review technical drawings; a reduction in the number of contract data require-
ments lists needed to conduct business with DoD program offices; and signifi-
cant cost avoidance.3
Despite these potentially significant benefits,
however, the conversion of tens of millions of tech-
nical drawings, models, manuals, and manufactur-
ing information into electronic images for easier
access has profound implications for the adequate
protection of the nation’s most critical and sensitive
defense-related information. Two primary concerns
are access control to proprietary information and pro-
tection of classified information. Without address-
ing these issues fully, DoD’s “new business strategy”
Patrick J. Geary is currently the Technology and Force
Protection section head for the Naval Sea Systems Com-
mand, Washington, D.C. He received a bachelor’s degree
from Virginia Commonwealth University. Mr. Geary is a
June 2000 graduate of the Naval War College, where he
earned a master’s degree in national security and strategic
studies. He also holds a master’s degree from the Univer-
sity of Richmond.
Mr. Geary is the ninth national president of the Opera-
tions Security (OPSEC) Professionals Society.
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might very well have an overall negative impact on U.S. national defense
strategy.
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION
Defense-related technical data includes a variety of sensitive (and sometimes
classified) information that must receive limited distribution and careful access
control. Protection requirements for this information are specified in federal
statutes and regulations, as well as directives, instructions, and standards of the
Department of Defense, each of the military services, and the Department of
Commerce.4 One type of sensitive data requiring protection from unautho-
rized disclosure is proprietary information. There are three main concerns
with electronically accessible proprietary information: legal liability, labeling
and controlling the accuracy of data, and identifying users.
Recent federal court decisions, such as Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State,
and subsequent written opinions from legal counsel of the Department of the
Navy have focused on the need to protect proprietary data from unauthorized
access via the Internet.5 This legal issue has significant implications for systems
that will operate and interface via the Internet. These legal interpretations have
specifically stated that failure to properly protect proprietary data could result in
violations of federal statutes such as 18 USC 1905, which prohibits the disclo-
sure of proprietary data by the federal government.
The legal issue involving proprietary information is especially complex. Much
of what the United States needs to conduct its national defense strategy comes
from defense contractors, many of whom rely heavily on their proprietary or
trade-secret information to stay in business. They allow the U.S. government ac-
cess to their proprietary information on the condition it will be protected. If,
however, in compliance with DoD’s new business strategy, such information is
put in electronic form but then not adequately protected, an unauthorized indi-
vidual, organization, or company could obtain access to another company’s pro-
prietary data.
Until recently, almost all such data was kept in stand-alone storage facilities,
which made it relatively easy to set up access control procedures. However, it is
much more difficult to control access to data that is available through the
Internet. Therefore, implementing a new DoD business strategy for electronic
access poses an increased—and increasing—risk of legal liability to the U.S. gov-
ernment because of inadequate protection of proprietary information.
Also, in all cases where access is limited and distribution strictly controlled,
there must be a method for the U.S. government to indicate who may have ac-
cess. Maintaining control of this data will require labeling. It is not possible to
control access to sensitive electronically stored information unless it is labeled in
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a way that can be universally recognized and understood. Most of the data de-
scribed, including proprietary data, is either inadequately labeled or not labeled
at all, making it impossible to determine the sensitivity of each item.6 Providing
adequate electronic labels for the voluminous proprietary data will undoubtedly
be a time-consuming and costly undertaking.
To date, Congress has provided no funding to ensure proper access labeling of
electronically stored proprietary information. Labeling will also be required to
indicate whether the given document has been modified or destroyed. Known as
“data integrity,” this is one of the
most important aspects of net-
work security.7 Engineers rely on
the accuracy of technical draw-
ings for all aspects of deploying
and maintaining weapons sys-
tems for national defense. Since many people currently have access to this data
and could modify it, verifying its authenticity is critical for research, develop-
ment, testing, evaluation, and production results. Converting current hard-copy
data into electronic images will entail the associated, and extremely difficult, re-
quirement to label each file’s (and subfile’s) sensitivity level and unequivocally
certify its authenticity.
Electronic data is stored in and transmitted among a large number of reposi-
tories, local-area networks, and wide-area networks throughout the United
States and several other countries. The objective of the new DoD business strat-
egy initiative is to link all repositories and networks using the Internet to allow
faster communication between federal agencies, military departments, and de-
fense contractors. However, the larger the number of users and the more diverse
the organizations involved, the more difficult it will be to control the accuracy of
data and the identity of authorized users. It has been estimated that soon 1.5
million users will have authorized access to defense-related technical informa-
tion.8 These users will be U.S. military personnel, government employees, con-
tractor personnel, and foreign nationals.
Defense contractors are companies of various sizes and organizational struc-
tures. Some include many divisions or subsidiaries, while others may be wholly
owned, controlled, or influenced by other companies, organizations, or even
countries. One division within a company may have authorized access to infor-
mation for the performance of a specific contract that another division of the
same company does not.
This implies that, given the large number of users and all the interconnectivity
between repositories, networks, and diverse organizations, converting DoD
technical data into electronic images will mean a reduction or loss of the ability
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to confirm the identity, need-to-know, and authorization of each individual
wishing access. Also, it will become increasingly difficult to keep proprietary in-
formation from being modified, destroyed, or exposed to other kinds of deliber-
ate or unintended unauthorized disclosure, such as hacking.
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
As the Department of Defense plan unfolds to include classified data among the
types of information to be electronically accessible, two unanticipated problems
have come to light: how to get the classified data securely to the desktop, and
how to store and protect the data once it is there. Fortunately, moving classified
information through the Internet via Type 1 encryption is now becoming possi-
ble, but desktop storage and user security are still concerns.9
Classified information in storage must be physically separated from other
data to ensure its protection. All users handling classified data on the Internet
must have independent classified storage and handling capabilities at their
desks. Therefore, unless an alternative solution can be found, each user process-
ing digitized classified information on the Internet will need a separate and se-
cure personal computer, or a removable hard drive that is reasonably priced and
user-friendly. All of the concerns about processing and protecting corporate
proprietary information apply (with even greater stringency) to the processing
and protection of classified national security information.
SOLUTION
The solution to the proprietary data problem centers on the labeling issue. Two
possibilities come to mind. Congress could appropriate a large amount of
money—possibly as much as several hundred million dollars—to create and ad-
minister a universally acceptable system of labels. The system would have to ad-
minister literally tens of thousands of data categories and access levels. The second
solution would be to develop a machine capable of performing the same function.
In conclusion, it is imperative that these problems be resolved before the new
defense business strategy is fully implemented. Sometimes the advantages of
new technological developments disguise the problems they create. In this case,
the problems especially concern data security as part of the overall DoD defen-
sive information operations. For a variety of reasons, data security has, until re-
cently, generally been overlooked as a matter of high priority in the digital world.
So far, it appears the United States has been generally fortunate in protecting its
data. However, if government funding is not soon forthcoming to accompany
the new defense business strategy’s plan for digitization and networked access
to vast bodies of sensitive technical data, a dire price might be imposed on indi-
vidual companies or even national security as a whole.
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1. Dept. of Defense, Defense Reform Initiative:
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Century (Washington, D.C.: 1997), p. iii.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 7.
4. A complete list of the applicable require-
ments is available upon request.
5. Bernstein v. U.S. Department of State, 945 F.
Supp 1279 (ND, CA 1996). See Navy Dept.,
“Naval Supply Systems Command,” 4200
memo 0082.04 of 25 March 1997.
6. The author learned this while serving as the
computer security project manager for a Joint
Service Program Office from April 1998 to
July 1999.
7. Deborah Russell and G. T. Gangemi, Sr.,
Computer Security Basics (Sebastopol, Calif.:
O’Reilly and Assocs., 1992), p. 227.
8. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps are cur-
rently building a joint internet that will ac-
commodate approximately 500,000 users. If
one multiplies that number by three to in-
clude the U.S. Army and Air Force, the result
will be approximately 1.5 million.
9. Probably the best-known secure network
now in use is the SIPRNET.
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Your reviewer of my MacArthur’s War in the Winter 2001 issue [Dr. Donald
Chisholm, of the Naval War College] must have had a bad-hair day. Not a single
one of his nit-picking corrections, some of them already altered in the next
printing, relate to the thrust of the book (largely ignored in the inter-
est of demonstrating his superior naval expertise), which was that
General MacArthur bungled the command of the Korean War by failing
to run a hands-on operation and by a pattern of willful and arrogant
insubordination.
His technicality that the Japanese minesweepers and crews were not
really part of the Imperial Navy obscures the immorality of employing
them in a war operation at Wonsan in which at least one ship and crew
were casualties.
And he missed at least one more error as crucial to MacArthur’s misman-
agement as the rest—now corrected in the paperback reprint. The shiny new ve-
hicle in which the general rode to Haneda Airport as he was exiting Japan was a
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THEY WOULD HAVE FOUND A WAY
Sir:
The essay by Parshall, Dickson, and Tully in this issue [pages 139–51] was both a
critique of my article “The Battle of Midway: Why the Japanese Lost” [Summer
2000, pp. 60–100] and an exposition of their own theory of why the Japanese
could not get a strike force launched from their carriers at Midway before those
carriers were bombed at 1025 on 4 June. I wish to respond to certain points of
their critique of my article and then offer some comments on their theory.
First, I want to commend the authors for producing a most interesting essay.
They and I share the belief that the conventional American scenarios of what
happened on the Japanese carriers that fateful morning do not make sense, and
they as well as I have attempted to fashion more plausible scenarios—based on
more recent Japanese sources—to explain why Admiral Nagumo could not get a
“grand scale” attack launched. In that endeavor we have come up with very dif-
ferent explanations on certain points, though we agree on others. As one of the
purposes of my article was to stimulate critical analysis of the subject, I welcome
alternative points of view in the hope that from the clash of ideas a better under-
standing of what really happened on the Japanese side of that battle will eventu-
ally emerge.
Indeed, the authors have made me rethink some of my conclusions. I have
even been persuaded to concede one point that affects the timing in my scenario
for the operation to rearm the torpedo planes and dive-bombers on the Japanese
carriers. I now accept that the second-wave planes were already in the hangars
when Nagumo’s order to rearm them was given at 0715. Even had they been
spotted on the flight decks soon after the first wave departed for Midway, I now
believe that when the first American attack wave from Midway was anticipated
(Nagumo knew before 0600 that his carrier force had been spotted), they would
have been struck below to free the flight decks for combat air patrol (CAP) activ-
ity. The Japanese record of Zeros on CAP being recovered around 0700 on Akagi
and Hiryu substantiates this. This has the effect of advancing my rearming
schedule for Akagi by the time it would take to get the first few torpedo planes to
their arming stations in the hangar. (As I have the rearming process commenc-
ing on each plane as it reaches its arming station—about six minutes for the first
one, twelve minutes for the sixth—rather than waiting until the entire squadron
was lowered, the net advancement would be about ten minutes.)
This does not, however, vitiate my key point, which is: If Nagumo did not
receive the Tone 4 sighting report until 0800, instead of 0740 as commonly as-
sumed, the rearming operation would have proceeded twenty minutes longer
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before suspension or reversal than under the conventional scenario. As a result,
under my original rearming schedule, all the torpedoes would have been re-
moved by 0800, not only constraining Nagumo’s options at 0830—when a deci-
sion had to be made whether or not to launch a strike against the American
carrier force—but leaving much more to do after 0830 to restore the torpedoes
than if the rearming operation had been reversed at 0745.
Under a schedule advanced by around ten minutes, even more would have
been done by 0800—land bombs would probably have been installed on the first
chutai (division) of torpedo planes on Akagi. This would have left even more
work to be done after 0830 to reinstall the torpedoes—resulting in Nagumo’s
1030 deadline for launch being delayed even longer than under my original
schedule. However, this does not negate my supposition that had Nagumo re-
versed the rearming operation at 0745, as claimed in the conventional scenarios,
there probably would have been time to restore the torpedoes in time for a
launch to have taken place by 1000.
Having lauded the authors, and even having conceded a substantial point to
them, I now turn to some points in their critique of my article that I think are in
error.
They dispute my hypothetical assertion that the respotting of the torpedo
planes on the flight decks of Akagi and Kaga could have begun at 0920 had they
been rearmed with torpedoes (which I contend would have been possible had
the rearming operation been reversed at 0745, as has been claimed). They refute
this by saying (on p. 145) that this would have been prevented by “the high
tempo of CAP operations”during the period commencing at 0920. They say that
at 0920 “the Japanese were alert to a constant stream of incoming American
strikes. Until the coast was reasonably clear, and his CAP well stocked with fresh
fighters to last through the spotting process, Nagumo cannot have been ex-
pected to spot his strike.”
I believe this to be overstated. At 0920, Nagumo was aware that one Ameri-
can torpedo bomber squadron was approaching his carrier force (with dive-
bombers expected soon to follow.) He had no reason at that time to expect a
“constant stream of incoming American strikes.” As for CAP operations during
the period after 0920—five Zeros were launched at 0932 and three more at
0945—they were not an impediment to spotting attack planes on the flight deck
aft. Although the authors state (on p. 143) that planes would not “usually be
spotted aft during fighter takeoff operations” (their emphasis), they give no
logical reason why this could not be done if there was a compelling reason to do
so. Their note accompanying this statement says, “Any strike force spotted aft
would likely have contained a fighter escort of some sort, requiring Zeros to be
brought up from the forward section of the hangars via the forward elevators,
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thereby obstructing the flight deck for takeoffs in any case.” Only three Zeros
from each carrier were to be used for escort. One would think that they could be
brought up after the last CAP Zero to be launched prior to 1000 had taken off;
that would have been at 0945. There is no reason why they would have had to be
spotted at the same time as the first attack planes were spotted aft. Thus, there is
no good reason given why Nagumo could not have begun spotting his strike on
the flight decks at 0920 had they been ready (which, of course, they were not).
As for my assertion that had (hypothetically) the strike force been ready to
launch at 1000, it could have been launched during the fifteen-minute “window”
between attacks on the Mobile Force, the authors (on p. 145) counter as follows:
“This is wrong on several counts. First, we know that Akagi landed a CAP fighter
at 0910 and two more at 0951, meaning that even if there had been strike aircraft
on deck at 0920 (which we think unlikely in any case), they had to have been
moved back down into the hangar by 0951.” They seem to be saying that a “grand
scale” strike would have been aborted—and the strike planes stricken below—in
order to land two Zeros on CAP at 0951! I believe that most people would as-
sume that the recovery of those two Zeros for reservicing would have been post-
poned until the strike was launched. The authors err in assuming that because
Zeros on CAP were landed when no strike was spotted, those Zeros would have
also been landed in different circumstances—such as when a launch of strike
aircraft was imminent.
The authors continue: “Also, Isom clearly does not factor in the immutable
time costs associated with spotting and engine warm-up—a ‘fifteen-minute
window between attacks’ simply does not suffice.” My hypothetical case assumes
that the strike planes would already have been spotted by 1000, and with the en-
gines of all but the last few planes brought up already being warmed up. The en-
gines on those last few planes could be warmed up while the planes in front of
them were being launched. In view of this, fifteen minutes would have sufficed
to launch the strike had it been ready (as I posit it would have been had the re-
arming operation been reversed at 0745).
The authors go on to say that I ignore “Nagumo’s own estimate that the strike
force would be ready at 1100, although a 1030 takeoff was hoped for, if things
went well. Launching at 1000, though, for all the reasons cited above, was never
even remotely in the cards, and Nagumo knew it.” Here, they appear to have con-
fused the two rearming scenarios I have been comparing: the one that would
have resulted had Nagumo received the Tone 4 sighting report at 0740—as
conventionally assumed—as opposed to the rearming schedule that probably
actually resulted from his not receiving it until 0800, and reversing the rearming
operation after that time.
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The 1030 scheduled launch time was a consequence of the actual (and later)
reversal of the rearming operation—and of course, a 1000 launch time was “not
in the cards.” But my point was that it well might have been had the rearming op-
eration been reversed at 0745. (Incidentally, the authors have misread Nagumo’s
statement in his official report. Nagumo states, on page 7 of that report, that he
was advised that the torpedo-equipped attack planes in Carrier Division 1
(Akagi and Kaga) would be ready for takeoff at 1030, and that the torpedo planes
in Carrier Division 2 (Hiryu and Soryu)—which had returned from the Midway
strike—would be ready by 1030–1100. These latter planes would be in a strike
group separate from the one he hoped to launch at 1030, which included the tor-
pedo planes only of Carrier Division 1.)
Having lambasted the authors on the preceding points, I now want to con-
cede another point to them. In their next paragraph (on p. 145) they state: “Fur-
thermore, the assertion that two-thirds of Akagi’s torpedo planes were on deck
at 1000 is clearly wrong.” Here, I believe the authors are correct. My recon-
struction of the actual rearming schedule was premised on the second-wave
planes being lowered to the hangars after Nagumo’s rearming order was issued
at 0715. As discussed earlier, I now accept that they were already in the hangars at
0715. As this would have advanced the rearming schedule by at least ten min-
utes—requiring even more work to be done to reverse it after 0830—it would
have resulted in fewer torpedo planes being ready for respotting by 1000.
Whether or not any of Akagi’s torpedo planes actually got up to the flight deck
before it was bombed is, despite Senshi Sosho’s claim, still debatable (though I
am now convinced that none of Kaga’s were on the flight deck).
Now for a few comments on the authors’ theory of why Nagumo could not get a
“grand scale” strike launched before his carriers were bombed at 1025. They con-
tend that beginning with several minutes before 0700 and running until 1030, the
need to keep the flight decks free for CAP activity prevented the spotting of strike
planes for a launch at all times during that (three-and-a-half-hour) period. Such a
launch was precluded, they say, because it would require forty minutes to raise and
spot a squadron of torpedo planes or dive-bombers, plus additional time to warm
up the engines and make the launch—adding up to nearly an hour. (It is said that
the Zeros on CAP could not be deprived of servicing or reinforcements for that
long.) They conclude that the inability of Nagumo to launch a strike “hinged nei-
ther on whether Nagumo received Tone 4’s message at 0740 or at 0800, nor on how
quickly the armorers in the Japanese hangars could do their work.”
The implications of this theory are astonishing. According to its logic, Nagumo
would not have been able to launch a grand-scale strike against the American
carrier force even had he not rearmed his second-wave torpedo planes and
dive-bombers for a second strike on Midway, and even if he had received the
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Tone 4 sighting report immediately after it was sent at 0728, and even if a more
thorough search effort had discovered the American carriers at 0700. The blun-
ders committed in rearming, search, and communications operations, which
have been blamed by Japanese as well as American historians for the debacle that
befell Nagumo, were—we are told—irrelevant. Even if Nagumo’s torpedo planes
had been properly armed at 0700, the authors contend, they could not have been
launched, because they were in the hangars at that time and could not have been
raised and spotted on the flight decks before 1030—until the American attacks
were over.
This theory, which completely finesses my analysis and that of many others,
is in my view simplistic. While the authors are to be commended for bringing
to light complications in Japanese carrier operations caused by CAP activ-
ity—complications underappreciated by commentators on the battle, including
me—they have applied certain elements of their theory much too rigidly.
First, regarding elevator operations: They contend that forty minutes was re-
quired to raise from the hangar and spot on the flight deck a squadron of planes.
Although it could take forty minutes to raise and spot a squadron of torpedo
planes on Akagi, this was true only if one elevator (the aft one) was used. Only
the aft elevator could be used when a full air group was in the hangar, as
dive-bombers would block the use of the midship elevator for raising torpedo
planes. (This would have been the case after 0900, when the Midway strike
dive-bombers, having returned, were stowed in the hangar.)
However, several Japanese veterans of the battle whom I interviewed stated
that if the dive-bombers were already aloft—as Akagi’s were after the Midway
strike force departed—the middle elevator could also be used to raise (or lower)
torpedo planes in an emergency. Likewise, when Hiryu’s and Soryu’s torpedo
planes were aloft (such as before 0900), the aft elevator on those carriers could be
used to raise dive-bombers. (Unlike Akagi’s aft elevator, the ones on those carriers
were large enough to accommodate dive-bombers.) This would reduce the elevator
time by almost half. Also, the elevators on the newer Hiryu and Soryu were faster
than those on Akagi and Kaga. Dive-bombers on those carriers could be raised and
spotted in less than forty minutes even if only one elevator was used. Thus, it did not
always, on all carriers, take forty minutes to raise and spot a squadron of bombers.
This faster elevator operation for the dive-bombers on Hiryu and Soryu is im-
plied by Senshi Sosho (the official Japanese history of the battle, which the au-
thors appear to accord a great deal of credibility). It states (on pages 289–90)
that the dive-bombers could have been launched very soon after 0830 (and
Minoru Genda, Nagumo’s air officer, states that at least some of those bombers
were already on the flight decks at around 0830). But the authors, rigidly ap-
plying what they believe to be Japanese carrier doctrine, state (on p. 146) that
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the “dive bombers were all in their hangars at the time and would have taken an-
other forty minutes to put in action, even if they had been rearmed.”
Yet Genda, Ryunosuke Kusaka, and Tamon Yamaguchi thought that the
dive-bombers could be launched soon after 0830. Even if they were in the han-
gars at 0815, those Japanese officers apparently relied upon a fairly quick raising
of them to the flight deck, utilizing two high-speed elevators on each of the car-
riers. For the authors to insist that only one elevator could be used for each
squadron of bombers and that it would invariably take forty minutes to raise
and spot them on the flight deck regardless of the circumstances and gravity of
the emergency is, in my opinion at least, much too extreme.
Second, regarding CAP operations: Although they clearly constrained deck-
spotting operations of the bombers, the constraints were not as absolute as the
authors maintain. I have already pointed out that CAP takeoffs did not prevent
the spotting of bombers aft. Landings of Zeros for reservicing did require a free
flight deck aft, but there was much more flexibility than the authors allow. For
example, they state that as Hiryu recovered CAP at 0840 “even if strike planes
had begun to be promptly brought up on Hiryu after the American B-17s de-
parted at 0815, they would have had to be stowed below again by 0840.” Again, I
believe most people would assume that landing of the Zeros would be postponed
until the strike had been launched. To suggest that a strike ready to go would be
aborted in order to land some Zeros on CAP seems much too dogmatic.
Thus, we are told that even the option of a launch of dive-bombers alone at
0830—an option that Nagumo has been roundly criticized for not taking up—was
in fact actually precluded by Japanese carrier doctrine relating to elevator opera-
tions and CAP. Likewise, we are told that this carrier doctrine precluded the
spotting of a strike between 0920 and 1000 and its launch during the “window”
between 1000 and 1015, even had one been ready.
While an underappreciation of the constraints that CAP operations placed
on strike plane operations may have been the greatest weakness in my analysis, it
seems to me that dogmatism by the authors regarding Japanese carrier doctrine
is the greatest weakness in their essay. I still believe that Nagumo and Genda
would have found a way to spot and launch a strike before 1025 had one been
ready. Therefore, I still believe it relevant to inquire why one never got ready.
DALLAS WOODBURY ISOM
London, United Kingdom
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REVIEW ESSAY
WHERE WILL PRESIDENTIAL AUTOCRACY TAKE RUSSIA?
Sergei Khrushchev
Nichols, Thomas. The Russian Presidency: Society and Politics
in the Second Russian Republic. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1999. 200pp. $45
This book describes the Russian presidency between 1990 and 1996, its society,
and its politics in the “Second Russian Republic” between 1993 and 1996. Exam-
ining one of the most dramatic periods in the history of Russia, Nichols begins
with Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempt to pull down the old authoritarian system
and to push Russia onto a democratic path of development.
In the first two sections, the author—a Naval War College professor—briefly
recounts the events of the years 1985–1991, offering his own interpretation of
Gorbachev’s failure. He poses a question: What kind of democracy, parliamen-
tary or presidential, suits Russia better? This issue has never before been dis-
cussed in this way, even though it is a most urgent topic with respect to what has
been happening, and is happening now, in Russia. Nichols concludes that presi-
dential democracy is preferable, maintaining that
“presidentialism in Russia is not a ‘mistake,’ an ex-
periment, or an authoritarian hoodwinking of the
public, but rather a deliberate act, a compromise
among elites who, like the public that elected them,
see it as the system most likely to protect all of them
from each other.”
Furthermore, the author finds confirmation of
his thinking in the chaotic parliamentary democracy
of Gorbachev’s time, when both politicians and the
people, unaccustomed to liberty, fell upon each other
Sergei N. Khrushchev is a senior policy research fellow in
the Global Security Program and principal investigator
for the Post-Soviet Studies Project at the Thomas J. Watson,
Jr., Institute for International Studies at Brown Univer-
sity, in Providence, Rhode Island. He is also an adjunct
professor at the Naval War College. Dr. Khrushchev, the
son of Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971), premier of the
Soviet Union from 1958 to 1964, became a U.S. citizen in
1999. He is the editor of his father’s memoirs and has writ-
ten widely on the history of the Cold War. His Nikita
Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower was
published in 2000 by Pennsylvania State University Press.
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with mutual accusations, paralyzed the office of the president, and disoriented
the whole of society, all of which rapidly led to the disintegration of the econ-
omy, inflation, and loss of central control over vast regions—culminating in De-
cember 1991 in the breakup of the country and the departure of Gorbachev from
the political scene.
As a counterbalance to Gorbachev, Nichols advances Boris Yeltsin, who was
elected in June 1991 as the president of Russia. Yeltsin began a bitter struggle
with parliament and parliamentarism. He struggled for the establishment of
strong presidential power—so strong that soon his democratic-reformist ap-
pointees (especially Boris Nemtsov) almost openly called the president a tsar.
Nichols is absolutely right. Between the uncircumscribed freedom of
parliamentarism, which in Russia’s case was accompanied by anarchy, and a
presidentialism that resembles monarchism, the latter is preferable. In the for-
mer case, the response to anarchy would be an even harsher dictatorship, but in
the latter case there could be hope that the country would pass over the reefs of a
transitional period and gradually enter the mainstream of normal democratic
development.
Nichols argues his case quite persuasively, dividing Yeltsin’s presidency into
the “First Republic” (up to the shelling of parliament by tanks in October 1993)
and the “Second Republic,” when Yeltsin carved out for himself a presidential re-
public, in which the Duma became in large measure a deliberative organ, as dur-
ing the rule of the last Russian emperor, Nicholas II. In the author’s opinion, this
turnaround allowed Russia to overcome the political crisis of 1993 and offered
the chance for peaceful development. This fairly detailed account of the events
of those years closes with the election of Yeltsin for a second term as president of
Russia in June 1996.
Where will presidential autocracy take Russia? Nichols poses the question
without answering it, for no answer exists. However, the book obliges the reader
to consider deeply the complexity of introducing democracy into an undemo-
cratic society, and the vicissitudes of that process. Unfortunately, in explaining
the difficulty of the democratic transformation in Russia, Nichols makes the
usual mistake of Western studies of describing all obstacles as proceeding from
the totalitarian Soviet epoch, the atomization of Soviet society, etc. In fact, ev-
erything is much more complicated. The Soviet period was undoubtedly totali-
tarian, notwithstanding its Marxist ideological dogma, little different from the
preceding centuries of Russian monarchical absolutism. Whereas the West, es-
pecially the United States, grew out of the Roman tradition of respect for written
law, and therefore for constitutions, or basic laws, Russian political culture ma-
tured with the Byzantine emphasis on the Will as something higher than the
Law. Seventy years of Soviet rule did not change the Russians; they reinterpreted
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Marxism, and Western ideology, in their own fashion, just as they are now trying
to reinterpret Western democracy. Therefore, Russia’s progress toward a normal
democratic government will be more painful than Nichols represents.
Having given a history of the Russian presidency, the author unfortunately
limits himself to a superficial account of the myriad interparty confrontations.
Within Russia all the “party” intrigues appear to be merely reflections of a strug-
gle for national power among oligarchic-criminal groups that emerged as a re-
sult of fraudulent privatization—groups that control political parties, power
structures within the government and the administration, the press, and televi-
sion. Regrettably, this key aspect of political life in both the First and, especially,
the Second Republics is completely absent from the book, a fact that substan-
tially lessens its value for understanding what is and has been going on in Russia.
Neither does Nichols in his analysis hesitate to indulge an easy division of histor-
ical players into good and bad.
For example, he paints the speaker of the parliament in the First Republic,
Ruslan Khasbulatov, and Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi in exclusively dark
tones. Such an interpretation of events simplifies the author’s exposition but
distorts the historical picture. In the parliament-president conflict of 1992–93
both sides were to blame—and perhaps Yeltsin, with his pathological striving for
personal power, more than Khasbulatov. Undoubtedly, the Yeltsin-Khasbulatov
struggle had to result in the elimination of one of them from the political arena.
Nichols seems to welcome Yeltsin’s victory, but The Russian Presidency would
doubtless have benefited had the author turned his attention to the forces that
the two players stood for. It would have been interesting to examine the possible
results had Yeltsin not signed the unconstitutional Decree 1400 that dissolved
parliament and the constitutional court, and suspended the operation of the
constitution itself.
In addition, not to the author’s credit are several political clichés that have
been transferred to this serious, historical work from the pages of periodicals.
Thus Vladimir Zhirinovskyi and his Liberal-Democratic Party are presented by
the author as a demonic, fascist opposition force. Yet Nichols declares it to be
well known that Zhirinovskyi and his party have always been controlled by the
government and the president, voting in parliament as ordered by the Kremlin,
and that its extremist-hooligan rhetoric serves a single goal, to divert the popu-
lace from the actual oppositional and protofascist movements, like the Russian
National Unity Party.
Also questionable is Nichols’s contradistinction in the last chapter between
Boris Yeltsin and the Belorussian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, as a civilized
and powerful president versus an abominable dictator, respectively. In such a
scientific-historical work, such propagandistic methods used without concrete
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evidence are inadmissible and reduce confidence in the author. If one is to be
objective, Lukashenko is the very image of Yeltsin. In 1994, he repeated every-
thing that Yeltsin did in 1993 but without having tanks shoot at the Belorussian
parliament. The emergence of president-autocrats has been a phenomenon in
the post-Soviet era; Yeltsin and Lukashenko, far from being exceptions, require
separate, serious analyses along the lines established by this book.
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BOOK REVIEWS
THE CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Utgoff, Victor A., ed. The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2000. 319pp. $22.95
The Coming Crisis is a series of essays by
noted scholars in the field of national se-
curity affairs examining the effects of
continued nuclear weapons proliferation
and the potential for regional nuclear cri-
ses. While one can argue that use of nu-
clear weapons by a rogue state today is
more likely than it was during the Cold
War, discussion of what the United
States could and should do if deterrence
fails has been noticeably absent in recent
years. The authors revive this discussion
and, in doing so, contribute significantly
to the study of proliferation.
The first half of the book addresses the
underlying pressures that cause states to
consider acquiring and potentially em-
ploying nuclear weapons. It makes the
case that there are many reasons why a
state may develop nuclear weapons, rea-
sons that may have only a peripheral re-
lationship to security issues. A highlight
of this section is Caroline F. Ziemke’s es-
say on the strategic personality of Iran.
She asserts that the behavior of a “rogue
state” often has roots in national myth.
These nations may not be as unpredict-
able and as roguish as we might surmise
at first glance.
The second part of the book consists of
five essays that examine how nuclear cri-
ses might develop between the United
States and a regional nuclear power, and
what the consequences might be. Stephen
Peter Rosen and Stephen M. Walt each
examine the impact of proliferation on
alliances and coalitions, but they come to
contradictory conclusions. Barry R.
Posen conducts a hypothetical analysis of
a Gulf War with a nuclear-armed Iraq.
His conclusion is that, faced with such a
crisis, the United States should not and
probably would not hesitate to intervene
to defend vital interests.
Two essays focus on what the United
States might do following a first use by a
regional aggressor. George H. Quester ar-
gues that a U.S. response in such a case
would be driven more by American
norms of law enforcement than by Cold
War theory. Quester believes that crimi-
nals are punished for four distinct rea-
sons: to disarm, to make an example, to
impose revenge, and to reform. He states
that once a regime with a modest nuclear
capability has used nuclear weapons, it
will be seen as “too dangerous to live
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with . . . but not too dangerous to
defeat.”
Similarly, Brad Roberts discusses regional
nuclear war termination, arguing that the
United States would have not only to ad-
dress the immediate problems presented
by the war but also to ensure that longer-
term U.S. interests were served by “win-
ning the peace” that follows. The United
States has to avoid being perceived as a
“nuclear bully” whose power must be
counterbalanced, but neither can it come
off as a “nuclear wimp,” unwilling to
confront an aggressor. Instead, the
course of action chosen must show the
United States to be a responsible and just
steward of the international good.
In the concluding chapter, Victor A.
Utgoff contends that in response to a re-
gional nuclear threat the United States
would likely be far more resolute than
others have suggested and would likely
respond in kind to a first use of nuclear
weapons by an aggressor. He concludes
with a number of policy implications.
The fundamental premise of this book is
that sooner or later the proliferation of
nuclear weapons is going to lead to a
confrontation between the United States
and a nuclear-armed state. While there
are many points of disagreement between
the authors, all concur that such a con-
frontation will be a seminal event and
will define not only the role of nuclear
weapons but also that of the world’s only
superpower in the post–Cold War era.
All students of national security policy
owe it to themselves to consider the pol-
icy implications of this premise. The
Coming Crisis will be valuable to them.
JON GREENE
Commander, U.S. Navy
Lavoy, Peter, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds.
Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will
Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000. 270pp. $45
The title says it all. This book is a compi-
lation of empirical and analytical data on
the strategic evolution of nuclear, biolog-
ical, and chemical (NBC) agents and
weapons in the twenty-first century. A
central theme of the book is how new re-
gional players (states and nonstate ac-
tors) are likely to convert prevalent
conventional military doctrine and train-
ing into nonconventional means of war-
fare. The book is very ambitious in its
scope; it attempts—overall, success-
fully—to address systematically concep-
tual problems in the integration of such
weapons into the military infrastructure,
delivery systems, command and control
procedures, and war plans. More impor-
tantly, the editors and the authors of the
various case studies utilize a theoretical
framework to explain and predict future
trends of behaviors, intentions, and capa-
bilities among very diverse players. Real-
ism and neorealism, organizational
theory, and culture are used to flesh out
these unique differences in approach as
well as in the implementation of NBC
programs and doctrines.
Except for the conclusion and the chapter
on terrorism, the chapters are case stud-
ies, focusing on Iraq, Iran, Israel, India,
Pakistan, and North Korea. The authors
are specialists who devote a great deal of
effort to describing the relationship be-
tween strategy and policy, on one hand,
and between national security and na-
tional military strategy, on the other. The
result is a complex web of relationships,
behavioral manifestations, and decision-
making processes involving an amalgam
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of scientific, bureaucratic, and military
institutions and forces. In the chapter on
Iran, for example, Gregory Giles elo-
quently argues that Iran was reluctant on
moral and religious grounds to use
chemical weapons during the first few
years of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–87) but
that its policy changed abruptly as a re-
sult of rising Iranian casualties and fear
of Iraqi chemical-warfare preponderance.
Hence, realism became key to explaining
the Iranian NBC doctrinal shift after
1987. Although Iran ratified the Chemi-
cal Weapons Convention within a few
months of its coming into force, Iran has
opted to pursue a clandestine NBC pro-
gram. Such weapons are the subject of
intense debate within the increasingly
factionalized, institutionalized, and secu-
larized Iranian political elite today. This
has given rise to “multiple actors playing
roles in a key strategic program[,] . . .
[ensuring] that there will be continued
bureaucratic competition for resources,
missions, and influence.” More signifi-
cantly, such competition has far-reaching
political, economic, and military implica-
tions, associated primarily with com-
mand and control mechanisms. Israel (a
chapter by Avner Cohen) and India (by
Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu) also utilize
NBC secrecy and ambiguity to enhance
their conventional deterrence capabili-
ties—Israel to keep its Arab adversaries
off balance and to avoid American
nonproliferation pressure, and India to
keep China, not Pakistan, in check. Paki-
stan (Zafar Iqbal Cheema), however, ap-
parently sees the development of its NBC
program as a necessity—not a choice—
because in the “absence of conventional
security alternatives and nuclear security
guarantees . . . [such] weapons were
viewed as a necessary counter [to] a per-
ceived threat from India.”
The chapter by Jessica Stern analyzes the
dynamics of terrorism in the twenty-first
century. She argues that the potential for
nonstate actors to acquire, develop, de-
ploy, and use NBC weapons is growing.
Stern may be correct in her concern. Yet,
although there is a precedent, in that ter-
rorist groups such as the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo have used such devices, there is
no hard empirical data to support a sus-
tained argument that terrorists will be
going the NBC route, at least in the near
term. Terrorism has become complex in-
deed; acquiring, assembling, deploying,
and using NBC agents does not mean
that the selected device will be workable
or effective. Moreover, the cost of em-
barking on such a program for terrorist
causes will almost certainly outweigh the
benefits. Terrorists, at least for now, will
continue to opt for conventional weap-
ons, albeit at more sophisticated and le-
thal levels. There is evidence, however, of
more credible linkages between terrorism
and technology, and between terrorism
and international finance.
Ultimately, one cannot escape the fact
that among the newly emerging NBC
players there is a diversity of doctrines
and command structures. This will ad-
mittedly make it harder to predict possi-
ble political and military outcomes; more
significantly, it means that the NBC genie
cannot be put back in the bottle. Will the
current U.S. debate on the Strategic Mis-
sile Defense Initiative exacerbate this al-
ready volatile situation?
If there is one criticism to make of this
book, it is that it sometimes suffers from
a lack of consistency in terms of units of
analysis under examination (nuclear, bi-
ological, and chemical agents vary re-
markably in scale of effects, timing, etc.);
some essays weigh more heavily on one
agent at the expense of the others.
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Comparative analysis should instead gen-
eralize, with rigor, about similarities and
differences with respect to common phe-
nomena. This book is, however, a valu-
able addition to the complex body of
literature on strategy, national security,
and comparative political and military
dynamics.
K. A. BEYOGHLOW
Marine Corps Command and Staff College
Mauroni, Albert J. Chemical-Biological Defense:
U.S. Military Policies and Decisions in the Gulf War.
Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1998. 226pp. $59.95
Although we lived with the dangerous
specter of nuclear attack for more than
fifty years during the Cold War, concerns
about the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) have virtually
exploded into our consciousness in the
past decade. Since the demise of the for-
mer Soviet Union—once referred to as
our “malefactor partner in the concept of
mutually assured destruction”—our fears
seem to focus far less on the threat of nu-
clear holocaust, and more on the threat
of attack by chemical or biological
agents. The logical point of departure for
this shift in focus seems to be the Persian
Gulf War, when the world learned of a
rogue nation seemingly bent on prolifer-
ating these weapons of mass terror.
In this book, Albert J. Mauroni attempts
a historical recounting of U.S. efforts to
deal with chemical and biological warfare
agents on the modern battlefield. Mauroni,
a former U.S. Army Chemical Corps officer
who currently works as a management
consultant specializing in Department of
Defense chemical and biological defense
programs, provides a detailed look at
what was essentially a “cold start”
go-to-war effort on behalf of the U.S.
armed forces. The consistent premise
throughout this work is that no one in
the Department of Defense (with the ex-
ception of the Army’s Chemical Corps)
was even remotely prepared for an en-
counter with chemical or biological
agents as it readied for war with Iraq.
Convinced at the onset of Operation
DESERT SHIELD that Saddam Hussein
would indeed use WMD against U.S. and
coalition forces, the Pentagon began
what Mauroni describes as a “mad
scramble” to train and equip U.S. forces
to operate in the presence of WMD
agents. He reviews the preparation to de-
fend against exposure to these agents,
and assesses U.S. efforts to protect its
forces against a highly lethal asymmetri-
cal threat. In addition, Mauroni devotes a
chapter to the issue of “Gulf War illness,”
providing a fairly meticulous and forth-
right discussion of this controversial sub-
ject. He concludes with substantive
recommendations on where the future
focus of U.S. efforts to deal with the bur-
geoning threat of chemical and biological
agents should lie. At a minimum,
Mauroni’s work at dissecting the policies
and decisions of the Gulf War is impor-
tant if only as a lesson that the United
States must never again be so fundamen-
tally ill prepared to operate in the asym-
metrical environment.
There are criticisms to be made of this
book, however. At the surface level,
Mauroni uses far too many acronyms for
the book to be easily decipherable for the
non-Army (and especially nonmilitary)
reader. Although he includes a list of
abbreviations at the beginning to assist
with the veritable “acronym soup” of ab-
breviations, it becomes confusing and
tiresome to refer back constantly to a
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glossary to understand what one is
reading.
Additionally, Mauroni’s use of the term
“chemical-biological” can lead one who
is uneducated in the specific characteristics
of chemical and biological agents to be-
lieve that there is no readily discernable
difference between the two types of
WMD agents. In reality, there is nothing
farther from the truth. Chemical and bio-
logical agents are so different in their
properties and potential effects on the
human physiology that discussions about
countering or mitigating their effects
should remain separate. By consistently
lumping them together, Mauroni gives
the reader the impression that the mea-
sures taken for defense and consequence
management against chemical-agent ex-
posure will be essentially the same as
those for coping with a biological threat.
Of greater concern, however, are state-
ments made by the author in the first
chapter. He describes his purpose in
writing the book: “Only if CB weapons
were used on civilians and population
centers would they truly be ‘weapons of
mass destruction.’ On the military battle-
field, these weapons, shorn of the ridicu-
lous air of menace given to them by
politicians and the media, are merely an-
other tactical-operational factor like en-
emy air attacks or unforeseen terrorist
attacks; military forces can and do take
steps to minimize the effects of chemi-
cal-biological contamination. If a military
force invests a small amount of time and
funds in planning, defensive equipment
and training, the immediate threat of
mass casualties is avoided, and chemi-
cal-biological weapons become merely
‘weapons of mass disruption’ [his italics]
instead of destruction.”
I find these comments both naïve and
dangerously out of touch with the reality
of WMD agents, and certainly contradic-
tory to U.S. efforts at counter-proliferation
throughout the Department of Defense.
Although we have taken steps to deal
with the possibility of chemical exposures
among our operational forces (which
should be construed as tactical events in
the scope and scale of their effects), call-
ing a biological agent a “weapon of mass
disruption” ignores its potential for stra-
tegic impact. The World Health Organi-
zation (which currently offers the most
widely accepted casualty estimates for bi-
ological agents) predicts that the United
States could incur more than 250,000 ca-
sualties in a targeted population of
500,000 from only fifty kilograms of
weaponized anthrax; such an event could
hardly be usefully characterized as a
“disruption.”
There are other places where the reader
may take exception to Mauroni’s state-
ments—most notably, his comment in
chapter 3 that in 1990 the “official U.S.
policy was to reduce the likelihood of en-
emy chemical weapons use by threaten-
ing retaliation with similar munitions.”
The United States never considered the
use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War,
since it had long before decided not to
use chemical weapons as retaliation in
kind. The author’s footnote in chapter 4
regarding the requirement for a company
of bakers to augment a medical unit is
flatly derogatory to the medical profes-
sionals who did so much to ensure that
health-protection measures were in place
during the Gulf War. His claim that the
medics were ill trained and ill prepared
to deal with contaminated casualties
since “these practical issues had never
surfaced in the minds of the medical
community” is patently false. Several
hundred volumes published since the
First World War deal with the medical
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handling of chemically contaminated
casualties.
In the end, this work comes off as not
much more than a “hoo ah” for the Army
Chemical Corps, who are billed as having
redeemed the Department of Defense’s
collective ineptitude with respect to
chemical or biological attack. While
Mauroni does offer an accurate overall
accounting of the Army Chemical
Corps’s efforts to deal with the asymmet-
rical threat of chemical and biological
agents on the battlefield, he gives little
more than a passing nod to the overall ef-
forts of the other services and their col-
lective attempts to counter or mitigate
this omnipresent threat. Readers familiar
with the subject of WMD should be cau-
tioned that there is much with which to
find exception in this work. Readers un-
familiar with the subject should be care-
ful not to conclude that the capabilities




Medical Service Corps, U.S. Navy
Khalilzad, Zalmay M., and John P. White, eds.
The Changing Role of Information in Warfare. Santa
Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999. 452pp. $25
Is there need for yet another book on the
role of the military in the information
age? To judge by this volume, a collection
of essays published under RAND’s Project
Air Force, the answer is yes—but this may
be twice the book we need. In this case,
more than enough is not necessarily better.
The Changing Role of Information in War-
fare is part of RAND’s Strategic Appraisal
series, and it primarily addresses the ef-
fects of information technology on
American military planning and
operations. The fifteen chapters provide
a useful review of the dangers and oppor-
tunities that information technology
presents to U.S. military forces. While
originally intended for the Air Force, the
work should interest a wider professional
audience, especially because it includes a
broad spectrum of views, ranging from
techno-optimists to info-war pessimists.
The editors are well regarded authorities:
Zalmay Khalilzad is a former assistant
deputy under secretary of defense for
policy planning, and John White is a for-
mer deputy secretary of defense. Many of
the articles were written by well-known
writers on strategy and information war-
fare, and the foreword is by Andrew W.
Marshall, Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense; he is
considered by many to be among the
foremost thinkers in the U.S. government
on future threats and strategies.
However, roughly half the articles cover
ground familiar to anyone who has been
following the discussion in recent years
about the importance of information in
warfare and the dangers of computer
warfare. These chapters might be useful,
for example, to someone looking for a re-
view of the various ways computer hack-
ers can disrupt military operations. But
because so much has been written on this
constantly changing topic, the more tech-
nical chapters do not cover much new
territory and are already slightly outdated.
The chapter on information-age terrorism,
for instance, warns that future terrorist
attacks may take the form of “cybotage”
aimed at information infrastructure. This
may be true, although it hardly is a new
idea; moreover, so far in the information
age, old-fashioned terrorism remains domi-
nant, as the attack on the USS Cole re-
minded us.
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Similarly, the chapter on U.S. strategic
vulnerabilities discusses the tentative
steps being taken at the national level to
deal with the information warfare
threat—but it has been dated by more
recent efforts at information warfare de-
fense, including the Clinton administra-
tion’s National Plan for Information
Systems Protection, published after this
book went to press.
Luckily, only about half the book dis-
cusses the familiar territory of informa-
tion systems and technology. The second
half examines many of the broader ques-
tions involved in how the U.S. military is
adapting to the information age.
One of the best chapters is “The American
Military Enterprise in the Information
Age.” The late Carl H. Builder argues that
the most important effect of the informa-
tion revolution may not be the applica-
tion of technology to existing missions
but the need for the military to adapt to,
and find, new and different missions.
For Builder, it appears that the American
military’s “enterprise”—its primary pur-
poseful activity—is no longer (if it ever
was) to “fight and win our nation’s
wars.” Deterrence and forward defense
will not play the central roles they did in
twentieth-century conflicts, he speculates,
so the military may find itself reduced to
providing constabulary and expedition-
ary capabilities, while keeping the mili-
tary arts and sciences alive for the future.
Jeremy Shapiro takes a skeptical ap-
proach to the entire concept of an “infor-
mation revolution.” He argues that the
information age is not producing the sort
of wholesale change we would expect
from a revolution, either in military af-
fairs or in society at large. He cites the
work of Stephen Biddle and others who
have described the “productivity
paradox”—the idea that the outlays for
information technology have not as yet
led to the increases in productivity that
would be expected in a social and eco-
nomic revolution.
If the change is not revolutionary, Shapiro
argues, the U.S. military should not has-
ten to make radical organizational or
other changes. He quotes approvingly
Eliot Cohen’s observation that the creation
of a corps of “information warriors” today
might make as little sense as would the
creation of a corps of internal-combustion
warriors in the last century.
A chapter by Stephen T. Hosmer offers a
welcome look at psychological operations
(PSYOP), an important aspect of infor-
mation warfare that is usually neglected
by all but the U.S. Army. Army PSYOP
advocates may not like what they read
here, however. Hosmer argues that al-
though psychological effects are indeed
vital, history shows that actual PSYOP ef-
forts are not nearly as effective in reduc-
ing the enemy’s will to fight as are
well-planned combat operations. Stan-
dard measures of psychological warfare
effectiveness, such as the numbers of en-
emy surrenders and desertions, do not
correlate directly with the intensity or
quality of PSYOP efforts but closely re-
flect the nature of combat operations.
Military commanders can best produce
catastrophic disintegration of enemy re-
sistance, Hosmer writes, not through
leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts but
by sustained, weeks-long air and artillery
attacks combined with deliberate efforts
to deprive the enemy of food, and ulti-
mately with ground operations aimed at
exploiting the enemy’s weakened morale.
His advice may appear obvious, but it
suggests that commanders may be paying
too much attention to technical PSYOP
efforts and not enough to the psychological
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effects of combat operations. In addition,
his research seems to suggest that sus-
tained, well-planned strikes may be more
important than the sudden mass attacks
designed to produce “shock and awe”
that are heralded by many network-centric-
warfare advocates.
Additional useful chapters review the
ethical considerations arising in infor-
mation warfare and examine whether
or not such mechanisms as arms control
and export regimes can apply to
information warfare technologies. An ar-
ticle by Francis Fukuyama and Abram N.
Shulsky reviews the lessons (familiar to a
Naval War College audience) that the
military can learn from business in
adapting to the information age.
One minor complaint—the book does
not offer biographical sketches of the
contributors. A few pages devoted to that
information would be more useful than
the largely unnecessary listing of abbrevi-
ations and acronyms. Overall, this collec-
tion is useful, but a better introduction to
many of these concepts is found in an
earlier RAND work by John Arquilla and
David Ronfeldt, In Athena’s Camp: Pre-
paring for Conflict in the Information Age





Szayna, Thomas S. Identifying Potential Ethnic Con-
flict. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1998. 329pp. $25
Since 1989, the U.S. military has been in-
volved in a number of intrastate conflicts
integrally related to ethnicity. These eth-
nic conflicts have been devastating to
those involved; the conflicts contributed
to regional destabilization; and they have
been assumed to breed international ter-
rorism. Most saliently, they have virtually
destroyed the hope of peace benefits that
were predicted to accrue at the end of the
Cold War.
The intelligence community was tasked
by the State and Defense Departments to
provide explanations for ethnic conflict.
Indications-and-warning systems were to
be developed and used to alert policy and
military decision makers to impending
crises. It was assumed that good analysis
and prediction would contribute to poli-
cies and practices designed to prevent,
manage, or contain ethnic conflict and
thereby minimize damage to interna-
tional peace and stability. A number of
studies were conducted internally or were
outsourced. The task was apparently, but
deceptively, simple—produce a predic-
tive model of ethnic conflict. The crite-
rion for a successful model was equally
simple—did it work? That is, did the
model provide more information of a
critical nature than could be provided by
country experts, and was it available in a
timely fashion?
Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict is the
public report of research sponsored by
the deputy chief of staff for intelligence
of the U.S. Army. It was produced by a
group at the top level at RAND Corpora-
tion in Santa Monica, California.
The stated purpose of the project was to
help the intelligence community order its
thinking about the logic and dynamics of
ethnic conflict and to systematize
information-collection requirements.
The authors did not provide a compre-
hensive explanation of ethnic conflict but
attempted to answer the questions of
how ethnic mobilization occurs and un-
der what conditions it leads to violence.
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The research was based on the assump-
tion that reliance on static indicators and
simple statistical correlation (as found in
many other models) did not adequately
account for change. Change was assumed
to be the political mobilization of “ethnic
factors used to aggregate and articulate
group grievances.” Political mobilization
was assumed to be found in changes be-
tween and among groups in economic,
political, and social spheres of life activi-
ties. In other words, they were looking
for specific changes in the relationship
between group and state that could signal
future conflict.
Three stages were identified: Potential for
Strife, Transformation from Potential to
Likely Strife, and From Likely to Actual
Strife. The potential for strife was identi-
fied in processes associated with closure,
that is, the reification of group bound-
aries, the strengthening of “us-them”
thinking. The transformation from po-
tential to likely strife—critical to the con-
ceptual framework—was found in the
mobilization of ethnic-political identity
influencing the balance of power between
a group and the state. This transforma-
tion was assumed to be found in factors
associated with emerging leadership, mo-
bilization of group resources, and a series
of “tipping” events (similar to the “trig-
ger mechanisms” found in other studies).
Change from likely to actual strife oc-
curred through an interactive strategic
bargaining process; this was portrayed by
assessing the group preferences and capa-
bilities of the state and the contending
ethnic groups, presented in tabular form.
The model was then applied to Yugoslavia,
South Africa, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia.
The best part of the model is its focus on
change and process. The authors proba-
bly have that right—most ethnic groups,
under most conditions, live in relative
peace and harmony; changes in
relationships are generally associated
with competition and conflict under con-
ditions of relative scarcity. But, however
good this assumption, the model was not
adequately developed to test the hypoth-
esis on a variety of cases. The variables, as
discussed in this publication, were very
general; they need further specification
and elaboration. The four case studies,
which purported to apply the model,
were written by situation experts. They
are very informative and make good
reading. Nevertheless, the writing seemed
to reflect the authors’ expertise and per-
spectives as much as any application of
the model.
If, then, the goal was to provide a model
that could apply statistical methodology
to comparative data and thereby contrib-
ute to predicting future ethnic conflicts,
it was not accomplished. Most of the
conclusions seemed drawn from the
analyses provided by RAND’s experts and
not produced by the operationalization of
the concepts or an application of the
model to the four cases. Perhaps because
this was a public document, the actual
data lies elsewhere and the model has
greater specificity and applicability than
appear in this short text.
The critical test of any model is whether
it works—whether it provides more pre-
dictive power than an informed observer.
In this case, it is hard to say, because as
the authors note, “the model needs fur-
ther specification and elaboration.” This
will not be the final book on ethnic
conflict.
As the consultants’ favorite saying goes:
“Progress has been made, but further re-
search is necessary.”
PAULETTA OTIS
University of Southern Colorado
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Swaine, Michael D., and Ashley J. Tellis. Interpreting
China’s Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future.
Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2000. 283pp. $20
Michael Swaine, author of the outstanding
The Military & Political Succession in China
(1992), and his fellow RAND analyst Ashley
Tellis have written a very good book about
Chinese security in both historical and fu-
ture perspective. It will certainly be of inter-
est to the policy community, as it should be
to all who work on Asian security.
Swaine and Tellis define grand strategy as a
country’s “basic approach to political-
military security.” China’s grand strategy
seeks to preserve domestic order, defend
against external threats, and eventually
attain “geopolitical influence as a major,
and perhaps, primary state.” These bland
objectives become vibrant when viewed
in historical context—many centuries
ago, with strong leadership and domestic
order, China dominated the region not
only, or even primarily, militarily but
also in cultural, political, and economic
ways that elicited deference and reduced
the need for military capability. Subse-
quent periodic weak leadership and do-
mestic disorder reduced China’s ability
to resist persistent threats from beyond
its long, vulnerable border and dimin-
ished its political strength, so China has
been united as a single entity under Chi-
nese rule for only about half of the last
1,800 years. Today, China is pursuing a
pragmatic strategy that emphasizes “the
primacy of internal economic growth
and stability, the nurturing of amicable
international relations, the relative re-
straint in the use of force combined with
increasing efforts to create a more mod-
ern military, and the continued search
for asymmetric gains internationally”
(e.g., entrance into the World Trade
Organization as a developing, rather than
developed, economy). Assuming that no
catastrophic revisions of this strategy are
forced on China, Swaine and Tellis ex-
pect it to continue through 2015–2020,
which they identify as the minimal time
frame in which the Chinese economy and
military might develop sufficiently to al-
low China to become globally preemi-
nent. If this strategy is not derailed (and
that is a major if), Swaine and Tellis ar-
gue, there are three plausible long-term
scenarios: that China becomes domesti-
cally chaotic, internationally cooperative,
or internationally assertive, perhaps to the
point of global preeminence. Where the
United States is the hegemon today and
for the foreseeable future, China may seek
to be the hegemon some decades hence.
Swaine and Tellis focus on hegemony
based on economic and military power.
However, as China may know from its
earlier experience as a hegemon in East
Asia, there is more to it than economic
and military power. The United States
became hegemonic in the West after
World War II, when it possessed both
economic and military power, and an at-
tractive liberal ideology that provided
profound economic and social benefits.
It led a coalition against a militarily pow-
erful, ideologically expansionist Soviet
Union; when the Soviet Union collapsed,
in part because its ideology was not func-
tional in practice and its empire was held
together by force, the United States
found itself with a global stature of nearly
hegemonic scope. Since 1991, U.S. ideol-
ogy has reduced the opposition by other
countries against the United States that
might have been expected had the order
it represents relied on military and eco-
nomic power alone. While many voices,
some in Mandarin, complain about U.S.
hegemony, it provides a robust and
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functional order in which states like
China can develop in reasonable peace.
Though it may not want to acknowledge
the fact, China benefits from the hege-
mony of U.S. order, and from its en-
forcement by American naval and air
power.
Unlike the United States after World War
II, China does not appear to offer a glob-
ally compelling ideology; in the absence
of such an ideology, increasing Chinese
power and assertiveness may frighten
countries to resist China by generating
power internally or externally. Internal
power might take the form of developing
nuclear weapons. Most likely, external
balancing would take the form of intensi-
fied ties with the United States, though
Taiwan, Vietnam, and India all might
have reasons to become better acquainted
with each other; even a weak Russia
might contribute to a China-constraining
coalition. Increases in Chinese power—if
only for defensive purposes, like looking
after China’s energy interests abroad—
might lead to resistance, because no
country could be sure that Chinese inten-
tions would not change. Counterbalancing
would likely become more intense if
China were to seek to move from regional
hegemony to “geopolitical preeminence
on a global scale.” The absence of an ade-
quate consideration of such “balancing”
may be the most significant weakness in
this book. However, this is an impressive
study of China’s grand strategy, and it is
worthy of serious examination.
CARMEL DAVIS
University of Pennsylvania
Woolley, Peter J. Japan’s Navy: Politics and Para-
dox, 1971–2000. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1999. 166pp. $49.95
In 1971 James Auer published The Post-
war Rearmament of Japanese Maritime
Forces, 1945–1971, “a book that [was]
meant to challenge certain assumptions
surrounding post–World War II Japan
and its military, in particular its maritime
forces.” Thirty years later, in post–Cold
War Japan, some of those same supposi-
tions persist. Of particular note, beliefs
that Japanese rearmament is an Ameri-
can initiative, that Japan seeks only to
provide for its own internal security
while the United States is responsible for
all external threats, and that militarism is
returning to Japan, result in conflicts
within Japan and among its Asian
neighbors.
To many, the U.S.-Japan alliance both
protects Japanese security interests and
provides the cork that keeps Japanese
militarism in the bottle. To students of
Asia, the alliance follows a natural evolu-
tion resulting from the congruence of in-
terests of two maritime nations as Japan
reasserts its regional influence. To the
prescient, the U.S.-Japan alliance is the
bedrock for stability in a region rife with
competing interests, developing conflicts,
and unresolved animosities.
Peter Woolley, a professor of comparative
politics at Fairleigh Dickinson University,
has studied and written extensively on
Japanese maritime development. He has
written the next volume in this continu-
ing story of Japan’s defense-system evo-
lution, masterfully picking up where
Auer left off. Woolley provides a concise
analysis of the Japanese Defense Forces’
role in a world awakening to the transi-
tional peace of the post–Cold War era.
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His focus is an examination of the devel-
opment and potential of the Japanese
navy in the context of the U.S.-Japan
Defense Security Alliance.
Rising from the ashes of World War II to
become a legitimate regional power, Ja-
pan has developed the “second most
powerful naval force in the world’s larg-
est ocean.” This has led the United States
and others to press Japan to contribute
more to the security of the democratic
and free-trading world, while its neigh-
bors closely watch for signs of militarism
that would signal resurgent nationalism
and imperialism.
Through comparative analysis, Woolley
presents the development of the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF),
and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF)
generally, in decision-making models de-
veloped within each of the book’s seven
chapters. He sees the efficacy of Japan’s
military might and fear of its potency as
catalysts that will awaken the long-dormant
Japanese aim for regional hegemony and
dominance.
Woolley begins by examining the cultural
implications of the expanding role of the
JMSDF, followed by the institutional di-
mension of the legal constraints imposed
by the Japanese constitution on JSDF ac-
tivities. In subsequent chapters, he traces
the impact of strategic purpose on the
development of these forces as Japan ac-
cepted the role of defending its sea-lanes
out to one thousand miles. Woolley fol-
lows with an examination of the domes-
tic and international implications of
Japan’s expanding capabilities and opera-
tions as it sent minesweepers to the Per-
sian Gulf in 1991, and how the
incremental changes in Japan’s defense
policy over the last three decades resulted
in tacit international and domestic ac-
ceptance of its participation in
peacekeeping operations. Woolley con-
cludes with a valuable discussion of Ja-
pan’s changing defense posture and its
relevance to aiding the United States in
protecting shared vital interests in Asia.
Well researched and meticulously docu-
mented with an extensive bibliography,
this book is an excellent reference for
anyone wanting to understand Japanese
defense policy and the forces that affect
it. However, it is more than a book about
the development of the JMSDF in the last
three decades. It is also about the devel-
opment of Japan’s national defense pol-
icy and the forces that move Japanese
policy makers. It is a concise treatise that
effectively uses maps and tables to help
the reader understand key points.
Thus, the reader should be cautioned
that the title of this book does not accu-
rately convey its value as an examination
of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Japanese defense forces—not just the
JMSDF—nor does it suggest the richness
of the author’s analysis of Japanese policy
making. This book provides much more,
and it can serve as an excellent resource
for gaining insight into the most impor-





Lavell, Kit. Flying Black Ponies. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute Press, 2000. 376pp. $32.95
Flying Black Ponies is an effective combi-
nation of combat narrative, squadron
history, and personal memoir, telling the
story of Light Attack Squadron 4 (VAL 4,
or the “Black Ponies”), a naval aviation
squadron stationed in the Mekong Delta
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during the Vietnam War. During most of
the war, the U.S. Navy made an intense
effort with its Mobile Riverine Force to
interdict enemy arms and supplies that
flowed, primarily from Cambodia, across
the Mekong Delta into the area sur-
rounding Saigon. Kit Lavell’s book is a
readable account of the Black Ponies’ im-
portant role in this hazardous interdic-
tion campaign.
The Mekong Delta is not an easy place to
conduct any type of military operation. It is
a lush, steaming, tangled waterscape of
swamps, soggy plains, and rice paddies
crisscrossed with thousands of miles of
rivers, streams, and canals. The canal-
interdiction war in the Mekong was lim-
ited in 1968 in part by the inability to
sustain close air support. The “Swift
boats,” river patrol boats, SEAL teams,
and the overstretched squadron of Navy
attack helicopters (HAL 3, or the
“Seawolves”) that were already in place
clearly needed assistance. The new Com-
mander, Naval Forces Vietnam, Vice Ad-
miral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., decided that
air firepower was needed that could
reach station quickly and remain there
for several hours. The Black Ponies be-
came operational in the Mekong during
April 1969 in order to give fixed-wing
aircraft punch, mainly with five-inch
Zuni rockets, to the fight for control of
the strategic river delta.
The book follows VAL 4 from its com-
missioning in San Diego, in January
1969, until its last mission and decom-
missioning in April 1972. The narrative
also contains useful summaries of Navy
tactics in the Mekong Delta, briefly de-
scribing MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN,
SEA LORDS, GIANT SLINGSHOT, DUFFLE
BAG, ACTOV, and other operations in
which the Black Ponies were involved.
Lavell also weaves numerous other
elements of the squadron’s experiences
into his account. Lavell was one of the
Black Pony pilots, flying 234 combat mis-
sions in the OV-10 Bronco aircraft dur-
ing his tour with VAL 4. He effectively
describes the frustration of being at the
very end of the line of the Navy’s support
and supply organization in Vietnam, and
of dealing with rear-echelon staff admin-
istrators. He also pays deserved tribute to
the enlisted maintenance and ordnance
crews who worked long hours in the heat
and humidity to keep the squadron air-
craft safely airborne and armed. He por-
trays the sometimes humorous and
somewhat disrespectful escapades of ju-
nior officers, particularly as the pullout
from Vietnam neared in 1972.
Most importantly, however, this book is
about the pilots of VAL 4 and their com-
bat experiences. In three years of flying in
the Mekong Delta, the squadron com-
piled a unique and impressive record.
The Black Ponies’ ability to “scramble”
when the Riverine Force made contact
with the enemy continually resulted in
direct air-ground firefights. The combat
action is sharply drawn, evoking the ten-
sion, complexity, and confusion of deliv-
ering air strikes, especially in close
proximity to friendly forces on the
ground. When strikes took place at night
and in bad weather (which they often
did), the descriptions are even more har-
rowing. Several of the stories of the aerial
fighting are effectively paired with per-
sonal memories of the same engagement
by other personnel involved—river pa-
trol boat crews, SEAL teams, and
Riverine Force troops on the ground.
As Steven Coonts notes in his foreword,
Flying Black Ponies can be read as a charac-
teristic example of the way America fights
its wars. Coonts describes the volunteers
that fought the air war—young men of
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blue-collar or decidedly middle-class
background, mostly from farms or small
towns. Their story is an important one,
and the first-person accounts of individ-
ual sacrifice and aircrew heroism are a
needed addition to the narrative of the




Gentile, Gian P. How Effective Is Strategic Bombing?
Lessons Learned from World War II to Kosovo. New
York: New York Univ. Press, 2001. 273pp. $36
The issue of strategic bombing’s effec-
tiveness is vitally important to political
and military leaders. U.S. Air Force doc-
trine has argued for decades that
airpower’s ability to operate directly and
immediately at the strategic level of war
is its unique and defining characteris-
tic—a characteristic that must be ex-
ploited. Many disagree, so the debates
have been long and heated.
Gian Gentile, a serving Army officer, now
adds to the literature on this important
subject. Unfortunately, he never really
comes to grips with the key issue of effec-
tiveness implied by the title of his book.
Rather, he has chosen to replow some old
ground, looking anew at the U.S. Strate-
gic Bombing Survey (USSBS), chartered
by President Franklin Roosevelt to exam-
ine and report on the effects of strategic
bombing in World War II. Measuring
bombing’s effectiveness and examining
the workings of the USSBS that studied
bomb effects are two different things.
The story of USSBS has been told before.
In many ways it is a typical tale of war-
time America. A need is identified, re-
sources and personnel are mobilized, vast
amounts of energy and material are ex-
pended, and notable gains are achieved.
At the same time, the path to success is
not a straight line—there is much ineffi-
ciency, debate, and compromise. Sausage
is being made.
Gentile does not contest the findings of
USSBS. Indeed, virtually no one has at-
tempted to do so in the five-plus decades
since they were released. The reason is
simple: no one has the time, stamina, re-
sources, or expertise to review the moun-
tain of data collected and analyzed by the
thousand individuals who conducted the
USSBS.
Instead, Gentile seeks to discredit the
survey’s findings by revealing flaws and
inconsistencies in the survey itself. Pri-
marily, he argues that Army Air Forces
(AAF) leaders were so interested in form-
ing a separate air force after the war that
they induced bias into the USSBS. He is
unable to make this charge stick. The
survey was led by noted industrialists,
bankers, economists, lawyers, and other
professionals, most of whom had had lit-
tle or no direct involvement with avia-
tion prior to their work with the survey.
Gentile admits that General Henry “Hap”
Arnold, the AAF commander, stressed to
these civilian leaders the need for objec-
tivity, impartiality, and truth in the sur-
vey’s findings. Yet he treats such
admonitions as duplicitous, despite the
statement by the USSBS head that “at no
time has there been the slightest inclina-
tion to interfere with us.”
In truth, it is difficult to imagine that
men like John Kenneth Galbraith, Paul
Nitze, and George Ball could have been
manipulated and pressured to distort
their findings. Common sense and logic
tell us it is more likely that these
men—and their hundreds of colleagues
on the survey— examined thousands of
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documents, interviewed hundreds of wit-
nesses, visited scores of bombed sites,
and then concluded that strategic bomb-
ing had indeed been a decisive factor in
the Allied victory, as they reported.
Alas, such a conclusion is unacceptable
to Gentile. He must find nefarious
schemes and schemers, and so he repeat-
edly questions the motives and veracity
of the participants. For example, when
General Curtis LeMay testified before
Congress that he did not believe airpower
could “win the war” and that a balanced
mix of land, sea, and air forces was neces-
sary for victory, Gentile dismisses his
statement as a “shrewd and bureaucrati-
cally astute” tactic to manipulate his ci-
vilian superiors.
The USSBS has been controversial ever
since it was written. Small wonder—at-
tempting to measure the effects of strate-
gic bombing in World War II was a
massive undertaking, conducted at a time
when the techniques of systems analysis
were in their infancy. Gentile finds it
troubling that survey members were not
in total agreement. This should hardly
come as a surprise. If the unfolding of
historical events were simple and uncon-
tested, our libraries would be far smaller.
His concluding chapter, dealing with the
survey that analyzed the air campaign of
the Persian Gulf War, is less tendentious.
Here again, however, the author presents
little that is new, and, more importantly,
he does not attempt to address the book’s
ostensible focus—the efficacy of strategic
bombing.
Measuring the effectiveness of strategic
air attack is one of the greatest challenges
facing military planners today. It is an
enormously complex and difficult prob-
lem that defies easy solution. Yet as
airpower becomes increasingly dominant
as a foreign-policy tool, such measure-
ment is essential. This poorly reasoned
and highly parochial book will not help
us find answers to that pressing need, nor
will it foster understanding among the
services.
PHILLIP S. MEILINGER
Science Applications International Corporation
McLean, Va.
Jordan, Robert S. Norstad: Cold War NATO Su-
preme Commander—Airman, Strategist, Diplomat.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 329pp. $49
Lauris Norstad was a major Air Force
leader during the defining years of the
Cold War, and except for Dwight Eisen-
hower, he was the most prominent of all
the Supreme Allied Commanders Europe
(SACEUR) since that position was estab-
lished in early 1951. Surprisingly, up to
now, nothing definitive had been written
on his role as SACEUR. Robert Jordan, a
professor at the University of New Or-
leans and an authority on Nato, has filled
that gap.
Norstad grew up in a small town in Min-
nesota and graduated from West Point in
the class of 1930. Transferring to the Air
Corps in 1931, he was one of that rela-
tively small group of regular-officer avia-
tors who provided air force leadership
during World War II. When the war be-
gan, Major Norstad was serving on an air
staff in Washington, D.C. He came to the
attention of General Henry “Hap” Arnold,
who headed what had become in June
1941 the Army Air Forces. In 1942 Arnold
established a select group of young offi-
cers, the brightest he could find, to work
in his immediate office. Norstad was one
of them—he was on the way up.
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That summer Arnold sent Norstad to
England to serve as operations chief of
the Twelfth Air Force—Eisenhower’s air
arm for Operation TORCH, the Novem-
ber 1942 invasion of North Africa. In his
war memoir, Eisenhower had this to say
about Norstad: “[Norstad was] a young
air officer who so impressed me by his
alertness, grasp of problems, and person-
ality that I never thereafter lost sight of
him.” Before long, Brigadier General
Norstad was operations chief for the
Allied Air Forces Mediterranean. In the
fall of 1944, Arnold returned Norstad to
Washington, D.C., as chief of staff of the
Twentieth Air Force, charged with
planning the strategic bombing campaign
against Japan. By war’s end, Major Gen-
eral Lauris Norstad, though not one of
the top combat heroes of the Army Air
Forces, was definitely one of its top
comers.
From the end of World War II until the
Korean War, the leadership of the re-
duced American armed forces struggled
with new questions. Two of the most im-
portant were the role of nuclear weapons
and how the U.S. military should be or-
ganized. With Eisenhower serving as
chief of staff of the U.S. Army, and
Norstad his deputy for operations (G-3),
Norstad was involved in both issues, par-
ticularly in developing the compromises
that led to the 1947 legislation resulting
in the National Military Establishment,
and ultimately to a separate Department
of the Air Force. Subsequently, Lieuten-
ant General Norstad, operations chief for
the Air Force, played a major role in or-
ganizing the Berlin Airlift during the crisis
of 1948–49. In the fall of 1950 he became
commander of U.S. Air Forces Europe.
The main focus of Jordan’s book con-
cerns Norstad’s subsequent twelve years
of service in Europe, in particular the last
six, when he served as SACEUR.
The author analyzes in detail three major
issues confronted by Norstad that were
most significant: the role and employ-
ment of nuclear weapons in alliance de-
fense, the Berlin crises of 1958–59 and
1961–62, and the problem of balancing
SACEUR’s roles as both an international
and an American forces commander.
The nuclear weapons issue was compli-
cated by the fact that the British had their
own weapons, the French wanted theirs,
and the West Germans, having none,
were not quite certain they would be fully
defended if the alliance had no recourse
other than nuclear war. As Jordan dem-
onstrates, Norstad was an able diplomat
who succeeded in developing an alliance
consensus on the role of nuclear weapons
in deterring the Soviet Union.
Since Berlin was inside the Soviet-occupied
zone of Germany, it became an ideal lo-
cation for the Soviets to apply pressure
on the alliance—by denying, or threaten-
ing to deny, access to the city. Though
the issues were extremely complex, in a
clear and interesting fashion Jordan ex-
plains Norstad’s role as diplomat and
strategist in meeting Nikita Khrushchev’s
challenge.
It is in his examination of SACEUR’s
conflicting roles as an American and si-
multaneously an international commander
that Jordan makes his major contribution.
This issue came to a head for Norstad
with the arrival of the Kennedy adminis-
tration in 1961, with its secretary of de-
fense, Robert Strange McNamara. The
substantive issue was the nature, role,
and control of nuclear weapons as an ele-
ment of Nato strategy. The process issue
was that the administration found it hard
to accept SACEUR’s dual role, tending to
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view Norstad as an American commander
only. The details cannot be developed
within the confines of a review, but in the
end Norstad was forced to walk the
plank—though the final jump was de-
layed for a period of two months by the
administration’s need for his assistance
during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
Robert Jordan has produced an impor-
tant work that is thoroughly researched,
nicely written, and most insightful. No
doubt it will be the definitive biography
of Lauris Norstad—Cold War airman,
strategist, and diplomat. The book will
also be of interest to those involved in the
study of civil-military relations, especially
in these years of increased commitment
of U.S. military forces in multinational or
international interventions.
DOUGLAS KINNARD
Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Retired
Emeritus Professor of Political Science
University of Vermont
Crane, Conrad C. American Airpower Strategy in
Korea, 1950–1953. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2000. 252pp. $35
Conrad Crane is a research professor for
military strategy at the Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, and
formerly a professor of military history at
the U.S. Military Academy. Crane previ-
ously wrote Bombs, Cities, and Civilians:
American Airpower Strategy in World War
II (1993), which is widely respected for
its rich and adroit analysis. American
Airpower Strategy in Korea, 1950–1953 is
a comprehensive, thoroughly researched
treatment of the many issues that the
newly constituted U.S. Air Force faced as
a result of having to fight its first war as
an independent service—a war that it
was not doctrinally or materially
prepared for, and that the service had
neither anticipated nor especially wanted
to fight. Crane logically takes the reader
through the war from the prehostilities
period, which generally set the stage for
the limited character of the war and spe-
cifically established the character of the
Air Force’s contribution; the opening
moves and initial setbacks; the miraculous
end-around at Inchon and subsequent
march to the Yalu; the bitter winter of
1950–51; and finally to the stalemate
along the thirty-eighth parallel.
Crane analyzes the performance of the Air
Force in conducting air warfare in a re-
gional, limited conflict at a time when the
service was focused on strategic nuclear war
and restricted by government policy as to
the resources that could be allocated to Ko-
rea. It was a condition that the Air Force
would again confront in Vietnam. The Ko-
rean War presented the Air Force with a
myriad of challenges, not the least of which
was the attempt to meet high expectations
for operational effectiveness based on re-
sults obtained during World War II.
However, the very nature of the new con-
flict constrained that effectiveness. A clas-
sic example of the limited nature of the
Korean War was the prohibition against
crossing the Yalu River to engage enemy
forces or interdict lines of communica-
tion. Crane also takes great pains to high-
light how austere were the resources
made available to the Korean area of op-
erations, because the Air Force was re-
quired to maintain the bulk of the active
component in a ready status to respond
to other worldwide threats. This require-
ment was the catalyst for many issues
that arose during the conduct of the war,
among them the decision to recall to ac-
tive duty large numbers of aircrewmen
who had served in World War II and
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were in many cases not keen to leave
their families and jobs to serve in an un-
declared “police action.”
In addition, Crane recognizes, the Air
Force was challenged by interservice ri-
valry with the Army and the misunder-
standing of its role in battlefield air
interdiction, and to a lesser degree by
negative perceptions created by strategic
bombing at the expense of close air sup-
port for the Army. He points out that the
frustration felt by Army commanders
was exacerbated by the effective and ded-
icated close-air support provided to the
Marines by their air component. The
Army continually questioned why the Air
Force could not provide for it the same
level of effective support.
Crane also rightly recognizes the effective
leadership and operational genius of the
Far East Air Forces (FEAF) planner, Brig-
adier General Jacob Smart, who was able
to produce a coherent interdiction strat-
egy which he skillfully “sold” to the
Army. Smart recognized the difficulty of
conducting tactical interdiction opera-
tions against an entrenched enemy who
did not require much in the way of sup-
ply. He reoriented FEAF’s interdiction ef-
forts away from cutting tactical lines of
communications to striking such opera-
tional targets as hydroelectric facilities,
supply distribution centers, and other
“deep” targets, all with some effect.
Crane’s book is a valuable compilation of
the contributions of the Air Force in the
prosecution of the Korean War. Crane
reveals the warts but also gives glowing
credit where it is due. Much more than a
mere chronology, this is an insightful
book that is a must-read for critical stu-




Gardner, W. J. R. Decoding History: The Battle of the
Atlantic and Ultra. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 1999. 263pp. $34.95
For thirty years after the Second World
War, historians said very little about the
role of signals intelligence in the Battle of
the Atlantic—because either they did not
know about the Allies’ remarkable
code-breaking successes, or they could
not write about what they did know.
That changed in 1974, when revelations
about ULTRA exposed the full extent of
the Allied penetration of Germany’s sig-
nals. Unfortunately, in the subsequent
rush to rewrite the history books to in-
clude ULTRA, its significance was fre-
quently inflated.
In this study of ULTRA and the Battle of
the Atlantic, Gardner offers the most
fully developed case yet that monocausal
explanations for the Allied victory in this
campaign are inadequate—that ULTRA
was only one critical factor among many.
Gardner provides two case studies to
support his argument. The first demon-
strates that Britain’s growing ascendancy
over the U-boat in 1941 had many causes,
most of which were unconnected with
ULTRA. Just as important as code break-
ing, if not more so, was the tightening up
of the convoy system and the German
decision to shift U-boat operations west-
ward in order to avoid the increasingly
hostile environment around the British
Isles. The greater availability of escort
vessels and growing American assistance
also played an important part in turning
the tide in Britain’s favor in 1941. It is
therefore a mistake to suggest, as some
have done, that ULTRA alone may have
saved as much as two million tons of
shipping during this period.
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Gardner’s second case study covers the
period from mid-1942 to mid-1943, the
final turning point in the campaign.
Once again, he makes a strong argument
that factors other than ULTRA were es-
sential for the Allies’ success, most im-
portantly the closing of the mid-Atlantic
“air gap” and the increasing number and
effectiveness of Allied escort vessels. By
1943, Gardner notes, it was more hazard-
ous than ever for the Germans to attack
convoys. At the same time, the growing
number of U-boats operating in the
mid-Atlantic made the evasive routing of
convoys extremely difficult for the Allies,
even when ULTRA was available on a
timely basis.
These case studies cover periods when
ULTRA was most valuable because Ger-
many was employing its U-boats in “wolf
pack” attacks on convoys. When U-boats
operated individually rather than in
groups, which was the case for nearly
two-thirds of the war, ULTRA’s value was
much less. Gardner also emphasizes that
there were lengthy periods when German
signals were being read only after consid-
erable delay. For much of the war, he
concludes, ULTRA’s principal use was to
enable the Allies to build up a general
picture of the size and methods of the
German U-boat fleet. It seldom had any
impact on the Battle of the Atlantic at the
operational or tactical levels.
This book deliberately focuses on the
turning points of the campaign and the
broad relationship of ULTRA to other fac-
tors; it does not provide either a
blow-by-blow account of the Battle of the
Atlantic or a systematic examination of
ULTRA’s employment by Allied com-
manders. The period from June 1943 un-
til the end of the war is largely ignored.
However, Gardner devotes a considerable
portion of this book to background
information about the Battle of the At-
lantic, including the importance of eco-
nomic factors, the role of technology,
Germany’s own code-breaking activities,
and the workings of convoy. This mate-
rial should be useful for the general
reader even if it offers little for the
specialist.
Gardner’s broad conclusions are carefully
reasoned and well balanced. The Battle of
the Atlantic would have been a harder
and costlier struggle without ULTRA, but
the Allied victory cannot be solely attrib-
uted to code-breaking successes. Decoding
History will not be the final word on sig-
nals intelligence and the Battle of the At-
lantic, but it may put an end to the wildly




Reynolds, Leonard C. Dog Boats at War: Royal Navy D
Class MTBs and MGBs, 1939–1945. Gloucestershire,
U.K.: Sutton, 1998. 260pp. $35
There are few untold stories left from
World War II, but the actions of the
Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces can be de-
scribed as little known and unappreci-
ated. Serving in small plywood craft
much like the more famous American PT
boats, the Coastal Forces wreaked havoc
with Axis forces in British and foreign
waters. Operating from small harbors
and primitive forward bases, theirs was a
war of small, close-knit crews and close
action with the enemy. They did it all,
from convoy escort to shipping interdic-
tion, clandestine landings to reconnais-
sance operations, and finally, distant
screening for invasion forces. Coastal
Forces were a ubiquitous presence in the
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European theater. Wherever there were
Axis forces in coastal waters or areas, the
Royal Navy dispatched Coastal Forces to
counter them. Yet strangely, little has
been published about these deadly
fast-attack craft and their courageous
crews. Dog Boats at War redresses some
of that shortfall in naval literature.
Written by a wartime motor gunboat
commander, Leonard C. Reynolds, this
book tells the Coastal Forces’ story with
an authenticity that can only be pro-
duced by one who was there. Reynolds
focuses on the actions that took place
during his service in 1942–45, and on the
class of boat in which he served, the
Fairmile D-class motor-torpedo and mo-
tor gunboat (MTB and MGB, respec-
tively). The title, Dog Boats at War, is
derived from the nickname given to the
rather blunt-looking Fairmile fast-attack
craft.
The Royal Navy entered World War II
with two flotillas of underpowered
MTBs. They proved woefully inadequate
against the German Schnellbooten and
Italian MAS torpedo boats. The Admi-
ralty tasked Noel Macklin of Fairmile to
develop a fast-attack boat to compete
with the enemy boats. Macklin’s design
was ready by March 1941 and was put
into production six months later after a
rushed but successful testing program.
The first boats entered service in the Eng-
lish Channel by early spring 1942. Ori-
ginally intended as motor gunboats for
convoy escort, they were converted to
torpedo boats while under construction.
Equipped with two twenty-one-inch tor-
pedo tubes instead of a six-pounder can-
non, the MTBs proved very effective at
intercepting German convoys transiting
off the Dutch and French coasts.
The “dog boat” was a simple and robust
design, but its performance was not
extraordinary. Its 115-foot hull had a
blunt semi-hard-chine design and used
four Packard 1,250-horsepower engines
to achieve a maximum speed of
thirty-two knots—some five knots slower
than its German or American counter-
parts. The dog boats were also small in
comparison to their opponents but rode
better in a seaway. Their superior stabil-
ity often proved decisive in the rough wa-
ters of the English Channel and off the
Norwegian coast. In the end, however, it
was the crews that made the difference.
It took a special kind of sailor to man a
plywood boat filled with five thousand
gallons of highly volatile aviation gaso-
line. The Royal Navy found their early
crews among the yachtsmen, racing en-
thusiasts, and fishermen who populated
Britain’s coastal towns and villages.
These early recruits shaped the force that
followed. The dog boats went to war with
small crews of thirty to thirty-two men
commanded by young Royal Navy Vol-
unteer Reserve officers, many drawn
from the Commonwealth. The com-
manding officers were generally in their
twenties, and most had at least two years
of experience in fast-attack craft. The
crews were also either reservists or “war-
time only” ratings. The average age of the
crewmen was between eighteen and nine-
teen, with perhaps one career regular
petty officer on board to provide experi-
ence. The result was a tightly knit, young,
and aggressive crew—ideally suited to the
unconventional fighting that character-
ized warfare in fast-attack craft. Survival
depended on the commander’s judgment
and the crew’s teamwork. It was a suc-
cessful formula that served the boats well
from Norway to the eastern
Mediterranean.
The Royal Navy’s Coastal Forces oper-
ated in a style not unlike that of light
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forces of the Napoleonic era. Some of the
actions described here are worthy of the
best adventure fiction. Many boats ran
agents, supplies, and weapons to the un-
derground forces resisting Nazi occupa-
tion. For example, the 30th MTB
Flotilla’s boats often hid in caves along
the Norwegian fjords or crept along dark
“leads,” dodging German patrols while
seeking contacts and recruits among the
occupied population. MTBs carried the
kidnapped German general Werner
Kreipe off Crete and transported him to
Egypt for interrogation. They also played
a deadly game of hide and seek with the
Axis navies and the Luftwaffe in the
Aegean Sea and among Yugoslavia’s
coastal islands. Wherever they served, the
dog boats were the force of choice for en-
gaging the enemy closely—and they paid
dearly for it, losing 273 officers and men
killed in action.
Some 228 dog boats were built between
November 1941 and April 1945. They
fought in over three hundred actions,
sinking and damaging innumerable Axis
vessels while losing some thirty-seven of
their own. On the basis of eight years of
research in official records and interview-
ing people involved, Reynolds has com-
piled as complete and accurate a record
of the dog boats’ actions as humanly pos-
sible. Dog Boats at War is a brilliant, if
occasionally dry, treatment of an impor-
tant and all but ignored part of the Royal
Navy’s history in World War II. It is
worth its price, and I hope it will be fol-
lowed by similar works on the Coastal
Forces’ other elements.
CARL OTIS SCHUSTER
Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Sailua, Hawaii
Anspacher, William B., et al. The Legacy of the White
Oak Laboratory. Dahlgren, Va.: Naval Surface War-
fare Center, 2000. 503pp. (Available by e-mail at
mrspat@gateway.net or by phone [301] 439-3140).
$42
The Navy has had a remarkable and pro-
ductive group of in-house research and
development laboratories. Sadly, with the
drawdowns of the post–Cold War era,
many have been closed, among them the
“White Oak Laboratory”—the Naval
Ordnance Laboratory at White Oak,
Maryland. WOL, as it was popularly
known, gave the Navy a tremendous leg-
acy of technology, weapons, and people.
Fortunately, that legacy has been pre-
served by William Anspacher, Betty Gay,
Donald Marlowe, Paul Morgan, and
Samuel Raff in this richly detailed ac-
count of the laboratory’s history.
First, the required disclaimer: this reviewer
spent twenty years of his midcareer with
WOL. And good years they were.
The laboratory was built in 1946 in what
was then remote suburban Maryland,
where ordnance testing would presum-
ably not disturb the neighbors. It was an
outgrowth of the Mine Building at the
Washington Navy Yard, and mine devel-
opment was the core of its original work.
From it came the Navy’s postwar mines:
the Mark 50 series, CAPTOR, the subma-
rine-launched mobile mine, and the De-
structor series.
In 1948, high-mach-number wind tun-
nels captured at Peenemunde, Germany,
were installed at WOL and became oper-
ational. With these, the laboratory began
a new line of technological development
for the Navy. From those first tunnels
grew a series of hypersonic wind tunnels
that gave engineers the ability to test re-
entry vehicles at speeds up to Mach 14.
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In addition to military work, the tunnels
were used by the space shuttle program
to study reentry forces. The laboratory
became the nation’s center of excellence
in hypersonic aerodynamics.
White Oak was never a “big systems”
center, and in that lay the roots of its ul-
timate demise. Rather, it was a technol-
ogy center, focusing on ordnance and
system components.
From 1946 on, the laboratory created ex-
tensive expertise for the Navy in explo-
sives, warhead design, fuzing, metallic
and nonmetallic materials, magnetic si-
lencing, nuclear weapons effects, and un-
derwater acoustics. The authors devote
substantial chapters to each of these—the
people, the anecdotes, the products, and
the fleet applications. Describing them all
is beyond the scope of this review; that
pleasure is saved for the reader. Fleet-
savvy readers will recognize many
WOL-developed components in the sys-
tems they use today.
Magnetic-silencing research necessitated
the construction of a unique building made
entirely of wood and nonmagnetic metals.
Up close it looked more like the work of
a cabinetmaker than a government-
contracted building. Magnetic-signature
and degaussing work at WOL led to the
development and fielding of the drive-
through deperming facilities for subma-
rines at Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor,
Washington.
The Naval Science Assistance Program,
under whose aegis laboratory scientists
were assigned to major fleet commands
to solve technical problems and intro-
duce new technical concepts, was created
and managed at WOL. Two generations
of Navy scientists went to sea, wrung salt
water out of their socks, gave the Navy
new tricks, and returned with solid un-
derstandings of their ultimate customer.
Technology developed at WOL spun off
new and unanticipated applications in
the civilian world. Nitnol, a metal alloy
with temperature-stimulated memory
properties, found use in orthodontics.
Research in the mathematics of nonlinear
systems led to techniques for controlling
heart arrhythmia, making a chaotic
heartbeat a regular one.
The legacy of the laboratory for the fleet
is in the technology and hardware now
deployed; the legacy in the hearts of the
alumni and alumnae (and there are many
of the latter) is in the people and the im-
ages. Fortunately, the authors have done
them all full service. The book is gener-
ously illustrated and filled with the peo-
ple, from the recipient of two Nobel
Prizes in physics to the fellow who liber-
ated a fire truck from another govern-
ment installation—White Oak didn’t
have one.
Beyond being a fine institutional history,
the book is a valuable study in public ad-
ministration as practiced for military re-
search and development. The authors
have unearthed and analyzed an impres-
sive amount of bureaucratic history in-
volving all the players in the Navy’s
research and development hierarchy.
In their analysis, the White Oak Laboratory
suffered from not having a platform-based
mission. As an ordnance and technology
laboratory, it was not the creature of any
of the Navy’s controlling baronies—air,
surface, or submarine. The laboratory
served them all but had the prime respon-
sibility for no platform-based major
weapon system. Thus it was always just
outside the door, looking through the
window but not sitting at the table.
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In 1974 the White Oak Laboratory was
merged with the Naval Weapons Labora-
tory at Dahlgren, Virginia, to become
half of the Naval Surface Warfare Center,
and it found itself in the surface warfare
community. A long, painful, but inexora-
ble decline in the laboratory’s fortunes
began. The authors’ detailed and insight-
ful treatment of this period, with all its
bureaucratic infighting and personalities,
is an important part of the book. At its
core, the lesson in public administration
is that pure technology and elegant com-
ponents alone are not a sufficient raison
d’être in the military research and
development world. Such an institution
must have a clearly defined customer
base and serve it with comprehensive in-
tegrated systems.
In 1996, the White Oak Laboratory was
closed, and its people and projects were
sent to other naval centers. At this writ-
ing the grounds and main buildings are
expected to become new laboratories for
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
This is not unfitting. A plaque in the
lobby will remind everyone of what was
once accomplished there for the Navy.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Washington, D.C.
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FROM THE EDITORS
In Memoriam
NEWPORT PAPER NUMBER 15
A new volume in our Newport Papers series is now available: International
Environmental Law and Naval War: The Effect of Marine Safety and Pollution
Conventions during International Armed Conflict, by Sonja Ann Jozef
Boelaert-Suominen. Dr. Boelaert-Suominen is currently an adviser on interna-
tional law to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia. For a copy, contact our associate editor, Mrs. Pat
Goodrich, at goodricp@nwc.navy.mil, (401) 841-6583, or by fax at (401) 841-1071.
The monograph is also available at full length (Adobe Acrobat required) on our
Website: www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/newpaper.htm.
MICHAEL I. HANDEL
The editors greatly regret to report the passing on 14 June 2001 of an esteemed
colleague, scholar, friend, and contributor to this journal—Dr. Michael I.
Handel, a member of the Naval War College’s Department of Strategy and
Policy and the holder of the Philip A. Crowl Chair of Comparative Strategy.
ANDREW E. GIBSON
The editors further regret to report the passing on 8 July 2001 of Andrew E.
Gibson, formerly the holder of the Emory S. Land Chair of Maritime Affairs at
the Naval War College, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, president of the
Delta Steamship Company, coauthor of The Abandoned Ocean, and in World
War II the youngest master (age twenty-two) of a Liberty ship, commanding
the Leonidas Merritt. He also was a frequent contributor to the Naval War
College Review.
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WINNERS OF THE HUGH G. NOTT PRIZE FOR 2000
The President of the Naval War College has announced the winners of prizes for
the finest articles (less those considered for our history prize) appearing in the
Naval War College Review in the 2000 publishing year:
First Prize ($500) Dr. John Garofano, “Deciding on Military Intervention:
What Is the Role of Senior Military Leaders?” (Spring)
Second Prize ($300) Yoram Dinstein, “The Right to Humanitarian Assistance”
(Autumn)
Third Prize ($200) Maj. Robert D. Critchlow, USAF, “Whom the Gods Would
Destroy: An Information Warfare Alternative for Deter-
rence and Compellence” (Summer), and
Michael N. Schmitt and Maj. Peter J. Richards, USAF,
“Into Uncharted Waters: The International Criminal Court”
(Winter).
WINNER OF THE EDWARD S. MILLER HISTORY PRIZE FOR 2000
Through the generosity of the distinguished historian Edward S. Miller, the
President of the Naval War College has awarded a prize to the author of the finest
article on a historical subject to appear in the Naval War College Review in 2000.
The winner ($500) is Dr. Donald Chisholm, of the Naval War College, for
“Negotiated Joint Command Relationships: Korean War Amphibious Opera-
tions, 1950” (Spring).
F R O M T H E E D I T O R S 1 9 3
These awards are made with the support of the Naval War College Foundation, a private, nonprofit organiza-
tion dedicated to improving the quality of the educational resources of the Naval War College in areas where
government funds are not available.
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS AVAILABLE
In order to encourage the study of American naval history, the Naval Historical
Center offers research support for established scholars and doctoral candidates.
For 2002–2003, the following opportunities are available (for information and
forms, consult the NHC Website at www.history.mil):
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes Predoctoral Fellowship: $10,000 to a predoctoral
candidate who is undertaking research and writing on a dissertation in the field
of U.S. naval history. Applicants must be U.S. citizens enrolled in an accredited
graduate school who will have completed all requirements for the Ph.D. except
the dissertation by 1 June 2002. Deadline for applications is 28 February 2002.
Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper Research Grants: Up to $2,500 each to individ-
uals undertaking research and writing in the field of U.S. naval history. Appli-
cants should have either Ph.D.s or equivalent credentials, and they must be U.S.
citizens. Deadline for applications is 28 February 2002.
CALL FOR PAPERS
The Society for Military History will hold its sixty-ninth annual conference at
the Monona Terrace, Madison, Wisconsin, 4–7 April 2002, on the theme “War
and Remembrance: Constructing the Military Past and Future.” The program
committee particularly invites proposals for papers and panels that assess the
military classics, memoirs and reminiscences, military reformers, and military
leadership. Proposals for papers and panels treating all aspects of military his-
tory are welcome, as always. Proposals should include a one-page abstract for
each paper, outlining topic, thesis, and sources, and should enclose a brief c.v.
The program committee intends to post the abstracts on the SMH Web site,
www.smh-hq.org. The committee welcomes volunteers to serve as chairs or
commentators. Please submit proposals for papers and full panels no later
than 1 November 2001, to: Prof. Jerry Cooper, Dept. of History, University of
Missouri–St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo., 63121; tel. (314) 516-5735, fax (314) 516-5781,
e-mail cooper@msc.umsl.edu.
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